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Abstract
This thesis provides an ex-post evaluation of the effects of regulatory and competition
policy enforcement interventions on non-price dimensions of competition. Chapter 1 ex-
amines the effects of a merger between two large Dutch supermarket chains on the variety
and composition of product assortment. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 investigate, both the-
oretically and empirically, the effects of access regulation in fixed telecoms markets on
incentives to invest in superior infrastructure technologies. Non-price effects, together
with price effects, are crucial to shed light on the extent of competition in a market and
assess the effectiveness of regulatory and competition authorities’ interventions. When
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Introduction
Regulatory and competition policy enforcement interventions aim at promoting the better-
functioning of markets, ensuring the entry of efficient firms, protecting and fostering firm’s
incentives to innovate. Competition policy is often described as the ”set of policies and
laws which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as
to reduce economic welfare”.1 Firms may indeed restrict competition in a way that is not
necessarily detrimental (for instance, there is a hot and ongoing debate on mergers and
their effects on innovation). Regulation, instead, generally applies to upstream markets
where fixed costs are so high that it would be not efficient for more than one firm to
operate. Regulatory authorities ensure efficient entry and a fair level of competition in
the markets downstream. While regulation may stimulate competition in the short-term,
it may reduce the incentives to invest in the long term.
Over the past decade competition authorities and academic researchers have become in-
creasingly interested in conducting ex-post economic evaluations of competition policy
enforcement. Most of the existing work has focused on the price effects of individual
merger and cartel decisions. Quite limited are instead the attempts to evaluate ex-post
the efficacy of regulatory frameworks.
This thesis provides an evaluation of the non-price effects of a merger decision and assesses,
both theoretically and empirically, the impact of the EU regulatory telecommunications
framework on investment.
Chapter 1 studies the effects of a national merger between two large Dutch supermarket
chains on prices and on the depth as well as composition of product assortment.2 The
empirical strategy exploits the geographic variation in the intensity of local competition
and market structure to causally identify the effect of the merger. This local variation is
particularly appropriate for analyzing non-price strategies such as assortment decisions,
since product assortment in grocery markets is typically chosen at the local level to re-
spond to local demand conditions and store characteristics. The estimate of the effect of
the merger is based on a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method and relies on the com-
1Competition policy: theory and practice. M. Motta. Cambrige University Press.




parison between areas where both merging parties were active before the merger and areas
where only one of them was active. The intuition behind this identification strategy is
that the anti-competitive effects of the merger (if any) are likely to be stronger in the
former areas than in the latter ones, as only in overlap areas the intensity of competition
has changed. Results show that the local change in competitive conditions due to the
merger did not affect individual products’ prices but it led the merging parties to repo-
sition their assortment. While the low-variety and low-price target’s stores reduced the
depth of their assortment when in direct competition with the acquirer’s stores, the latter
increased their product variety. By analyzing the effect of the merger on category prices,
the analysis also finds that the target most likely dropped high-priced products, while the
acquirer added more of them. Thus, the merging firms reposition their product offerings
in order to avoid cannibalization and lessen local competition.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide a theoretical and empirical model aimed at investigat-
ing the impact of access regulation on investment in telecoms infrastructure. Telecoms
markets are characterized by high barriers of entry and high sunk cost. Following the
liberalization of telecoms markets, European regulatory agencies have intervened to en-
sure a fair level of competition. The EU regulatory framework indeed imposes operators
with significant market power to provide access to their legacy copper infrastructure at
fair, transparent and non discriminatory prices. Both chapters are based on the outcomes
observed in the Slovak fixed telecom market, where the incumbent has infringed its reg-
ulatory obligations by refusing to properly provide access to the legacy copper network
and setting excessively high wholesale access price. Having no access to the incumbent’s
copper network, alternative operators started investing in a superior technology, the fiber.
The Slovak incumbent has subsequently been fined by the European Commission for hav-
ing abused its dominant position and infringed Art. 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning
of the European Union.
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical model aimed at explaining the mechanisms that makes
the Slovak outcome possible. I have developed a two-stage model which unfolds as follows:
in the first stage the incumbent decides the access price; in the second stage, both the
entrant and the incumbent decide whether investing in a fiber network. If the entrant does
not invest in fiber, it will purchase access to the incumbent’s network. When making its
decisions, the incumbent does not know the entrant’s costs to deploy the fiber infrastruc-
ture. Results show that, for intermediate values of investments costs, the incumbent will
set an access price higher than the fair price would have been set by the regulator, and the
entrant invests alone in the fiber network. The paper also shows that, when the entrant’s
investment generates some positive spillovers or reduces the incumbent’s uncertainity on
its own investment’s costs, the incumbent reacts to the entrant’s investment by investing
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itself.
Chapter 3 empirically assesses the effects of the abuse of dominance in the Slovak fixed
telecoms market on the investment in fiber made by alternative operators. By exploiting
the anticompetitive conduct engaged by the Slovak incumbent, this chapter empirically
evaluates the impact of access regulation on investment in fiber. To reach an identification
of the effects of the abuse, I adopt a DiD approach and compare the variation in fiber
investment made by alternative operators (AOs) in Slovakia, before and after the abuse,
to the variation in fiber investment made by AOs in the Central Eastern European (CEE)
countries. CEE countries shows indeed favourable conditions to early investment in fiber,
as much as in Slovakia. The empirical analysis aim indeed at isolating the effect of the
abuse from any other confounding factors (e.g. less developed copper network and more
urgent need of superior networks) which may explain the investment effort made by alter-
native operators in Slovakia. Results show that, by banning access to its copper network,
the Slovak incumbent has triggered alternative operators to invest in fiber connections.
Further, the analysis shows that, due to the abuse, Slovakia has attained a higher level of
fiber investment. This effect is likely to be driven by the investment made by alternative
operators: there is no evidence, indeed, that the incumbent has invested in fiber more
than would have done in the counterfactual.
Non-price dimensions are crucial for shedding light on the extent of competition in the
market and evaluate the effects of a competition policy decision. The analysis of the
merger between two large Dutch supermarket chains (Chapter 1) showed that when shaken
by a change in market structure, local managers may not change prices but adapt their
product assortment. It is empirically documented that retail chains often choose nearly-
uniform pricing despite the profit loss that this strategy might entail ( [DellaVigna and
Gentzkow, 2017]). Since changing prices might be too costly, local managers may indeed
react by increasing differentiation, so that local supermarkets can avoid cannibalization,
soften competition and consequently increase their profits even without changing prod-
ucts’ prices.
Dynamic effects on investment, rather than short-term effects on prices, should be care-
fully taken into account when evaluating the efficacy of regulation. The analysis of the
investment strategies pursued by alternative operators in the Slovak market (Chapter 2
and 3) shows that, by infringing its regulatory obligations and banning access to its cop-
per network, the incumbent has triggered alternative operators’ incentive to invest in a
superior technology (the fiber).
Yet, conclusions on consumers welfare are far from obvious. The welfare effects of strate-
gic assortment repositioning in grocery retail markets are difficult to measure: while an
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increase in price has an obvious negative impact for all consumers, a modification of other
characteristics that consumers value differently might benefit some of them and harm
others. The investment effort made by alternative operators in the Slovak fixed telecom
market has been limited to urban areas where costs were expected to be lower. The lack of
access regulation may strengthen the position of the incumbent in rural and intermediate
areas, and ultimately harm consumers in those areas.
Chapter 1
Price or Variety? An Evaluation of
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Analyzing how supermarket chains adjust prices and non-price variables in response to
local market conditions is important for the understanding of how competition works in
retail markets. Most existing papers study this issue by analyzing price variations across
different local areas with a cross-sectional approach (e.g. [DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019,
Hitsch et al., 2019]). We instead consider variations along different strategic dimensions
in response to a major change in the local market structure. Specifically, we assess the
relative importance of price and non-price strategies in response to an exogenous shock,
namely a national merger that differently affects various local markets. Unlike most of the
previous literature, we not only focus on prices but also consider the effect on non-price
variables, such as variety of assortment. Indeed, it is documented that assortment choices
and product positioning play a key role for competition in grocery retail [Draganska et al.,
2009], where non-price attributes are important determinants of customer choice and
satisfaction [Matsa, 2011] and that retailers tailor assortments in response to differences
in local demand [Quan and Williams, 2018].
We study the merger between two large Dutch supermarket chains – Jumbo and
C1000 – that was conditionally approved by the Dutch competition authority – Autoriteit
Consument & Markt (ACM) – in 2012. We use a particularly rich database that entails
quarterly information on average prices as well as variety for all the 125 product categories
sold in a sample of 171 stores of the merging parties and their main competitors located in
different areas scattered across the Netherlands for the 2010-2013 period. These categories
cover the entire space of grocery products offered in the country during the sample period.
As commonly done in the literature on retail markets, we define variety as the depth of
assortment, i.e. the number of stock keeping units (SKUs) sold in each product category
[Ren et al., 2011]. We enrich this category-level dataset with more fine-grained monthly
information on a sample of 33 specific products that were sold throughout the whole
sample period and chosen to represent a typical basket for Dutch households.
The Jumbo/C1000 merger is well suited to study firms’ reaction to changes in local
market conditions, as it is likely to unequally affect different local areas. Our empirical
strategy exploits the geographic variation in the intensity of local competition and market
structure to causally identify the effect of the merger. We estimate the effect of the merger
by means of a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) strategy that relies on the comparison
between areas where both merging parties were active before the merger (overlap areas)
and areas where only one of them was active (non-overlap areas). The intuition behind
our identification strategy is that the competitive effects of the merger, if any, are likely
to be stronger in the former areas than in the latter ones, as, other things equal, only
in overlap areas did the intensity of competition change. By matching overlap and non-
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overlap areas with a procedure that is based on observable characteristics, we account for
differences in demand and supply conditions across treated and non-treated areas. This
identification strategy based on local variation is particularly appropriate for analyzing
non-price dimensions of competitions such as assortment decisions, which are often made
at the local level [Quan and Williams, 2018].1 The advantage of focusing on a relatively
small and homogeneous market such as the Dutch retail market is that we have very
granular data on the location of stores and on the characteristics of local areas. This
allows us to cleanly identify the effect of the merger, and therefore of a change in the
competitive conditions, on pricing and assortment decisions.
We find that the merger did not have any significant effects on prices of individual
products. However, the merger led to a reduction in product variety and to an increase in
average category prices, which would suggest a move toward a smaller and more expensive
assortment. Yet, these average effects are the result of two opposing forces. On the
one hand, the acquirer (Jumbo), the high-variety chain, raised its assortment as well as
its average category prices, with respect to what happens in couterfactual stores. This
suggests that Jumbo added high-priced products to its assortment line. On the other hand,
C1000 (the target) decreased both its assortment and its average category prices, which
implies a move toward a smaller and cheaper assortment. Thus, looking behind average
effects allows understanding the logic of the local managers’ decisions. The repositioning
of the assortment’s depth and composition of the two merging chains in a way that reduces
the similarity between them responds to an incentive to internalize the effects on the other
chain and soften competition between the merging parties.
Overall, these findings show that the local managers’ reaction to a change in local
conditions, such as a merger between two retail chains, may lead to an adjustment in
terms on assortment rather than on prices. Managers may find it more costly to change
prices instead of assortment, given that they have more discretionality on the latter policy.
We build a simple theoretical model where variety can be both a vertical and horizon-
tal attribute of a store and show that, after a merger between two close competitors like
the one that we consider, the new entity optimally reduces assortment in the low-variety
store because this entails an increase in the other store’s demand. This is consistent with
previous theoretical and empirical findings. For instance, [Gandhi et al., 2008] show in a
theoretical setting that merging parties move away from each other in the product space
to avoid cannibalization. [Rhodes and Zhou, 2019] find that an asymmetric market struc-
ture might arise where some retailers decide to remain small (in terms of product range)
to soften competition. As in our case, the flexibility in product offerings is therefore a tool
1Since the evidence on local variation on prices is not conclusive, we also use an alternative iden-
tification strategy based on the comparison between the merging parties and competitors (see section
5.2.1).
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that managers have to target different types of consumers thereby avoiding fierce compe-
tition. Similarly, in an empirical study [Sweeting, 2010] finds that firms buying competing
radio stations tend to differentiate them, thereby avoiding audience cannibalization.
We assess the effects of the merger on prices and variety not only for the merging
parties but also for their main competitors. Methodologically, this is important as the
study of rivals’ reactions to a merger might help to identify its competitive effect (see
for instance [Ashenfelter et al., 2013b] and [Aguzzoni et al., 2016b]). Moreover, from a
policy perspective, the joint assessment of the merger’s price and variety effects for both
the merging parties and competitors allows us to draw richer conclusions on the merger’s
implications in terms of consumer surplus, as we can better approximate its effect at the
market level. We find that the response of individual prices to the merger is not different
between the merging parties and their competitors. This indicates that the merger did
not have a national effect on prices that could derive from either increased market power
or from efficiency gains. Furthermore, we observe a limited response by competitors in
terms of assortment (slight increase) and no response in terms of average category prices.
This implies that rivals’ reaction is unlikely to compensate for the changes in the merging
parties’ strategies at the local level.
Our study is not only important to shed new light on retailers’ price and non-price
reactions to local market conditions, but it also helps us to better evaluate the effects of
mergers in such a crucial sector that accounts for about 20% of global GDP [Bronnenberg
and Ellickson, 2015]. While the growing literature on retrospective merger evaluation
substantially helped to improve the understanding of the effect of realized mergers, most
of these studies focus solely on price effects [Hosken and Tenn, 2016]. Thus, our paper
also contributes to this discussion by complementing more traditional approaches and
providing new evidence of the effect of mergers not only on prices but also on non-
price attributes such as variety and assortment decisions. This seems to be particularly
timely and important since, surprisingly, the competitive effect of mergers on variety in
grocery retailing is still largely unexplored, despite remaining one of controversial and
unresolved issues in merger control [OECD, 2013, p. 9].2 In particular, mergers’ effects
on variety are ambiguous, as they may ”lead firms to spread similar products apart, to
withdraw duplicative products, or to crowd products together to preempt entry” [Berry
and Waldfogel, 2001, p. 1009].
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we summarize the relevant
2The 2010 revision of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines emphasize the importance of non-price
dimensions of competition stating that ”enhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price
terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product quality, reduced product
variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation. Such non-price effects may coexist with price effects,
or can arise in their absence” (Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission, 2010, p. 2).
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literature. In Section 1.3, we provide some background information on the Dutch grocery
market and on the merger under consideration. Section 1.4 describes the data. We present
our econometric model in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 presents the empirical results and a
simple theoretical model of competition in variety. Section 1.7 presents robustness check
and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it speaks to the literature dis-
cussing pricing strategies in retailing. In general, retail chains may have national or local
pricing strategies. [Ater and Rigbi, 2017] and [Eizenberg et al., 2018] show significant local
price dispersion in grocery prices in Israel, and [Rickert et al., 2018] document local pricing
in Germany. Other papers document instead a uniform pricing strategy, i.e. the fact that
in many retailing markets, firms held prices fixed across multiple goods sold in a single
market [Orbach and Einav, 2007, Cho and Rust, 2010, Shiller and Waldfogel, 2011] but
also across separate markets [DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019,Hitsch et al., 2019]. [Dobson
and Waterson, 2005] analyze in a theoretical setting the relative profitability of uniform
and local pricing if compared to a national pricing strategy. Compared to this literature
we add evidence that firms do use alternative strategies other then prices when facing
local shocks.3
Second, our paper contributes to the literature studying the link between market con-
centration and product variety. In particular, both [Gandhi et al., 2008] and [Mazzeo et al.,
2014] theoretically study the issue of product repositioning after mergers and highlight the
importance of considering effects on variety together with price effects. [Lommerud and
Sørgard, 1997] show that merged firms might have a strategic incentive to narrow product
ranges and that this is generally welfare detrimental. More recently, [Rhodes and Zhou,
2019] show that the impact of mergers on the structure of retail markets may depend on
consumer search frictions, and in particular that firms with narrow product ranges can
coexist with firms with larger offerings when search costs are low. The empirical evidence
on this issue is also mixed. [Bauner and Wang, 2019] explore the effect of competition,
and in particular of wholesale warehouse entry, on pricing and product positioning. They
3In contrast to our study, [DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019] show that, in the US, there is limited
within-chain variation not only in prices but also in product assortment as well. Similarly to what we do
in one of our analyses, they define an assortment index based on the average national-level prices of the
products sold by a local store. They find that this index varies more across than within chains. While
cloking at such indexes is useful to understand the depth of assortment, it does not allow studying the
breadth of assortment across categories as we do. Moreover, the analysis of [DellaVigna and Gentzkow,
2019] does not exploit any source of exogenous variation at the local level to identify the extent of the
local store reactions in the different strategic competitive dimensions.
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find that the incumbents adopt a strategy of differentiation from the entrant firm. Most
existing studies focus on very different industries from grocery retail and do not focus
on the effect of a specific merger but rather consider several mergers or changes in con-
centration due to other factors such as entry or exit. A number of papers analyze the
effects of the merger wave that took place in the US radio industry at the end of the
1990s. [Berry and Waldfogel, 2001] find that these mergers increase variety and [Jeziorski,
2014] quantifies the effect of this increased variety on both sides of the market (listeners
and advertisers). [Sweeting, 2010] finds that these mergers do not affect aggregate variety,
because changes affecting the merging parties and competitors offset. The evidence on
other markets is mixed. [George, 2007] finds that content variety increases with ownership
concentration in the US daily newspaper market on prices and product characteristics.
Based on the estimation of a structural demand model, [Fan, 2013] simulates the effect of
a hypothetical merger between two local newspapers in the United States. She finds that,
following the merger, newspaper publishers have an incentive to reposition their product
and decrease their variety. This leads to welfare losses for readers. She also shows that
the effects of mergers would be underestimated if one ignored the adjustments of prod-
uct characteristics. Similarly, [Chu, 2010] builds a structural model to analyze the cable
TVs’ response to satellite entry in terms of prices and quality (measures as number of
channels), showing through a counterfactual scenario that eliminating quality competition
implies softer price competition and reduced consumer welfare. [Götz and Gugler, 2006]
find evidence of a reduction of variety after mergers in retail gasoline markets. [Watson,
2009] finds mixed evidence on the effect of geographic differentiation on competition and
variety in retail eyeglasses. Finally in an extension of their main price analysis, [Ashenfel-
ter et al., 2013b] analyze the effects of a merger between home appliance manufacturers
on the length of their product line. They find a substantial reduction in variety by the
merging parties.
Third, our paper is related to the growing literature on ex-post merger evaluation and,
in particular, to the relatively small number of papers analyzing the effect of mergers
in retailing sectors.4 [Hosken et al., 2018] highlight the importance of looking at local
competition in retail markets, as they find that price effects of mergers in the U.S. grocery
retailing industry significantly depend on the degree of local concentration. [Barros et al.,
2006] estimate the effect of additional concentration on prices in the Portuguese food
retailing market, and find that prices generally increased. Similarly, [Allain et al., 2017]
find that grocery mergers in France significantly raised prices, especially in local markets
experiencing larger increases in concentration. [Rickert et al., 2018] find a similar result
on the effect of a merger between German supermarkets. On the contrary, [Chakraborty
4See [Hosken and Tenn, 2016] for a survey of retail mergers.
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et al., 2014] show that the 2004 Safeway/Morrison merger in the U.K. lowered prices and
led to a change in the form of price competition. [Hanner et al., 2015] assess the effect of
retail mergers on entry in the U.S. and show that the relative position of brands changes
over time but these changes are rarely determined by entry or exit of new, large, firms.
In a field experiment on the retail sector in the Dominican Republic, [Busso and Galiani,
2019] show that increased competition leads to a decrease in prices and to an increase in
perceived service quality.
Despite the potentially relevant welfare implications of non-price effects of retail merg-
ers, we are only aware of one paper analyzing mergers’ variety effects within this literature
on mergers retrospectives. [Pires and Trindade, 2018] study a series of 14 different super-
market merger events, which affected 61 US cities. They show that these mergers did
not have any effect on prices but increased variety on average by 3%. Their analysis
differs from ours in several dimension. As for the econometric approach, they do not
account from selection on observables when constructing the control group. Secondly,
their estimates mix the effect of several mergers that are potentially different one from
the other. Therefore the average treatment effect that they measure must be taken cau-
tiously. Moreover, their data only include five categories of beverage products, while we
have information on the whole range of product categories (125) that are sold in Dutch
supermarkets. Differently from [Pires and Trindade, 2018], we also have information on
average category prices, which allows us to draw implications on the composition of as-
sortment. More fundamentally, we can cleanly identify the different reactions of the two
merging parties in terms of product repositioning. Understanding that this is the driver
of the average effect of the merger on variety is the main novel contribution we offer in
this paper.
Finally, we also relate to the literature that analyzes variety and, more generally,
non-price attributes in retail markets. [Bronnenberg, 2015] builds a general equilibrium
model that explains the optimal provision of variety in the market. [Brynjolfsson et al.,
2003] estimate the effect of increased variety offered by online bookstores on consumer
welfare and show that increased variety generates gains to comsumer that are 7 to 10
times larger than the gains coming from price effect. [Quan and Williams, 2018] quantify
the value of increased variety due to online retail taking into account the role of local
tastes and retailer responses, and show that the positive welfare effect of increased variety
are much lower than previously estimated. [Hwang et al., 2010] explain the drivers of
local variation in assortment choices by US supermarket chains. [Ren et al., 2011] analyze
instead the role of product variety as a tool of differentiation in consumer electronic
retailing. Finally, [Richards and Hamilton, 2006] studies price and variety competition
among grocery retailers in the U.S. These contributions highlight the importance of variety
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as a strategic variable in retail markets, although they do not focus on the impact of
mergers as we do.
1.3 The Dutch Grocery Sector and the Merger
Between 2009 and 2012, several mergers took place in the Dutch grocery sector. The
Dutch competition authority (ACM) cleared all of them, mostly subject to remedies. In
this paper we focus on the last of these mergers, Jumbo’s acquisition of C1000.5 In the
following subsections, we first describe the functioning of the market as well as the issues
related with this merger.
1.3.1 The Dutch Grocery Market
The main market players at the time of the mergers included the merging parties – Jumbo
and C1000 – and several other supermarket chains. Jumbo is a full-service supermarket
formula operating across the country. It had a regionally strong position in the southern
regions of the Netherlands, which had already expanded thanks to the previous acquisition
of Super de Boer (SdB) and Schuitema. The most important characteristic of the Jumbo
core marketing proposition is the ”every day low price” guarantee. Jumbo stores used to
run few promotions. C1000 was also a full-service supermarket formula, which operated
across the country. Its core strategy was on deep, short-lived, promotions. Its assortment
was reportedly smaller than the other major national players.
Among competitors with a national footprint, Albert Heijn (AH) is the largest full-
service supermarket chain and is perceived as the market leader. It operates across the
country adopting various store formats. Its commercial offering is similar to Jumbo’s
offering, especially in terms of product variety. Moreover, it is the only other major
chain of supermarkets operating across the whole of Dutch territory. Two large hard
discounters have an important presence in the Dutch market: Aldi and Lidl. During
the first half of the 2010s, hard discounters progressively increased their assortment and
started selling a (limited) list of branded goods. However, significant differences with
traditional supermarket formulas still exist. Finally, the market is characterized by a
series of other, smaller, regional players, including Coop, Detail Group, Spar (part of
an international group with a stronger position in other countries), Hoogvliet, and Jan
Linders.
5We only focus on the last merger because it was the most relevant one concluding the acquisition
process that started in 2009 and because the data on product assortment are only available for a limited
period. In order to isolate the effect of the Jumbo/C1000 merger from previous mergers, we selected
areas in which no other merger had occurred.
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[insert Figure 1.1 here]
Figure 1.1 represents the time evolution of the market shares of all supermarket chains
and discounters (at the national level) both in terms of net sales floor area (left panel)
and in terms of the number of stores (right panel). AH is clearly the largest chain. The
combination of SdB, C1000, and Jumbo has a net sales area similar to AH. A considerable
number of stores belong to chains other than the ones listed. Overall, the total number of
supermarkets has essentially remained constant from the beginning of 2009 through the
end of 2011.
1.3.2 The Merger between Jumbo and C1000
In our analysis, we study Jumbo’s acquisition of over 400 locations (the entire C1000
supermarket chain) that took place in February 2012. C1000 stores initially continued to
operate under the C1000 insignia and were expected to be re-branded under Jumbo brand
during the years following the merger. At the end of our sample period, the re-branding
from C1000 to Jumbo was not yet fully completed. The Jumbo/C1000 merger approval
was conditional on the divestiture of eighteen stores. Jumbo complied in July 2012 to
this set of remedies by selling the eighteen locations – along with additional stores – to
Coop and Ahold (owner of the Albert Heijn chain).
The geographic market definition adopted by the ACM was based on a 15-minute
isochrone around the analyzed stores. However, the ACM noted that Dutch consumers
are not inclined to shop outside their town. Hence, in practice, the geographic market
definition is a mixture between a 15-minutes isochrone and the administrative borders of
each municipality.6 In our analyses, we adopt the definition put forward by the ACM and
control for a number of explanatory variables measured at the municipal level to account
for local demand and supply drivers as well as levels of competition.7
With respect to the product dimension, the relevant markets defined by the ACM
include both supermarket chains and hard discounters. In our study, we embrace the
product market definition adopted by the ACM. However, we restrict our analysis to a
particular format (i.e., regular supermarket), in order to maximize the similarity between
the different stores analyzed and make our final sample more homogeneous. Moreover,
given the increasing role covered by hard discounters (e.g., Lidl and Aldi) in the Dutch
market in recent years, we explicitly control for their presence and strength in each relevant
geographic market.
6The large majority of our areas (63%) have a radius that is smaller than 15 minutes by car. The
mean size of such areas is 60 square kilometres. The other 37% of the areas are small towns, which are
only slightly larger, with a mean area of 73 square kilometers.
7We drop all large cities from our sample since the geographic market definition is more complex in
this case as there are clearly several geographical markets within a city.
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1.4 Data and Sample
For our empirical analysis, we collected store-level data for an appropriately selected
sample of stores from Information Resources Incorporated (IRI), a firm specialized in
collecting and analyzing data on retailing.8 The period under analysis is January 2009 to
December 2013 and the date of the merger is defined by the date of the ACM decision in
February 2012.
The composition of the estimation sample is affected by budget limitation and the
willingness of the data provider to share only specific information. The supermarkets
included in our sample are selected from areas where the merging parties overlap and from
comparable areas where they do not overlap.9 To define comparable areas, we pairwise
match cities where the merging parties overlap with non-overlap cities by applying a
propensity score matching approach, a technique that allows collapsing a set of different
characteristics into a single dimension.
We have very precise location data for our sample of stores 10 Thanks to this fine-
grained information on local markets, we assess the level of similarity taking into account
a full range of observable factors that could vary across overlap and non-overlap areas, such
as demand and supply characteristics (for a similar approach see [Aguzzoni et al., 2016b]).
Specifically, we use the average density population, average store size, HHI, number of
stores, average income, stores’ rental cost, and the presence of hard discounters. Our
selection ensures a widespread geographic coverage of the Dutch territory and a balanced
representation of all merging parties and of the selected subset of competitors.11
Within areas of overlap and areas of non-overlap, we select a suitable number of stores
both from the merging parties and from competing chains. Our final selection includes
171 different stores representing the merging parties’ chains and two competitors (Albert
Heijn and Coop).12
For this list of stores, we obtained data both at the product level and at the category
level. In particular, we have information on turnover, volumes, and number of products
(SKUs) for each of the 125 product categories collected in the IRI database. Moreover,
8See http://www.iriworldwide.nl/.
9Two further mergers affected the Dutch market in the previous four years (2009-2012). In order to
isolate the effect of the merger under analysis, we restrict the choice of the areas and, consequently, of
the stores in such a way that the average behavior of the treated and control group could not be biased
by the occurrence of the other events. For a further discussion of this issue we refer to [Argentesi et al.,
2015].
10These data come from the ’Supermarkt gids’ database, which lists geographic data (including ad-
dresses, postal code, city, province) together with additional information (e.g., availability of parking or
automatic counters) for all supermarkets in the Netherlands.
11Further details on the propensity score matching procedure used in the analysis are reported in
Appendix 1.10.
12A description of the criteria for choosing the stores in our sample is in Appendix 1.10.
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we have information on turnover and volumes on a selection of specific products within
several categories. Hence, we have two separate databases to study the merger’s effect on
price and variety, which we discuss in the next subsections.
1.4.1 Product-level Data
In order to quantify the effect of the merger on SKU prices, we collected information on
a balanced sample of products that were sold throughout the entire sample period. This
allows us to use SKU-specific fixed effects that significantly enhance the quality of our
specification. Due to several constraints, we could not collect product-level price data on
all products sold in each store. Hence, we based our selection of categories and products on
best practices from the academic literature and ideas originating from the 2014 inquiry in
the food retail sector carried out by the German Cartel Office ( [Bundeskartellamt, 2015]).
The final list of categories includes coffee, cola, cleaners, diapers, fresh milk, traditional
Dutch sausage (frikandel), mayonnaise, olive oil, sanitary napkins, shampoo, and toilet
paper.
Our selection of these categories is based on the following criteria: i) the inclusion
of both ’food’ and ’non-food’ items; ii) the inclusion of traditional items for which com-
parisons across geographic markets are easier; iii) the inclusion of items belonging to the
basket of goods typically consumed in the Netherlands; and iv) the inclusion of items
whose characteristics set them apart from other items, either because we expect lower
price sensitivity or due to higher level of differentiation and innovation (e.g., diapers).
To measure price changes, it is important that the selected products are comparable
both over time and across stores. Dutch supermarket assortments usually include at
least one A-brand item, such as ’Coca-Cola’, one private label, and one first-price (i.e.,
cheapest) item for each product. We exclude first-price items from our sample, as the
data provider indicates that these may differ significantly in quality. Similar problems
hold for fresh articles, which we also exclude. For each product defined at SKU level, we
have three time series: two SKUs for ’A-brands’ and one SKU for private labels. We try
to ensure comparability across stores using the same quality and format (e.g., ’fresh whole
milk, 1 liter bottle’) as well as comparability over time (e.g., not mixing different SKU
over time unless necessary to ensure a sufficient coverage of the period under scrutiny).13
Out weekly SKU prices are defined as total turnover over volumes, and are net of
promotional measures. Panel A of Table 1.1 reports descriptive statistics on prices for
our sample of products distinguishing between overlap and non-overlap areas as well
as between the pre-merger and post-merger periods. Because we have very different
products in our sample, the price variation is large, ranging from few cents to 20 EUR:
13The list of selected SKUs for the price analysis is reported in Appendix 1.10.
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some products are quite cheap, while other very expensive. While we do not observe
large differences between overlap and non-overlap areas both pre- and post-merger, prices
appear to have increased on average after the merger (11% and 9% in overlap and non-
overlap areas respectively).
1.4.2 Category-level Data
To analyze the effect of the merger on product variety and category prices, we collected
quarterly data on the number of SKUs for each of the 125 product categories sold in
each of the 171 stores in our sample. This variable represents the depth of assortment
and measures the product offerings available to consumers in each store. In addition, we
compute an average price per category using quarterly data on turnover and sales volumes
for each product category. Our database includes total turnover (in EUR), volume (sales),
promotional turnover (in EUR), and promotional share (as a percentage of total sales)
measured at store level for the 2009-2013 period. Measurements are weekly but are
provided with a four-week periodicity starting with week 4 of 2009. Hence, also our
monthly price data is determined as total turnover over volumes, and is net of promotional
measures.
Panel B and C of Table 1.1 reports descriptive statistics on the average category
prices and variety, separately for the overlap and non-overlap areas as well as pre-merger
and post-merger periods. While for the average category prices we do not observe large
differences between overlap and non-overlap areas nor before and after the merger, variety
seems to differ in both respects. With over 90 SKUs per category, assortment size appears
to be very large as it is the variation across categories, stores, and time. Some categories
are not offered at all in some stores in a given quarter, while other categories have up to
1,689 different SKUs (for instance sauces). Assortment is ca. 5% lower in overlap areas
before the merger but is slightly higher in non-overlap areas after the merger. In both
areas variety increases on average after the merger.
[insert Table 1.1 here]
1.4.3 Control Variables
To identify the appropriate control areas as well as to disentangle the effect of the merger
on prices and variety from the effect of market conditions, we collected data on demand
and supply shifters in order to control for them in our analysis. We used two main
sources: the Central Bureau of Statistics – Statistics Netherlands (http://www.cbs.nl/en-
GB/menu/home/default.htm) and the Department of Spatial Economics & Spatial Infor-
mation laboratory of VU University Amsterdam. Local demand and market conditions
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are summarized in Table 1.2, which also reports preliminary statistics for each variable.
As shown, data have different time references.
[insert Table 1.2 here]
1.5 Empirical Model
The aim of the study is to analyze the impact of the merger on prices and variety. We
implement a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach, in which we exploit both time and
cross-sectional variation of prices and product variety in order to identify the effect of the
merger. The DiD approach entails a comparison of two properly identified groups: the
treated group – which is affected by the ’treatment’, i.e., the merger – and the control
group – which is not affected by the ’treatment’– before and after the merger decision.
The strength of this method is that it isolates the effect of the merger from any other
factors that (i) may affect the trend in price (variety); and (ii) may be related to the
differences between the treated and the control group.
The matching procedure that we adopted to define the control group controls for se-
lection into the treatment due to observable characteristics, while the double differencing
entailed in the DiD approach removes the time-invariant group-specific unobserved het-
erogeneity as well as the common time effects that might be otherwise confounded with
the effect of the merger.
As more thoroughly discussed in Section 1.5.2, the basic hypothesis of our empirical
strategy is that competition in grocery markets works at the local level. This is in line
with the geographic market definition commonly adopted by competition authorities and
by the ACM in this specific case. The competitive effects of a merger are expected to be
potentially stronger in areas characterized by an overlap between the merging parties –
i.e., areas where stores of both chains were present at the time of the merger – than in
areas where the parties did not compete with each other door to door. The former areas,
in fact, would be the ones experiencing stronger changes in competitive conditions as a
decrease in the number of competitors occurs. Therefore, we can identify the potential
effect of mergers by comparing prices and variety of the merging parties in areas of overlap
(treated group) vis-à-vis areas of no overlap (control group).14
14This identification strategy is very similar to the one used in, for instance, [Aguzzoni et al., 2016b]
to evaluate the price effect of a merger between U.K. book retailers, [Hosken et al., 2018] to study the
effect of U.S. grocery mergers on prices, as well as [Allain et al., 2017] to study the price effect of mergers
across French supermarkets.
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1.5.1 Econometric Specification
We run our analysis for the full sample, including the merging firms and competitors,
as well as separately for each of the two merging parties and their competitors. The
estimation on the full sample aims at measuring the overall effect of the merger at the
market level, which is possibly the most relevant for consumers. The estimations on the
sub-samples aim to identify the strategic reactions of the different players in the market,
which helps us study the mechanism driving the average effects and better explain the
post-merger competitive dynamics.
We compare the change in an outcome variable in a selection of stores that were
located in overlap areas with the change in the same outcome variable in other stores
picked from the best-matched non-overlap areas before and after the merger.We estimate
the following equation:15
Outisjt = α + βoverlaps + γpostt + δpostt × overlaps + λZsjt + µij + τt + εisjt, (1.1)
whereOutisjt is the price (variety, category price) level for product (products’ category)
i at store s of insignia j during month (quarter) t; overlaps is a dummy variable that
takes on the value of one if the store is located in an overlap area; postt is a dummy
variable that takes on the value of one if the products’ price (variety, category price) is
observed in the post-merger period (i.e. after February 2012 for the price regression and
after the first quarter of 2012 for the variety and category price regressions); Zst is a set
of variables that control for local market features (on the demand and supply side) that
change over time.
We control for the average difference in the price (variety, category price) across dif-
ferent products (product categories) and supermarket chains by including fixed effects
µij for all combinations of products (product categories) and supermarket insignias. By
following this approach, we are able to control for the effect on price and variety deter-
mined by the change in insignia. Moreover a time trend together with a set of quarterly
dummies τt is used to capture aggregate shocks affecting all stores.
16 The error term εisjt
is assumed to be heteroskedastic and correlated at the product-insignia level in the price
analysis and products’ category-insignia level in the analyses based on category data (i.e.
the average category prices and variety).17
The main variable of interest is postt×overlaps, whose coefficient measures the average
treatment effect on the treated of the merger by identifying the additional variation in
15Estimating this equation in logarithms leads to qualitative and quantitative similar results.
16We also tried a specification with time fixed effects and obtained similar results.
17We experimented with different correlation structures but our results were not significantly affected.
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price, variety, and category prices experienced by the treated stores compared to the
control stores moving from the pre-merger to the post-merger period.
1.5.2 Identification
The first key ingredient of our identification strategy is to assess whether competition in
grocery retail works at the local level, as we compare the different evolution of treated
and not-treated local markets. Thus, in Section 1.5.2, we discuss the descriptive empirical
evidence supporting this claim in detail.
Second, to causally identify the effect of the merger on the outcomes of interest, we
need to ensure that the difference in the average behavior in the control group adequately
represents the change with respect to the average behavior that would have occurred
absent the merger (i.e. the counterfactual scenario). Thus, we need to make sure that the
control group is comparable to the treatment group in terms of observables characteristics
before treatment. Our matching approach for the selection of the relevant areas and stores
should help ensure this condition is met.18 In Appendix 1.10 we show that observables
are balanced between overlap and non-overlap areas. In Section 1.5.2 we show that the
evolution of the dependent variables in treated and control areas was similar before the
merger and we formally test the common trend assumption.
Local or National Competition?
The choice of the most appropriate counterfactual to evaluate the effects of a merger
strictly depends on the geographic extent of competition. A comparison between the price
– or other variables of interest – in areas where the merging parties overlap (i.e. areas
affected by the merger) vis-à-vis areas of no overlap (i.e. not affected by the merger)
identifies the effect of the merger only if competition is, at least to some extent, local.
Since this issue was not fully explored during the review of the Jumbo/C1000 merger,
we carry out a more in depth assessment, examining both qualitative evidence – such
as questionnaires to market participants and evidence collected during phone interviews
– and quantitative evidence on the variation of retail offers across stores (see [Argentesi
et al., 2015]).
With respect to pricing strategies, both the questionnaires and the interviews support
the view that prices are generally set at the national level, although promotions are
occasionally set at store level. However, the interviews also indicated a consensus that
Jumbo allows for greater degree of autonomy in price setting at store level than other
18The matching procedure is made store by store and separately for each of the two merging parties
and for the competitors. For instance, for each merging party store in overlap areas, we find the store
that best matches among those in non-overlap areas.
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chains. Given that the qualitative evidence is not conclusive, we complement it with an
analysis of the geographic extent of price variability.
First, we graphically analyze the price distribution for different supermarket chains of
each SKU at different points in time by means of boxplots. Second, we compute, for each
SKU and each month, the standard deviation of price from SKU’s average price of that
month. We then divide the standard deviation of each SKU’s price by the average price of
that SKU in order to obtain a measure of the price dispersion (the coefficient of variation)
that is independent of the price level. These analyses for several products in our sample
are shown in Appendix 1.10. Although price variation appears to be limited –both by
looking at boxplots and by a close examination of the cumulative distribution function
of the coefficient of variation– the figures show that some variability exists. Therefore,
given the existence of some variation, local competition cannot be ruled out. Studying
the reaction to the local shock due to a merger that differently affected different regional
markets can be a way to shed further light on this issue.
Since the evidence on the existence of a national pricing policy is not conclusive, we
perform a robustness check for the analysis of the merger’s effect on SKU prices where
we use the competitors to the merging parties as a control group instead than comparing
overlap and non-overlap areas. The underlying assumption, based on the Bertrand model
by [Deneckere and Davidson, 1985]), is that if the merging parties increase their prices
after the merger, competitors will also increase their prices, but by less.19 The results of
this extension are discussed in Section 1.6.1.
As for variety, most of the interviewed market participants report that, although the
overall range of assortment is generally set at central level, individual stores are allowed a
substantial degree of autonomy in their individual assortment decisions. Stores belonging
to each chain may adapt their own assortment to the local conditions of supply (e.g.,
competitive pressure coming from the other local players), demand (e.g., distribution of
consumer preferences), and individual constraints (e.g., size of the stores, shelf space, etc.).
For this reason, it is quite safe to assume that decisions on product assortment are set
locally. To provide more formal evidence on this assumption, we perform a similar analysis
as we did it for prices in Appendix 1.10. By means of box-plots and the analysis of the
coefficient of variation we show the existence of substantial local variation in assortment
decisions for several exemplifying categories.
19This identifying assumption has been used in previous merger retrospective studies, see for instance
[Ashenfelter et al., 2013b] and [Aguzzoni et al., 2016b].
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Common trends
To support our identification strategy based on selection on observables and check whether
our empirical approach is appropriate, we analyze whether the pre-merger common trend
assumption is empirically verified in our data. If this assumption is met, with the treat-
ment and control groups behaving similarly pre-merger, we can be confident that the
control group is a good comparator for the treatment group after the merger. For each
of our variables (individual prices, variety, and average category prices), we first provide
a descriptive visual inspection of the trends and, then, perform a formal test of the com-
mon trend assumption. In what follows, we show the average evolution of the outcome
variables in treated and control stores without differentiating between the merging parties
and the competitors, in order to obtain the aggregate picture at the market level, which
is possibly the one most relevant for consumers. We get similar findings if we test the
common trend assumption by insignia, as in our main empirical specifications (results are
available upon request).
Figure 1.2 shows the average trend of product-level prices for stores in the overlap and
non-overlap areas across all product categories (panel a) and by product category (panel
b). The average price evolution faced by consumers in the treatment and control areas
are almost identical, i.e. are subject to the same common trend during the pre-treatment
period.20
[insert Figure 1.2 here]
As for variety, Figure 1.3 compares the evolution of the total number of SKUs per store
– our measure of variety – in the overlap areas to the average level of product variety in
non-overlap areas, across all product categories (panel a) and for some selected product
categories (panel b).21 Although trends seem to differ across categories, in this case the
figures also show quite similar trends before the merger within each category. However,
almost all series seem to diverge post-merger.22
[insert Figure 1.3 here]
Finally, Figure 1.4 plots the series of average prices per category in overlap and non
overlap areas across all product categories (panel a) and for a subset of products in the
20The exact same patterns can be observed if we disaggregate the price by insigna as shown in Appendix
1.10.
21Note that the sample for this analysis is not exactly the same as the one used for the price analysis
due to data quality issues that forced us to drop a number of observations. Hence, we undertook a
separate matching procedure to identify overlap and non-overlap areas for the analysis on variety, since
the relevant variable for this analysis is different from the one relevant for the price analysis.
22Again, very similar patterns can be observed by disaggregating the data per insigna (Appendix 1.10).
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analyzed categories (panel b). We can see in panel a) that the two series seem to follow the
same trend in the pre-merger period, meeting the key assumption for the identification of
the average treatment effect through the DiD approach. They start to diverge some time
after the merger, when prices in overlap areas become higher than prices in non-overlap
areas.23
[insert Figure 1.4 here]
In addition to this graphical evaluation, we also perform a formal test of the common
trend hypothesis. Similarly to [Ashenfelter et al., 2014], we first estimate the deviation of
the treated areas prices (variety, category price) from the average price (variety, category
price) of the control areas in each quarter. Then, we compute the slope of a linear trend
of these deviations in the pre-merger period and test whether the estimated slope is
statistically different from zero. The test confirms that individual prices show a common
trend in treated and control areas. For variety, only one category out of 125 does not show
a common trend. For average prices, 10 categories out of 125 do not show a common trend.
If we exclude categories without common trend from our sample the estimated treatment
effect is not affected. Similar results are obtained if we run these regression by insigna. 24
1.6 Results
1.6.1 The Average Merger Effects by Insignia
In this Section, we discuss the results of our analysis of the average effect of the merger
both on the entire sample and by insignia. In particular, for our three outcome variables
(individual SKUs’ prices, variety, and category-level prices) we disentangle the effect for
each of the two merging parties and for their main competitors (Albert Heijn and Coop).
This additional analysis is particularly relevant as it allows a heterogenous response to
the merger of the different market players that help us better identifying the mechanism
at play.
The Merger Effects on Prices
We start by looking at the evolution of prices on the selected sample of products across a
subset of categories discussed in Section 1.4.1. This exercise is meant to assess whether the
merger led to an increase in the price of a set of SKUs that is chosen to be representative
of the consumption bundle of Dutch consumers.
23Again, very similar patterns can be observed by disaggregating the data per insigna (Appendix 1.10).
24The results of this test are available upon request.
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The graphs shown in Figure 1.2 already offered a preliminary glimpse of the result
of the following econometric analysis: prices in the treated and control stores seem to
mostly maintain the same trend and level throughout the period of the analysis. If prices
were set locally and the merger had any negative impact on prices, we would expect the
distance between the two price trends to increase in the post-merger period.
To confirm the result of this graphical analysis, we perform several regressions using the
aforementioned DiD methodology. Results are reported in Table 1.3. Overall, product-
level prices seem to have significantly decreased in the post-merger period for both treated
and control stores. However, our regressions show that the price change post-merger is
not different between overlap and non-overlap stores. The average result estimated in the
full sample (column 1) holds both for both merging parties’ (columns 2 and 3 for C1000
and Jumbo respectively) and for the competitors’ prices (column 4), suggesting that the
merger did not have any significant effect on prices at the individual product level.
[insert Table 1.3 here]
These results might have two main explanation. First, it might be that the merger
did not have any competitive effect on prices. Second, the findings are consistent with
nearly-uniform pricing strategies at the national level. Because prices seem not to respond
to any other local conditions, as all control variables other than seasonality dummies are
not significant determinants of prices, it seems that the second explanation might be more
reasonable.
To complement this analysis based on local variation, we also test whether the merger
effect on SKU prices differs between merging parties and competitors.25 First, we test
that the post-merger effect reported in Table 1.3 is not different between these groups of
firms. While the coefficients’ estimates for Jumbo, C1000, and their competitors seem
to diverge, this difference is not statistically significant. However, this regression is not
adequate to compare prices if these are indeed set nationally. We therefore perform an
additional analysis where we use the average price for each SKU and each period of time
across all stores of a given chain in the sample. In this way, we smooth out the limited local
variation in prices and obtain a sort of ’national’ price for each chain. Our identification
then consists of using the prices of the competitors as a counterfactual for the prices of
the merging parties. The results of this analysis, available upon request, are consistent
with those obtained with our main identification strategy: The merging parties’ prices
do not change significantly after the merger with respect to rival chains’ prices. These
findings show that the merger does not seem to have any effect on prices at the national
25Also in this case, we test that the development of competitors’ prices mimics that of merging parties’
prices before the merger. We cannot reject the hypothesis of a common trend. These results are available
upon request.
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level either. This not only implies that the merger does not seem to have increased market
power nationally. It also implies that the merger does not seem to have produced efficiency
gains at the national level that are passed on to consumers, else the prices of the merging
parties should have decreased with respect to their competitors Albert Heijn and Coop.
The Merger Effects on Variety
We then turn to the analysis of the effects of the merger on decisions about product
assortments and variety. This analysis might be particularly informative, as this seems
to be one of the key strategic variables for supermarkets at the local level.
As before, the graphical analysis presented in Figure 1.3 indicates a common trend
before the merger within each category, which seemed to diverge post-merger for almost
all series. Specifically, we observe a decrease in variety for most categories. To gain a
precise estimate of these effects and to understand where the post-merger decrease in
product variety originates, we perform a formal econometric analysis. According to our
results presented in Table 1.4, the merger negatively affected the average level of the
product variety at the market level (column 1). Considering that the average variety level
in the control stores in the post-merger period is equal to 97.2 SKUs per category and
the coefficient estimate for the treatment effect is -3.065, the merger caused an average
reduction in variety by 3.2%.
If we separately look at the effect on the two merging parties and on their competitors
(columns 2, 3, and 4), we see however that this average effect is the result of opposing
trends. In particular, C1000, the low-assortment chain, sharply reduced variety after the
merger, by 15%, whereas Jumbo increased its assortment by 8%.26 This is compatible
with a repositioning in terms of the depth of assortment whereby the two chains tend to
differentiate themselves after the merger when they compete in the same local market.
The estimated effect of the merger on competitors’ variety (column 4) is weakly sig-
nificant and indicates that competitors slightly increase their assortment in overlap areas,
where the merger is supposed to have produced a stronger effect. Note, however, that the
magnitude of the effect on competitors is much smaller than the first-order effect on the
merging parties, therefore has a limited impact on the market-level effect.
[insert Table 1.4 here]
The fact that stores strategically reposition their assortment as a reaction to changes
in local conditions, while they do not adjust prices, strongly suggests that this competitive
dimension might be the main instrument for local managers to maximize their profits.
26The average variety for C1000 (Jumbo) is 96.6 (98.2) and the coefficient estimate for the treatment
effect is -14.70 (8.66).
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It is interesting to notice that the effect on variety is not driven by rebranding of the
merging parties’ stores (see table 1.10 in appendix 1.10). The repositioning of assortment
also takes place in C1000 stores that are rebranded to Jumbo (about 30% in our sample).
This suggests that the strategic repositioning effect prevails over the effect of adaptation
of assortment towards Jumbo’s.
The Merger Effect on Category-level Prices
In order to get an indication on the variation in the composition of assortment after the
merger, we analyze the post-merger dynamics in average category prices, both for each
of the two merging parties and for their competitors. Since the merger does not seem to
lead to a change in the price of individual products while the length of assortment did
change, looking at average category prices may give us an indication on how retail chains
modify the composition of their assortment within each category.
As shown in Figure 1.4, the series of average prices per category in overlap and non-
overlap areas start to diverge some time after the merger, when prices in overlap areas
become higher than prices in non-overlap areas. This graphical evidence is confirmed by
our regression results, which are reported in Table 1.5. First, average category prices
in the full sample significantly decreased in the post-merger period for both treated and
control stores. This mimics the results observed for the individual prices, which could
be the driver of category price dynamics as well. However, and more interestingly for
this study, our regressions show that, on the full sample, post-merger prices are higher
in stores located in the overlap areas compared to stores located in the non-overlap areas
(’Overlap × Post’). This means that the merger led to an increase in the average category
prices. This effect appears to be driven by the merging parties’ stores, whereas the effect
on the main competitor’s prices is insignificant. Specifically, C1000 decreased category
prices on average by almost 4 cents (a decrease of 2%), while Jumbo increased prices by
almost 15 cents (an increase by 8%).27
[insert Table 1.5 here]
The evidence so far suggests that the effect on average category prices is not due to
price changes, but rather to a composition effect. Consider C1000: since SKU prices
did not change and variety was substantially reduced in overlap area compared to con-
trol areas, the decrease in the average category price can be explained by the choice to
drop high-priced SKUs after the merger in overlap areas. Jumbo instead increased its
assortment as well as category prices, which suggests that it added high-priced SKUs
to its assortment. In other words, the high-variety and high-price chain Jumbo became
27The average category price for C1000 was 1.80 EUR, while it was 1.83 EUR for Jumbo.
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even more high-variety and high-price, whereas the low-variety and low-price chain C1000
became even more low-variety and low-price.28
Our interpretation of this evidence is that the merging chains repositioned their prod-
ucts in terms of depth as well as composition of assortment in order to avoid cannibaliza-
tion and soften competition. This explanation is consistent with a theoretical literature
on the effect of mergers on product positioning (Gandhi et al., JIE 2008; Mazzeo et al.,
2014). In the next section, we present a simple theoretical model of competition in variety
that rationalizes this evidence.
1.6.2 A Simple Model of Variety Competition
The model of variety competition presented in this section should help us to better un-
derstand the mechanisms behind the empirical results discussed so far. The purpose of
this simple model is to study the impact of a merger on retail firms (stores) that compete
on variety at local level.
We consider a local market where there are n stores that belong to n independent
firms. We study a merger between two firms focusing on the stores’ managers decision to
adjust the depth of the assortment. We further assume that prices are unaffected. This
assumption is consistent with our empirical findings and can be motivated by a national
pricing strategy.
To model this situation we assume that each store j (j = 1, ..., n ) sells a composite
good and sets the value of a variable vj ∈ [0, 1], where 0 represents the minimum level and
1 the maximum level of variety. The vector v = (v1, ..., vn) identifies a strategy profile.
A store offering a variety vj bears a cost equal to c (vj), with c (0) = 0, c
′ (vj) > 0, and
c′′ (vj) ≥ 0. Marginal cost is assumed constant and normalized to zero. We order the
stores according to their pre-merger level of variety so that:
vj < vj+1, j = 1, ..., n− 1.
Moreover, we assume that stores that pre-merger offer a higher level of variety charge
a higher price.29 This assumption has empirical validation: in our sample, chains with
larger variety tend to have higher prices.
Consumers make their purchasing decisions taking into account both the price a store
charges for the composite good and the store’s variety. For some consumers, variety is a
28It should be noted that, for category prices, the former effect is stronger than the latter, i.e. the
coefficient of the ’Overlap × Post’ dummy for C1000 is smaller and less significant than the corresponding
coefficient for Jumbo.
29Note that this condition will hold in the equilibrium of a game in which stores have to decide both
the level of variety and the price.
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quality feature. They prefer shopping at the store with the highest variety if all stores
charge the same price. These consumers will be referred to as ”vertical consumers” (v-
consumers, hereafter) because for them variety is a feature that vertically differentiates
stores. Other consumers incur decision costs that increase in the level of variety offered by
the store at which they shop. These consumers have a preferred level of variety. They are
named ”horizontal consumers” (h-consumers, hereafter), because they consider variety a
feature that horizontally differentiates stores.
To model this demand heterogeneity, we assume that there is a unit mass of consumers
with a unitary demand for the composite good offered by the n stores and that this mass
of consumers can be split in two disjoint subsets; the first subset, of size α, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
includes v-consumers; the second subset, with size 1− α, includes h-consumers.
V-consumers, indexed by i, vary according to the intensity of their preference for
variety. Thus the level of gross utility (in monetary terms) v-consumer i obtains when
she buys from store j is described by the following C2 function:
u (vj, wi) ,
with uvj > 0, uvjvj ≤ 0 and where wi is an idiosyncratic v-consumer’s characteristic such
that uvjwi > 0; wi represents how much consumer i cares about variety (i.e. consumers
with a higher w obtain a higher marginal utility from variety). This idiosyncratic char-
acteristic is distributed according to the cumulative G (wi) over a compact set that can
be normalized to [0, 1], without any loss of generality. We assume that G′′ (wi) ≤ 0.
H-consumers have a preferred level of variety. If a h-consumer, indexed by h, buys
from store j, her level of gross utility (in monetary terms) is described by the following
C2 function:
b (vh)− t (d (vh, vj)) ,
where vh is the preferred level of variety for h-consumer h, b (vh) > 0 is the gross benefit
of buying at the (ideal) store that offers the preferred assortment, d (vh, vj) is a measure
of the distance between vh and the level of variety in store j, vj, and t (·) is a ”transporta-
tion cost” function that is increasing in d (·), with t (0) = 0 and t′′ ≥ 0. H-consumers
are distributed over the variety space, [0, 1], according to the cumulative H (vh), with
H ′′ (vh) ≤ 0.
Let us define wj and hj as the v-consumer and the h-consumer that are indifferent
between buying from store j and store j + 1, respectively. We assume that the price
differential between two adjacent stores is such that hj < vj+1, i.e. that the h-consumer
that is indifferent between j and j + 1 has a preferred level of variety that is below that
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offered by store j + 1. The overall demand for firm j is qj (v) = qvj (v) + qhj (v) where:
30
qvj (v) = α [G (wj)−G (wj−1)]
is the demand function for store j = 1, ..., n stemming from v-consumers, and
qhj (v) = (1− α) [H (hj)−H (hj−1)]
is the demand function for store j = 1, ..., n stemming from h-consumers.
We assume that before the merger the equilibrium profile v∗ = (v∗1, ..., v
∗
n) is such that









= 0 for any j = 1, ..., n.
Suppose that stores j (j = 1, ..., n − 1) and j + 1 merge. In this merger between
”close competitors,” we refer to store j as the ”low-variety store” and to j + 1 as the
”high-variety store.”31 The new entity resulting from the merger, denoted by m, will have
to decide the level of variety in the two stores (j and j + 1) it now controls. It will do so
with the aim of maximizing the following profit function:
πm (v) = πj (v) + πj+1 (v) .
In Appendix 1.10 we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1.1 After a merger between two close competitors, the new entity decreases
variety in the low-variety store. The new entity decreases variety in the high-variety store
only if there are ”many” v-consumers.
If the two merging parties are close competitors, they have an incentive to change
variety if this entails an increase in the demand of the other merging party. Let us
consider v-consumers first. Both the low-variety store and the high-variety store have
an incentive to decrease variety because the demand originating from v-consumers of the
other merging party increases if they do so. On the contrary, the two merging parties
increase the demand for the other party stemming from h-consumers if they increase the
distance between them. This means that the low-variety store has an incentive to decrease
variety and the high-variety store has the opposite incentive. As a consequence, the
prediction is not ambiguous for the low-variety store: it will decrease variety considering
30We derive the stores’ demand functions in Appendix 1.10
31In Appendix 1.10 we also discuss the case of a merger between distant competitors, i.e. firms whose
stores are not adjacent in terms of variety.
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the effect of this choice both on v-consumers and on h-consumers. For the high-variety
store, the incentive to decrease variety only exists if there are ”many” v-consumers, as the
former effect dominates the latter. Since the presence of many v-consumers makes the
stores’ offer a vertically differentiated product and this tends to lead to more concentrated
markets, we can argue that the negative impact on variety is likely to be larger in markets
that show a higher level of concentration.
The above predictions are consistent with our empirical findings. Indeed, we find that
C1000, the low-variety chain, reduces variety as a consequence of the merger. Jumbo
increases variety, although to a lower extent, which in our model is possible only if there
are not many v-consumers.
1.7 Additional Empirical Results
1.7.1 Heterogenous Effects
In order to explore further the drivers of the previous results, we estimate two different
heterogeneous treatment effects. First, we investigate whether the effect of the merger
varies across areas depending on the level of post-merger concentration.32 While we do
not find any effect on individual prices, we find that the effect on variety is particularly
severe in areas where concentration is high (Herfindal-Hirschmann-Index – HHI – higher
than 4,000). Interestingly, this is especially true for competitors. This result suggests
that in highly concentrated areas, consumers were strongly and negatively affected by the
merger: average assortment is reduced by 50% more than in less concentrated areas as
a consequence of the merger. Moreover, the differentiation effect between the merging
parties is smaller in highly concentrated areas. Indeed, the reduction in variety in C1000
stores and the increase in variety in Jumbo stores is less pronounced in these areas. This is
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model described in Section 1.6.2, because
in highly concentrated areas the incentive to horizontally differentiate is weaker than in
other areas.33
Second, we further explore whether the effect of the merger was different in areas
affected by structural remedies.34 In particular, the ACM required the merged entity to
divest 18 stores, which were sold to Coop and to the Albert Heijn chain. We find no
differential effect on individual prices for areas with divestitures if compared to control
32These results are reported in Appendix 1.10, Tables 1.11, 1.12, and 1.13.
33The effect on average category prices is not significantly different in highly concentrated areas as
compared to less concentrated ones, suggesting that overall the composition of assortment is not differen-
tially affected. Consistent with the results on variety, both the reduction in average prices for C1000 and
the increase in average prices for Jumbo are weaker in areas where the market is highly concentrated.
34These results are reported in Appendix 1.10, Tables 1.14, 1.15, and 1.16.
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areas without divestiture.35 While we still estimate a significant negative effect of the
merger on variety in the full sample, this effect is not significantly different in areas
affected by the remedies than in other treated areas where no divestiture was required.
Yet if we look at the effect by insignia, we observe that remedies did have an effect.
Both C1000 and Jumbo reduced variety, which also implies that the differentiation effect
between the merging parties is much weaker in areas with divestitures. Finally, and
perhaps more interestingly, average category prices seem to have decreased in overlap
areas where divestitures were imposed. This is exactly the opposite effect that we observe
in overlap areas where no divestiture was imposed. These results indicate that, in areas
where remedies were imposed, variety and category prices decreased and the strategic
repositioning effect both in terms of depth and composition of the assortment was reduced.
1.7.2 Robustness Checks
In this section, we show that our previous results are robust to several checks (see Tables
1.17, 1.18, and 1.19 in Appendix 1.10). First, since we do not know exactly when the two
merging parties became one single entity and because the competitive conditions could
have started changing with the notification of the acquisition, we also run specifications
where we exclude windows of 3 and 6 months around the merger date from our dataset.
Results do not change, regardless of whether we look at the full sample, merging parties,
or competitors. In particular, for the analysis on variety (Table 1.18 in the Appendix
1.10), when we drop three and six months of data from around the merger date, the
effects are even stronger than in our baseline regressions. Results for average category
prices (see Table 1.19 in Appendix 1.10) also show that the effect is larger when we drop
3 or 6 months around the merger decision. This is in line with the qualitative evidence
of Figure 1.4, showing that there is a delay in the realization of the effect of the merger.
Second, for the analysis on variety, we exclude from the dataset the products that show
a seasonality in their assortment trend (namely sun protection products, insecticides, and
greeting cards). Even in this case, our qualitative and quantitative results do not change:
the effect of the merger on variety is still significant and negative. Finally, we re-balanced
the sample dropping categories without common trend, as explained in Section 1.5.2 and
results are not affected.
The results presented so far, even the heterogeneous treatment effects, represent av-
erage effects across all 125 categories in our sample. While we think that this is the right
approach, as we want to measure the average effect for a consumer who buys a basket of
35The divestiture dummy takes value of 1 for all the stores located in the areas where they occurred.
We then interact this variable with the ’Overlap × Post’ dummy. Thus, the coefficient of this double
interaction measures the difference between the treatment effect measured in overlap areas where one of
the C1000 stores were divested if compared to areas without a divestiture.
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goods potentially including products from all categories, it is interesting to understand
which categories drive this average result. In an additional robustness check, we therefore
re-run our previous regression at the category level for the merging parties.36 Reassur-
ingly, 112 out of 125 coefficients’ estimate of the average treatment effect on variety are
negative.37 Among these estimates, 37 are significant.38 Among the categories for which
we find significant negative effects, we have both food and non-food products. This means
that the average effect discussed in the previous sections captures the main tendency of
the merger on merging firms’ overall assortment decisions. As for average price, the effect
of the merger is positive for 114 out of 125 categories, but only 2 of them have significant
coefficients.
1.8 Conclusions
In industries where local competition plays an important role – such as the retail sector –
firms might forgo profits for not being able to geographically price discriminate and, thus,
respond to local market conditions. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows
that non-price terms and conditions are important strategic tools for managers in such
situations. Thus, the analysis of these additional dimensions, in particular assortment
decisions, is crucial for shedding light on the extent of competition in the market. This
is the major contribution of this paper.
To assess if and how local competitive conditions affect assortment and pricing deci-
sions, we analyze a major merger between the Dutch grocery retailers Jumbo and C1000
that differently affected competition in various local markets. We find that the merger
did not have significant price effects at the product level. When shaken by a change in
market structure, local managers do not respond by changing prices. This is consistent
with the nearly-uniform pricing patterns across heterogenous local markets observed in
the literature [DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2017]. However, we show that the merger caused
a significant decrease in the average depth of assortment at the market level. This effect
is driven by two opposing forces: on the one hand, assortment in C1000 stores shrank
and moved toward cheaper products; on the other hand, Jumbo increased the depth of
its assortment and repositioned its offer toward high-price products. Yet, the change in
36For the sake of space, we do not report the results of these 125 regressions but they are available
upon request.
37Only for one category – chilled rice and pasta– we estimate a positive but tiny (0.755) and significant
effect of the merger.
38Note that by running our model at the category level, we essentially compare the evolution of one
time series across the 50 overlap areas to the 37 non-overlap areas for which we have data on the merging
parties’ assortment (see table 1.8 in appendix 1.10). Hence, the fact that several coefficients are not
significant is most likely due to the limited power of our regression.
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variety in high-variety stores does not compensate the decrease in variety in low-variety
stores, especially in more concentrated markets, in which consumers perceive variety as
a quality feature. In these markets, consumers experience an overall reduction in the
assortment offered by supermarkets.
By increasing differentiation and specializing on different types of customers, local
supermarkets can avoid cannibalization, soften competition, and consequently increase
their profits even without changing products’ prices. We rationalize this behavior in a
simple theoretical model where stores compete on variety taking prices as given.
These results have important implications for policy and welfare as well. The reduction
in product assortment limits consumers’ choice and may ultimately harm them. Indeed,
[Brynjolfsson et al., 2003] show that changes in variety affect consumer welfare in an order
of magnitude of 7 to 10 times larger than price effects. Yet, we show the effect of variety
is heterogenous if variety is a vertical differentiation attribute for some consumers and a
horizontal one for others for which a deeper retail assortment might increase consumers’
shopping costs [Klemperer and Padilla, 1997]. While some consumers could benefit from
having a larger set of more expensive products in some stores, other might be hurt by
seeing some products disappear from their preferred stores or by the increased distance
in terms of variety between the stores they can shop at. In such circumstances, merger
policy might have redistributive effects across consumers which are difficult to evaluate.
This consideration applies to any competitive dimension that may have a heterogeneous
impact on consumers. Indeed, while an increase in price (or a reduction in quality)
has an obvious negative impact for all consumers, a modification of other characteristics
that consumers value differently might benefit some of them and harm others. In these
cases, the consumer welfare standard that is frequently adopted to assess the competitive
consequences of a merger seems less appropriate than a total welfare standard.
Even if we do not have enough information to assess how a change in the assortment
could have affected total welfare, our price analysis shows that the merger had no impact
on individual products’ prices charged by the merging stores in overlap areas. Therefore,
even if the assortment adjustment promoted cost savings, these might not have been
passed on to consumers. Hence, our comprehensive assessment of the effect of the merger
reveals that it may have harmed most consumers through an average reduction in product
variety that was not compensated by a change in prices. Our findings confirm therefore the
importance of considering non-price effects besides price effects in ex-post evaluations of
mergers in markets where non-price dimensions of competition are relevant for consumers.
They however highlight that the welfare effects of strategic assortment repositioning are
difficult to measure. This is an area that would deserve further research.
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1.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Stores’ market position (national level) over time: number of stores (top) and
net sales floor area (bottom) and
Total surface (.000 sqm)
Stores (number)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014






















Source: Our elaboration on Supermarket Gids data.
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Figure 1.2: Trends for individual SKU prices in treated and control areas
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
46 CHAPTER 1.
Figure 1.3: Trends for variety in treated and control areas
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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Figure 1.4: Trends for average category prices in treated and control areas
a) Across all categories
b) Per category










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Average Treatment Effect per Insigna: Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample C1000 Jumbo Competitors
Post -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0855∗∗∗ -0.0979∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.024) (0.030) (0.028)
Overlap -0.00712 -0.00704 -0.00821 -0.0126
(0.011) (0.017) (0.023) (0.020)
Overlap×Post 0.00133 -0.00390 0.00733 0.0120
(0.027) (0.046) (0.039) (0.048)
Population -0.000140 -0.000198 -0.0000585 -0.0000528
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Income 0.00210 0.000418 0.00189 0.00339
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Discounters Market Share 0.0459∗ 0.0135 0.0873 0.0823∗
(0.020) (0.028) (0.067) (0.037)
HHI 0.0000745 -0.000121 0.000314 -0.000279
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Net Sales Floor 0.00000302 0.00000990 -0.00000281 -0.000000980
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House Value 0.0000173 0.0000548 0.0000173 -0.0000110
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quarter 0.0388∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant -6.149∗∗∗ -5.317∗∗∗ -5.392∗∗∗ -7.451∗∗∗
(0.465) (0.687) (0.933) (0.832)
Observations 122,213 48,362 30,279 43,572
R2 0.9532 0.9510 0.9612 0.9514
Clustered-robust standard errors at the product-insignia level in parentheses. We control for fixed
effect at the product-insignia level as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal dummies. The
symbols ***, **, * denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Average Treatment Effect per Insigna: Variety
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample C1000 Jumbo Competitors
Post -2.402∗∗∗ 0.424 -6.504∗∗∗ -1.099
(0.559) (0.656) (1.052) (0.727)
Overlap 3.071∗∗∗ 11.41∗∗∗ -0.0837 -4.153∗∗∗
(0.537) (1.272) (0.377) (0.872)
Overlap×Post -3.065∗∗∗ -14.70∗∗∗ 8.659∗∗∗ 0.722∗
(0.364) (1.458) (0.938) (0.290)
Population -0.0798∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗ -0.00998
(0.011) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017)
Average Income 0.399∗∗∗ -1.117∗∗∗ -0.841∗∗∗ 2.114∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.182) (0.172) (0.253)
Discounters Market Share 0.425 -21.50∗∗∗ 24.72∗∗∗ 15.90∗∗∗
(1.243) (2.901) (2.799) (2.885)
HHI -0.0874∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ 0.0820∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.028) (0.013) (0.039)
Net Sales Floor 0.438∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.0165 0.184∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.094) (0.019) (0.027)
House Value 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0583∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Quarter 0.532∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ -0.204 0.294∗
(0.109) (0.153) (0.116) (0.117)
Constant 58.21∗ -35.44 216.9∗∗∗ 82.93∗∗
(22.897) (31.216) (23.002) (26.022)
Observations 225,667 90,484 72,056 63,127
R2 0.8806 0.8342 0.9047 0.9418
Clustered-robust standard errors at the category-insignia level in parentheses. We control
for fixed effect at the category-insignia level as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal
dummies. The symbols ***, **, * denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
level, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Average Treatment Effect per Insigna: Average price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample C1000 Jumbo Competitors
Post -0.0361∗∗∗ -0.0185 -0.0836∗∗∗ -0.0215∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005)
Overlap -0.00559 0.0219∗ -0.00801 -0.0201∗∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Overlap×Post 0.0254∗∗∗ -0.0391∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ -0.00930
(0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008)
Population -0.000178 -0.000467∗∗ 0.00110∗∗∗ -0.000392∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Income 0.00237∗ -0.00390 -0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Discounters Market Share 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.0644∗ 0.0329 0.138∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.032) (0.027) (0.035)
HHI 0.00119∗∗∗ 0.000451 0.00247∗∗∗ -0.0000795
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net Sales Floor -0.00000197 0.0000142∗ -0.0000165∗∗∗ -0.00000404
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House Value 0.000310∗∗∗ 0.000446∗∗∗ 0.000571∗∗∗ 0.000125
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quarter 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.00150 0.0102∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.934∗∗∗ -0.425 2.975∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.223) (0.228) (0.148)
Observations 216,060 77,605 71,960 51,881
R2 0.8873 0.8412 0.8918 0.9499
Clustered-robust standard errors at the category-insignia level in parentheses. We control for fixed
effect at the category-insignia level as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal dummies. The
symbols ***, **, * denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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1.10 Appendix
1.10.1 Propensity Score Matching for Areas Selection and the
Stores’ choice
This appendix describes the methodology used to select the stores. The ACM provided us
with historical location data on all supermarkets in the Netherlands, the ’Supermarkt gids’
database, which lists geographic data (including addresses, postal code, city, province)
together with additional information (e.g., availability of parking or automatic counters).
In 2013, the guide counts 6,641 stores. Our budget allowed selecting a total of 171
stores. As described in the paper, we compare the merging stores in the overlapping areas
(treated stores) and the merging stores in the non-overlapping areas (control stores). To
select appropriate stores for our analysis, we started by identifying the overlapping and
non-overlapping areas. There were 253 overlapping areas out of a total of 1,145 areas in
the whole sample.
In order to identify the areas for the selection of 171 stores, we follow an approach based
on the propensity score matching (PSM) methodology. PSM was developed as a technique
to correct for sample selection bias that may affect the estimation of the treatment effect
in non-randomized experiments. In randomized experiments, the results in the treated
and control groups may often be directly compared because the two samples are likely
to be similar (the assignment to the treated and control ’status’ is indeed random). In
non-randomized experiments, the direct comparison between the treated and control units
may be misleading because units exposed to the treatment systematically differ from the
units not exposed to the treatment. Propensity score matching allows to group treated and
control units according to their probability of receiving the treatment based on observable
characteristics. The propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of receiving
the treatment given a set of pre-treatment variables:
p(X) = Pr(D = 1|X)
The PSM technique allows for collapsing the multiple dimensions along which treated
and control units might differ into one single dimension: the propensity score. In the
case under examination, the probability of receiving the treatment may coincide with
the probability of being an overlapping area. We computed a propensity score for each
area and grouped overlapping and non-overlapping areas according to the similarity of
their score. We estimate the probability of treatment running a logistic regression. The
dependent variable is a discrete variable that takes value one if the area is overlapping
and zero otherwise. The independent variables include demand and supply factors that
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may influence the decision of a supermarket insignia to locate its stores in a given area.
We then group treated and control cities according their estimated scores. Treated
and control units with exactly the same propensity score are rarely found. Instead, each
treated unit is usually matched with its closest control, as indicated by the propensity
score value. We had to allow for multiple uses of the same control city in order to maximize
the number of treated cities included in our final sample (i.e., to prevent some treated
cities from falling ’off support’).39
Post matching, we then checked if treated and control areas are indeed similar in
observable characteristics except for the treatment. We do that by testing the equality of
means for the relevant explanatory variables and we conclude that the means across the
treated and control areas are not statistically different (see Table 1.6).
39In some of the control matched cities, there were no merging stores. The empirical strategy un-
derpinning the analysis across areas requires that at least one of the merging chains is present in the
non-overlapping (control) cities. For this reason, we could not limit the match to the ’nearest neighbor’,
but had to extend the match to the third nearest neighbor.
1.10. APPENDIX 55
Table 1.6: Equality of the means between treated and control areas
Means t-test
Treated Control %bias t-test p > t
Pscore 0.3906 0.3712 10.8 1.18 0.237
Average population density 13,580 11,830 8.4 0.78 0.434
Average store size 922.67 927.57 -1.6 -0.18 0.855
Average income 2,407.7 2,416.4 -2.8 -0.31 0.757
Number of stores (squared) 37.226 31.381 8.0 0.74 0.459
HHI 4,731.1 5,088.7 -11.7 -1.27 0.204
Average land price 142.34 147.41 -5.2 -0.52 0.604
HHI Discounters 1,757.2 1,776.9 -1.0 -0.11 0.916
Table 1.7 presents the list of areas obtained from the matching process and indicates
those areas that, among the treated ones, were deemed problematic (i.e. where the merged
entity had a combined market share above 50%). Moreover, we highlight in which of the
former areas a divestiture was required.
Table 1.7: List of matched areas
City Province Treated Overlap Overlap
MS>50% MS<50%
’S-HEERENBERG Gelderland Treated 0 1
DEN BURG Noord-Holland Untreated 0 0
DEN HAM OV Overijssel Treated 1 0
TERSCHELLING FORMERUM Friesland Untreated 0 0
BARNEVELD Gelderland Treated 0 1
ASSENDELFT Noord-Holland Untreated 0 0
BEMMEL Gelderland Treated 0 1
BEST Noord-Brabant Untreated 0 0
BODEGRAVEN Zuid-Holland Treated 0 1
OOSTERBEEK Gelderland Untreated 0 0
CAPELLE AAN DEN IJSSEL Zuid-Holland Treated 0 1
LISSE Zuid-Holland Untreated 0 0
DE MEERN Utrecht Treated 0 1
DALFSEN Overijssel Untreated 0 0
LICHTENVOORDE Gelderland Treated 1 0
EDE GLD Gelderland Untreated 0 0
DIEMEN Noord-Holland Treated 0 1
OUDDORP ZH Zuid-Holland Untreated 0 0
EERSEL Noord-Brabant Treated 0 1
DELFT Zuid-Holland Untreated 0 0
ENTER Overijssel Treated 0 1
BERGEIJK Noord-Brabant Untreated 0 0
GOOR Overijssel Treated 0 1
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GEMERT Noord-Brabant Untreated 0 0
GROESBEEK Gelderland Treated 0 1
HATTEM Overijssel Untreated 0 0
HARDERWIJK Gelderland Treated 0 1
MILL Noord-Brabant Untreated 0 0
HEEMSKERK Noord-Holland Treated 0 1
ALPHEN AAN DEN RIJN Zuid-Holland Untreated 0 0
HOLTEN Overijssel Treated 0 1
MAKKUM FR Friesland Untreated 0 0
HOOGERHEIDE Noord-Brabant Treated 0 1
ANNA PAULOWNA Noord-Holland Untreated 0 0
HOUTEN Utrecht Treated 0 1
MIDDELBURG Zeeland Untreated 0 0
IJSSELSTEIN UT Utrecht Treated 1 0
SEVENUM Limburg Untreated 0 0
KAATSHEUVEL Noord-Brabant Treated 0 1
MAASSLUIS Zuid-Holland Untreated 0 0
KERKRADE Limburg Treated 0 1
BOXMEER Noord-Brabant Untreated 0 0
LANDGRAAF Limburg Treated 0 1
HOORN NH Noord-Holland Untreated 0 0
LEIDEN Zuid-Holland Treated 0 1
EMMER-COMPASCUUM Drenthe Untreated 0 0
LOCHEM Gelderland Treated 0 1
VROOMSHOOP Overijssel Untreated 0 0
OMMEN Overijssel Treated 0 1
TIEL Gelderland Untreated 0 0
OOST-SOUBURG Zeeland Treated 0 1
NORG Drenthe Untreated 0 0
STADSKANAAL Groningen Treated 1 0
SEVENUM Limburg Untreated 0 0
CULEMBORG Gelderland Untreated 0 0
ROOSENDAAL Noord-Brabant Treated 0 1
ENKHUIZEN Noord-Holland Untreated 0 0
SAPPEMEER Groningen Treated 0 1
NIEUWE NIEDORP Noord-Holland Untreated 0 0
SITTARD Limburg Treated 0 1
HILLEGOM Zuid-Holland Untreated 0 0
SOEST Utrecht Treated 0 1
SMILDE Drenthe Untreated 0 0
SOMEREN Noord-Brabant Treated 0 1
ZETTEN Gelderland Untreated 0 0
SON Noord-Brabant Treated 0 1
LIENDEN Gelderland Untreated 0 0
STEENBERGEN NB Noord-Brabant Treated 0 1
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EDE GLD Gelderland Untreated 0 0
THOLEN Zeeland Treated 0 1
RENESSE Zeeland Untreated 0 0
TWELLO Gelderland Treated 0 1
OOSTERWOLDE FR Friesland Untreated 0 0
URK Overijssel Treated 0 1
KROMMENIE Noord-Holland Untreated 0 0
VELDHOVEN Noord-Brabant Treated 0 1
OSS Noord-Brabant Untreated 0 0
VINKEVEEN Utrecht Treated 0 1
ZEVENHUIZEN ZH Zuid-Holland Untreated 0 0
WASSENAAR Zuid-Holland Treated 0 1
KOLLUM Friesland Untreated 0 0
WESTERBORK Drenthe Treated 1 0
OPHEUSDEN Gelderland Untreated 0 0
WIERDEN Overijssel Treated 0 1
SCHAGEN Noord-Holland Untreated 0 0
WIJCHEN Gelderland Treated 0 1
GENNEP Limburg Untreated 0 0
WINSCHOTEN Groningen Treated 0 1
EERBEEK Gelderland Untreated 0 0
WOUDENBERG Utrecht Treated 0 1
ZEEWOLDE Flevoland Untreated 0 0
ZELHEM Gelderland Treated 0 1
AALSMEER Noord-Holland Untreated 0 0
IJSSELSTEIN UT Utrecht Treated 1 0
CULEMBORG Gelderland Untreated 0 0
ZEVENBERGEN Noord-Brabant Treated 0 1
WOERDEN Utrecht Untreated 0 0
DEURNE Noord-Brabant Treated Divestiture 0
LIENDEN Gelderland Untreated 0 0
GRAVE Noord-Brabant Treated Divestiture 0
BERGEIJK Noord-Brabant Untreated 0 0
KAMPEN Overijssel Treated Divestiture 0
EERBEEK Gelderland Untreated 0 0
OIRSCHOT Noord-Brabant Treated Divestiture 0
DALFSEN Overijssel Untreated 0 0
RAALTE Overijssel Treated Divestiture 0
VROOMSHOOP Overijssel Untreated 0 0
RAAMSDONKSVEER Noord-Brabant Treated Divestiture 0
HILLEGOM Zuid-Holland Untreated 0 0
ZUIDLAREN Drenthe Treated Divestiture 0
BOXMEER Noord-Brabant Untreated 0 0
IJSSELMUIDEN Overijssel Treated 1 0
BRUMMEN Gelderland Untreated 0 0
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To conclude, the propensity score matching technique allows us to identify the areas
from which we finally selected our sample of stores. In the next section, we describe this
second selection exercise.
1.10.2 The choice of stores
Within areas of overlap and areas of non-overlap, we select a suitable number of stores
from both the merging parties and the competing chains.40 However, we restrict the
choice to two competitors’ chains: Albert Heijn and COOP. This choice is based on a
number of considerations.
First, available information on chains’ strategy and the economic literature suggest
that it might be appropriate to include in the analyses an explanatory variable attempting
to capture ”chain-specific effects.” Consequently, we restrict the number of chains in order
to ensure that a sufficient number of stores is available for each chain.
Second, we want to include in our selection both a national competitor and a local
competitor, to exploit any differences in their responses to a change in competition.
Third, we adjust our selection in order to take into account data availability issues. In
particular, some supermarket chains – especially discounters like Aldi and Lidl – denied
access to store level data. In addition, the data provider warned us about (i) missing data
for some supermarket chains; and (ii) limited availability of data on private label goods
in 2009 and 2010.
Our selection also attempts to ensure a widespread coverage of the Dutch territory
as well as a balanced representation of merging parties and of the subset of competitors
selected, across areas of overlap and areas of non-overlap. Moreover, we do not select
stores from the largest cities. The main reason we excluded the largest cities from our
selection is related to the difficulties of matching them with appropriate control regions.
Data completeness proved to be an additional problem as supply level data are incomplete
for most of the largest cities.
Concerning the kind of stores, the ACM defines a single ’product’ market encom-
passing all supermarket formulas, including regular supermarkets, hypermarkets, and
discounters. The difference between the various formulas is determined mainly by the
shop size.41 The assortment size can be a further element of differentiation among stores.
Hypermarkets typically have the broadest assortment (20,000 SKUs is a common figure
40Among the stores of the merging parties, we wanted to have stores from the acquirer Jumbo and
the target C1000. Moreover, we also tried to have stores that were re-brandend during the sample period
–i.e., adopted the Jumbo insignia – as well as stores that were not re-branded.
41In a recent study, the European Commission adopted the following definition: i) supermarkets:
stores whose size is between 400 and 2,499 square meters; ii) hypermarkets: stores whose size is equal to
or greater than 2500 square meters; iii) discounters: all stores size.
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Table 1.8: The sample of Stores
Price Variety
Overlap Non-Overlap Overlap Non-Overlap
C1000 Rebranded to Jumbo 7 9 7 10
Not rebranded 19 13 20 13
Jumbo Jumbo 21 14 23 14
Competitors Albert Heijn 14 15 14 15
Coop 3 3 5 3
for food products). Supermarkets typically sell between 5,000 and 10,000 different food
SKUs. Finally, discounters have the narrowest assortment, typically between 1,000 and
2,000 SKUs. In our study, we follow a different approach. For each supermarket chain,
we limit our selection to regular formula only, in order to focus on the stores that are the
closest substitutes.
Our final selection includes over 171 different stores representing the merging parties’
chains and two competitors (Albert Heijn and Coop). For this list of stores, we asked
for data on turnover, volume, promotional turnover, promotional share, and variety for
a selection of products, as described in the data section. Note that we have a slightly
different sample for the price and variety specifications. Table 1.8 reports the sample of
stores used in our regressions.
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1.10.3 List of SKUs
The following table presents a list of the selected SKUs per products’ category used
in the price analysis. In the cells we report the number of stores for which we have
information on that particular product.
Table 1.9: Selected SKUs per Product Category – Price Analysis
PRODUCTS CHAINS
Category C1000 Jumbo SdB Coop AH
Cleaners A-brand Ajax 61 66 37 10 50
CITRONELLA 37
WITTE REUS 61 66 10 50







Coffee A-brand Douwe egberts 37 10 50
KANIS & GUNNINK 61 66 37 10 50
VAN NELLE SUPRA 61 66





SUPER DE BOER 37
Cola A-brand Coca cola 61 66 37 10 50
PEPSI 61 66 37 10 50







Diapers A-brand Huggies super dry 66 50
HUGGIES SUPER FLEX 66
PAMPERS BABY DRY 66 37 10 50
PAMPERS NEW BABY 61






SUPER DE BOER 37
Fresh Milk A-brand Arla biologisch 50
BIO PLUS 10
CAMPINA 61 66 37 50
FRIESCHE VLAG 61 66 37 10
VECOZUIVEL





Frikandels A-brand Beckers 61 66 37 10 50
MORA 61 37 10 50
VAN RIJSINGEN 66








Mayonaise A-brand Calve 37
REMIA 61 66 37 10 50
ZAANSE MAYONAISE 61 66 10 50






SUPER DE BOER 37
Olive Oil A-brand Bertolli 61 66 37 10 50
BIO PLUS 66 37 10
BIORGANIC
MONINI 61 50







SUPER DE BOER 37
Sanitary Napkins A-brand Always ultra 61 10
ALWAYS ULTRA NORMAAL 61 10
KOTEX MAXI SUPER 66 37 50
LIBRESSE INVISIBLE 61 66 37 10 50





Shampoo A-brand Guhl 61 66 37 50
NEUTRAL 10
SYOSS SHINE BOOST
Toiletpaper A-brand Edet soft 61 66 37 10 50
PAGE KUSSENZACHT 66 37 10 50
PAGE ZACHT EN STERK 61





SUPER DE BOER 37
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1.10.4 Local Variation
As explained in Section 1.5.2, in this Appendix we more carefully analyze the geo-
graphic extent of price and assortment variability. First, we graphically analyze the price
and assortment distributions for different supermarket chains of each SKUs at different
points in time by means of boxplots. Second, we compute a coefficient of variation for
each SKU and each month. For prices, we first compute the standard deviation of price
from SKU’s average price of that month. We then divide the price standard deviation
of each SKU by the average price of that SKU in order to obtain a measure of the price
dispersion independent of the price level. In a similar way, we compute the coefficient of
variation for variety. Below, we present a selection of the discussed graphs. Figures 1.5
to 1.9 show the geographic price variability of five SKUs, while figures 1.10 to 1.13 show
geographic variability in stores’ assortment for four selected categories.
For each SKU (category), the first graph (boxplot) shows the price (variety) dispersion
in May 2010, May 2011, May 2012, and May 2013. These graphs allows comparing the
price (variety) dispersion of Jumbo with:
price (variety) dispersion of the same SKU (category) sold by two competitors: the
market leader (Albert Heijn) and a smaller player (Coop). Both reportedly have
adopted a national pricing strategy.
price (variety) dispersion of the same SKU (category) sold by C1000. The data
in the graph refer to those C1000 stores that did not change their insignia to the
Jumbo’s Insignia during the period under study, even after the merger.
The second graph shows the cumulative distribution function of the coefficient of
variation for prices (figures 1.5 to 1.9) and variety (figures 1.10 to 1.13) respectively.
The coefficient of variation for price (variety) of each SKU (category), for each point in
time and for each chain, is computed as the ratio between the price (variety) standard
deviation and the average price (variety), and then plotted in a single graph, irrespective of
the moment of their measurement. The cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation shows the cumulative probability that the coefficient of variation is below a
given threshold. If the distribution concentrates around zero, the coefficient of variation
over the period of analysis for a given chain and SKU (category) is likely to be low; hence
the conclusion is that the chain sets national prices (assortment), i.e. there is no variation
across stores. A more evenly distribution, instead, shows that the coefficient of variation is
higher than zero. In the latter case, we would expect local prices (variety). The inclusion
of the cumulative distribution function of different chains in the same graph allows across-
chains comparisons. Chains whose curve is close to the vertical axis, are expected to set
national prices (have national assortment) with higher probability than the other chains:
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indeed, for that chain, the probability that the variation coefficient is around zero is
higher. In the first panel, Jumbo is compared to its competitors Albert Heijn and Coop;
in the second panel, Jumbo is compared to the target chain in the acquisition of C1000.
Figure 1.5: Box-plot (first panel) and cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation (second panel) for Ajax (cleaner brand)
Source: our elaboration on IRI data.
Figure 1.6: Box-plot (first panel) and cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation (second panel) for REMIA (a mayonnaise brand)
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data.
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Figure 1.7: Box-plot (first panel) and cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation (second panel) for Kanis & Gunnink (coffee brand)
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data.
Figure 1.8: Box-plot (first panel) and cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation (second panel) for private label coffee brands
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data.
Figure 1.9: Box-plot (first panel) and cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation (second panel) for Coca cola (brand)
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data.
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Figure 1.10: Box-plot (first panel) and cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation (second panel) for the category cleaners)
Source: our elaboration on IRI data.
Figure 1.11: Box-plot (first panel) and cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation (second panel) for the category coffee
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data.
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Figure 1.12: Box-plot (first panel) and cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation (second panel) for the category cola
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data.
Figure 1.13: Box-plot (first panel) and cumulative distribution function of the coefficient
of variation (second panel) for the category diapers
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data.
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1.10.5 Additional Figures on the Common Trends
Figure 1.14: Trends for individual SKU prices in treated and control areas – Jumbo
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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Figure 1.15: Trends for individual SKU prices in treated and control areas – C1000
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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Figure 1.16: Trends for individual SKU prices in treated and control areas – AH & Coop
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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Figure 1.17: Trends for variety in treated and control areas – Jumbo
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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Figure 1.18: Trends for variety in treated and control areas – C1000
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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Figure 1.19: Trends for variety in treated and control areas – AH & Coop
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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Figure 1.20: Trends for average category prices in treated and control areas – Jumbo
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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Figure 1.21: Trends for average category prices in treated and control areas – C1000
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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Figure 1.22: Trends for average category prices in treated and control areas – AH & Coop
a) Across all categories
b) Per category
Source: Our elaboration on IRI data
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1.10.6 Theoretical model: Additional results and Proofs
Given the modeling assumptions described in Section 6, we can derive the stores’
demand and profit functions. Let us start with the demand stemming from v-consumers.
We can define n + 1 indifference points, denoted by wj, with j = 0, ..., n, that partition
the set [0, 1] in n+2 subsets such that the v-consumer with characteristic wj is indifferent
between buying from store j and store j + 1. We interpret w0 as the consumer who
is indifferent between shopping at store 1 and not buying at all; similarly wn identifies
the consumer who is indifferent between shopping at store n and not buying. These
indifference points are implicitly defined by the following conditions:
u (vj+1, wj)− u (vj, wj) = ∆j, (1.2)
where ∆j = pj+1 − pj, u (v0, w0) = 0, ∆0 = p1, u (vn+1, wn) = 0 and ∆n = −pn. The
implicit solutions of equations (1.2) are denoted by wj (vj+1, vj). Their relevant charac-
terization is given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.10.1 For any j = 1, ..., n−1, wj (vj+1, vj) is decreasing in vj+1 and increasing
in vj.































The results can also be explained intuitively as follows. Let wj be the consumer indifferent
between j and j + 1, suppose that store j + 1 increases variety (i.e. vj+1 increases),
consumer wj is no longer indifferent between j and j+1; she now prefers buying from j+1
as the monetary saving she obtains if she buys from j (i.e. ∆j) does not suffice to offset
the increased utility she gets by shopping at j + 1. Hence, the new indifferent consumer
is the one with a less intense preference for variety; this explains why wj (vj+1, vj) is
decreasing in vj+1. Now suppose that store j increases variety (i.e. vj increases). Again
consumer wj is no longer indifferent between j and j + 1; she prefers buying at j because
the higher utility she gets if he shops at j+ 1 is no longer sufficient to compensate for the
extra-price he has to pay. The new indifferent consumer is the one with a more intense
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preference for variety; this explains why wj (vj+1, vj) is increasing in vj.
All consumers with wi > wj (vj+1, vj) prefer buying from store j + 1, while all those
with wi < wj (vj+1, vj) prefer buying from store j. Hence, demand for store j = 1, ..., n
stemming from v-consumers is:
qvj (v) = α [G (wj)−G (wj−1)] .
We assume that all v-consumers are served and therefore that G (wn) = 1 and that
G (w0) = 0.
Let us now turn to h-consumers. Again, we have to partition the set of h-consumers in
n+2 sub-sets. To do so, we have to identify n+1 indifference points hj (j = 0, ..., n) such
that a consumer located at hj ∈ [0, 1] is indifferent between shopping at j and j + 1. h0
and hn have the same interpretation as the one given for v-consumers. These indifferent
consumers are identified by the following conditions:
b (hj)− t (d (hj, vj))− pj = b (hj)− t (d (hj, vj+1))− pj+1
that can be written as:
t (d (hj, vj))− t (d (hj, vj+1)) = ∆j (1.3)
Equations (1.3) implicitly define the indifferent consumers, denoted as hj (vj, vj+1).
Lemma 1.10.2 For any j = 1, ..., n−1, hj (vj, vj+1) is increasing both in vj and in vj+1.
Proof 1.2 It is apparent that hj (vj, vj+1) ≥ vj. Indeed, ∆j is positive, as we assumed
that pj+1 > pj, and the expression t (d (hj, vj)) − t (d (hj, vj+1)) would be negative if
hj (vj, vj+1) < vj, as d (hj, vj+1) > d (hj, vj) and t(·) is an increasing function in d(·).
Hence condition (1.3) cannot hold if hj (vj, vj+1) < vj. Given this and the assumption


















































> 0. Again Lemma 2 can be intuitively explained. Let hj be the consumer
indifferent between j and j + 1, suppose that store j + 1 increases variety (i.e. vj+1
increases), consumer hj is now more distant from store j + 1 and is no longer indifferent
between j and j + 1; she now prefers buying from j. Hence, the new indifferent consumer
is closer to the location of j + 1 and, therefore, hj (vj+1, vj) increases. Suppose that store
j offers a higher level of variety (i.e. vj increases). Now consumer hj is closer to store
j and is no longer indifferent between j and j + 1; she prefers buying at j. In this case
the new indifferent consumer is also closer to j + 1; which explains why hj (vj+1, vj) is
increasing in vj.
All consumers with vh > hj (vj+1, vj) prefer buying from store j + 1, and all those
with vh < hj (vj+1, vj) prefer buying from store j. Hence, demand for store j = 1, ..., n
stemming from h-consumers is:
qhj (v) = (1− α) [H (hj)−H (hj−1)] .
Again, we assume that all h-consumers are served and, therefore, that H (hn) = 1, and
that H (h0) = 0.
The profit function of store j = 1, ..., n is:
πj (v) = pj (qvj (v) + qhj (v))− c (vj) .
Now suppose that stores j (j = 1, .., n − k) and j + k merge. Before proving the
propositions stated in section 6, we prove that a merger between ”distant competitors”
(i.e. when k ≥ 2) does not affect variety.
Proposition 1.2 A merger between two distant competitors does not affect the level of
variety offered in the market.
Proof 1.3 Post-merger the new entity maximizes the following profit function:
πm (v) = pjqj (v) + pj+kqj+k (v)− c (vj)− c (vj+k)































Hence the vj and vj+1 that solve the new entity’s maximization problem are the same as
the one that solve the maximization problem faced by the two stores pre-merger. Since the
other store’s maximization problem is not directly affected by the merger, it follows that
the pre-merger equilibrium profile remains an equilibrium post-merger.
Intuitively, the consequence of the merger is to internalize the effect that the decision
concerning variety has on the other merging party. Since the demand obtained by a store
j depends only on the level of variety set in the same store and in the two closest stores,
j + 1 and j − 1, a merger between two distant competitors does not alter the merging
parties’ incentives as the effects of a change in variety remain external effects.
We can now prove the proposition in the text that is reported here for the sake of
exposition.
Proposition 1.3 After a merger between two close competitors, the new entity decreases
variety in the low-variety store. The new entity decreases variety in the high-variety store
only if there are ”many” v-consumers.
Proof 1.4 The new entity maximization problem and the FOCs are those described in
the proof of Proposition E1. However, in this case k = 1. The low-variety store, j , has
an incentive to decrease variety if the FOC (1.4) is negative at the pre-merger equilibrium







Hence, the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of
∂qj+1
∂vj
, where we have replaced k
















> 0 and that
∂hj
∂vj
> 0. This proves that
∂qj+1
∂vj
< 0 and, therefore, that
the low-variety store has an incentive to decrease variety post-merger. We can repeat the
same reasoning for the high-variety store. In this case, the relevant FOC is (1.5) and the
relevant sign is the sign of
∂qj
∂vj+1


















< 0 and that
∂hj
∂vj+1
> 0. Hence the sign of (1.6) is not unambiguously
determined. The post-merger choice on variety of the high-variety store depends on the
relative strength of the two effects just identified. In any case, we can define a threshold













and we say that there are ”many” v-consumers if α > α∗. From all of the above it stems
that if there are many v-consumers the sign of (1.6) is negative and the high-variety store
will decrease variety after the merger. If α = α∗ the merger will have no impact on the
variety offered in the high-variety store. Finally if there are few v-consumers (i.e. α < α∗)
the high-variety store increases variety post-merger.
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1.10.7 Additional Heterogenous Effects and Robustness Checks
1.10. APPENDIX 83
Table 1.10: Heterogenous Effects of Rebranding
(1) (2) (1)
Price Variety Average Price
Post -0.0857∗∗∗ 0.368 -0.0183
(0.024) (0.657) (0.012)
Overlap -0.00750 10.27∗∗∗ 0.0218∗
(0.018) (1.183) (0.011)
Overlap×Post 0.0103 -9.202∗∗∗ -0.0535∗∗
(0.062) (0.959) (0.017)
Overlap×Post×No re-branding -0.0180 -7.584∗∗∗ 0.0248
(0.061) (0.848) (0.017)
Population -0.000197 -0.153∗∗∗ -0.000422∗
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000)
Average Income 0.000613 -0.718∗∗∗ -0.00435
(0.003) (0.151) (0.003)
Discounters Market Share 0.0162 -18.22∗∗∗ 0.0587
(0.033) (2.692) (0.032)
HHI -0.000119 -0.233∗∗∗ 0.000448
(0.000) (0.028) (0.000)
Net Sales Floor 0.00000957 0.804∗∗∗ 0.0000163∗∗
(0.000) (0.088) (0.000)
House Value 0.0000528 0.0346∗∗∗ 0.000449∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
No-rebranded store 0.00230 6.543∗∗∗ -0.0134
(0.012) (0.809) (0.008)
Quarter 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.153) (0.001)
Constant -5.329∗∗∗ -34.58 -0.400
(0.691) (31.451) (0.225)
Observations 48,362 90,484 77,605
R2 0.9510 0.8347 0.8412
We only present regressions for C1000. Clustered-robust standard errors at the
product/category-insignia level in parentheses depending on the outcome variable. We
control for fixed effect at the product/category-insignia level (depending on the out-
comes) as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal dummies. The symbols ***, **, *
denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 1.11: Interaction with high concentration: Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample C1000 Jumbo Competitors
Post -0.104∗∗∗ -0.0835∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028)
Overlap -0.00728 -0.00599 -0.00739 -0.0124
(0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020)
Overlap×Post 0.00482 -0.000989 0.0186 0.00822
(0.029) (0.050) (0.042) (0.050)
Overlap×Post× HHI > 4000 -0.0113 -0.0112 -0.0506 0.0203
(0.038) (0.069) (0.055) (0.088)
Population -0.000184 -0.000193 -0.000102 -0.0000103
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Income 0.00187 0.000535 0.00194 0.00308
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Discounters Market Share 0.0391 0.0168 0.0751 0.0879
(0.022) (0.029) (0.082) (0.047)
Net Sales Floor 0.00000364 0.00000890 -0.00000154 -0.00000107
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House Value 0.0000178 0.0000486 0.0000218 -0.0000102
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI > 4000 -0.00324 -0.00868 0.0428 -0.0184
(0.031) (0.049) (0.050) (0.064)
Quarter 0.0388∗∗∗ 0.0350∗∗∗ 0.0346∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -6.145∗∗∗ -5.313∗∗∗ -5.371∗∗∗ -7.469∗∗∗
(0.465) (0.691) (0.927) (0.837)
Observations 122,213 48,362 30,279 43,572
R2 0.9532 0.9510 0.9612 0.9514
Clustered-robust standard errors at the product-insignia level in parentheses. We control for fixed effect
at the product-insignia level as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal dummies. The symbols ***,
**, * denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 1.12: Interaction with high concentration: Variety
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample C1000 Jumbo Competitors
Post -2.120∗∗∗ 2.720∗∗∗ -6.962∗∗∗ -1.339
(0.536) (0.756) (1.058) (0.769)
Overlap 3.359∗∗∗ 12.97∗∗∗ 0.337 -3.705∗∗∗
(0.548) (1.399) (0.381) (0.862)
Overlap×Post -2.299∗∗∗ -15.82∗∗∗ 12.29∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗
(0.340) (1.620) (1.298) (0.291)
Overlap×Post×HHI > 4000 -2.217∗∗∗ 2.836∗ -10.76∗∗∗ -6.580∗∗∗
(0.657) (1.107) (1.712) (1.587)
Population -0.0664∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ 0.0386∗∗ -0.00327
(0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015)
Average Income 0.409∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗ -0.996∗∗∗ 2.039∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.141) (0.183) (0.248)
Net Sales Floor 0.384∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.0400∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.074) (0.019) (0.025)
House Value 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗ -0.0223∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Discounters Market Share 1.864 -10.39∗∗∗ 14.67∗∗∗ 15.85∗∗∗
(1.272) (2.066) (2.262) (2.984)
HHI > 4000 -2.506∗∗∗ -9.293∗∗∗ 4.104∗∗∗ 0.127
(0.613) (1.264) (1.179) (1.188)
Quarter 0.534∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ -0.159 0.317∗∗
(0.110) (0.154) (0.116) (0.116)
Constant 55.19∗ -48.85 214.3∗∗∗ 77.22∗∗
(23.009) (31.908) (23.060) (26.036)
Observations 225667 90484 72056 63127
R2 .8805652 .8333422 .9048633 .9417944
Clustered-robust standard errors at the category-insignia level in parentheses. We control for
fixed effect at the category-insignia level as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal dummies.
The symbols ***, **, * denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively.
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Table 1.13: Interaction with high concentration: Average Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample C1000 Jumbo Competitors
Post -0.0412∗∗∗ -0.0137 -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗
(0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006)
Overlap -0.00967∗ 0.0174 -0.00132 -0.0197∗∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Overlap×Post 0.0307∗∗∗ -0.0566∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ -0.0141
(0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008)
Overlap×Post×HHI > 4000 -0.0241 0.0742∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ 0.0344
(0.013) (0.026) (0.021) (0.020)
Population -0.000423∗∗∗ -0.000557∗∗ 0.000457∗ -0.000390∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Income 0.00159 -0.00368 -0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Discounters Market Share 0.0496∗∗ 0.0450 -0.0978∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.031) (0.029) (0.034)
Net Sales Floor 0.00000434 0.0000214∗∗∗ -0.00000906∗∗ -0.00000274
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House Value 0.000333∗∗∗ 0.000438∗∗∗ 0.000636∗∗∗ 0.000141∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI > 4000 0.0421∗∗∗ -0.0240 0.173∗∗∗ -0.0326
(0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Quarter 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.00229∗ 0.0103∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.996∗∗∗ -0.467∗ 2.904∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.220) (0.226) (0.149)
Observations 216060 77605 71960 51881
R2 .8871619 .8412363 .8916562 .9499007
Clustered-robust standard errors at the category-insignia levell in parentheses. We control for fixed effect
at the category-insignia level as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal dummies. The symbols ***,
**, * denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 1.14: Interaction with divestiture: Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample C1000 Jumbo Competitors
Post -0.148∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.029) (0.038) (0.035)
Overlap -0.00678 -0.00723 -0.00463 -0.0127
(0.009) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016)
Overlap×Post 0.00329 0.00164 0.00641 0.0130
(0.026) (0.043) (0.039) (0.046)
Overlap×Post×Divestiture 0.00834 0.00551 0.0135 0.0345
(0.038) (0.054) (0.053) (0.100)
Population -0.000164 -0.000213 -0.000195 -0.0000617
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Income 0.00192 0.000366 0.00120 0.00301
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Discounters Market Share 0.0464∗ 0.00933 0.0647 0.0979∗∗
(0.020) (0.029) (0.080) (0.037)
Net Sales Floor 0.00000351 0.00000815 -0.00000215 0.00000143
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House value 0.0000127 0.0000481 0.00000716 -0.0000292
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI 0.0000576 -0.000110 0.000148 -0.000190
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Divestiture -0.00209 0.00202 -0.0156 -0.00801
(0.014) (0.019) (0.027) (0.031)
Quarter 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0482∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -6.529∗∗∗ -5.501∗∗∗ -5.855∗∗∗ -8.021∗∗∗
(0.517) (0.761) (1.048) (0.930)
Observations 109,908 43,645 27,217 39,046
R2 0.9528 0.9512 0.9600 0.9510
Clustered-robust standard errors at the product-insignia level in parentheses. We control for fixed
effect at the product-insignia level as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal dummies. The
symbols ***, **, * denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 1.15: Interaction with divestiture: Variety
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample C1000 Jumbo Competitors
Post -11.24∗∗∗ -17.28∗∗∗ -10.17∗∗∗ -2.002
(1.498) (2.025) (1.647) (1.288)
overlap 3.438∗∗∗ 11.53∗∗∗ 1.820∗∗∗ -4.090∗∗∗
(0.554) (1.281) (0.431) (0.869)
Overlap×Post -3.834∗∗∗ -19.58∗∗∗ 13.86∗∗∗ 0.671∗
(0.447) (1.925) (1.407) (0.314)
Overlap×Post×Divestiture 0.578 10.15∗∗∗ -16.39∗∗∗ -3.013∗∗∗
(0.297) (1.217) (1.709) (0.478)
Population -0.107∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ 0.0192 -0.0490∗∗
(0.013) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015)
Average Income 0.0457 -1.804∗∗∗ -1.466∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.245) (0.208) (0.266)
Net Sales Floor 0.415∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.095) (0.024) (0.022)
House Value 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0568∗∗∗ 0.0643∗∗∗ -0.0236∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
Discounters Market Share -6.851∗∗∗ -25.91∗∗∗ -1.795 12.44∗∗∗
(1.445) (3.234) (1.970) (2.788)
HHI -0.104∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ 0.00937 -0.192∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.030) (0.011) (0.039)
Divestiture -9.926∗∗∗ -15.54∗∗∗ -7.161∗∗∗ -6.563∗∗∗
(0.965) (1.721) (0.874) (1.111)
Quarter 1.337∗∗∗ 2.579∗∗∗ 0.244∗ 0.372∗
(0.171) (0.289) (0.113) (0.145)
Constant -100.3∗∗ -336.7∗∗∗ 146.9∗∗∗ 67.12∗
(35.841) (56.505) (22.743) (31.699)
Observations 182146 73503 58254 50389
R2 .8770395 .8333096 .9005832 .9420009
Clustered-robust standard errors at the category-insignia levell in parentheses. We control
for fixed effect at the category-insignia level as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal
dummies. The symbols ***, **, * denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
level, respectively.
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Table 1.16: Interaction with divestiture: Average Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample C1000 Jumbo Competitors
Post -0.0464∗∗∗ 0.00577 -0.166∗∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.007)
Overlap -0.00378 0.0257∗ 0.00567 -0.0233∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Overlap×Post 0.0579∗∗∗ -0.0391∗ 0.264∗∗∗ -0.0127
(0.009) (0.015) (0.020) (0.009)
Overlap×Post×Divestiture -0.133∗∗∗ -0.0276 -0.319∗∗∗ -0.0389∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.034) (0.018)
Population -0.000220∗ -0.000629∗∗∗ 0.000794∗∗∗ -0.000580∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Income -0.000349 -0.00383 -0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Discounters Market Share 0.0705∗∗∗ 0.0732∗ -0.185∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.031) (0.040) (0.028)
Net Sales Floor -0.00000218 0.0000157∗ -0.0000207∗∗∗ -0.00000465
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House Value 0.000369∗∗∗ 0.000445∗∗∗ 0.000676∗∗∗ 0.0000563
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI 0.00128∗∗∗ 0.000457 0.00208∗∗∗ -0.000180
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divestiture 0.0202∗∗ 0.0204 -0.00271 -0.00121
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Quarter 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.00878∗∗∗ 0.00676∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.628∗∗∗ -0.174 1.629∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.269) (0.201) (0.145)
Observations 174,278 62,979 58,174 53,125
R2 0.8828 0.8439 0.8825 0.9461
Clustered-robust standard errors at the category-insignia levell in parentheses. We control for fixed effect
at the category-insignia level as well as a time trend and quarterly seasonal dummies. The symbols ***,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Telecommunications is an infrastructure industry where the network is an essential in-
put to provide telecoms services to consumers. In the last decade, investments in Next
Generation Networks (henceforth ”NGNs”)1 have been focal to policy makers attention:
promoting fast and ultra-fast internet access for all European household is the target of
the Digital Agenda prompted by the European Commission in 2010.2
Nowadays, fast, reliable and connected digital networks underpin every part of our
business and private lives: few examples are video on demand applications, high definition
television, cloud services. The deployment of ultrafast broadband networks that enable
a massive increase in bandwidth has become a major issue for regulator and telecom
companies.
Telecom markets are characterized by high structural barriers (high economies of scale,
high sunk cost) that make investment and full-based facility entry hard to sustain. Fol-
lowing the market liberalization, regulatory policies have typically promoted the entry of
alternative operators in the retail telecoms market by mandating access to the existing
infrastructure of the incumbent (the former monopolist). This approach has been trans-
posed in the academic literature as the ladder of investment approach (”LOI”): entrants
should be progressively encouraged to make investment in network assets which are less
and less easily replicable - thus climbing the so called ”ladder of investment”.
Regulatory tools may be detrimental for infrastructure investment. If the access prices
to the legacy copper network are set too low, entrants might prefer relying on the incum-
bent’s network and their incentives to invest in their own infrastructure may be hindered.
The LOI requires the regulator to ”burn up the rungs” on which the entrant is standing
while placing higher rungs (i.e higher level of access) on the investment ladder to neutral-
ize such effect. However, this poses a problem of regulatory credibility commitment and
informational requirement: entrants must believe that mandatory access will be tempo-
rary and regulator should know when the entrant is ready to move to the higher level of
access.
It turns out that setting attractive terms of access to the legacy network to promote
short-run competition can hinder entrant firms to invest and also reduce the infrastructure
owners’ (incumbents) incentives to upgrade their network. Regulatory tools can not
1Next Generation Networks (NGNs) are very high bandwidth networks featuring an architecture
able to integrate quad-play and high end services. NGNs can include VDSL (very-high-bit-rate digital
subscriber line), cable, fiber.
2The Europe 2020 Strategy seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to internet
speeds above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50 % or more of European households to subscribe to internet connections
above 100 Mbps. See Communication from the Commission to the Europena Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions - A Digital Agenda for
Europe, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R(01)
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only prevent investments in the existing technology, but also investment in a superior
technology, thereby delaying the migration from old to new infrastructure technology.
Setting the adequate regulatory framework to foster investment is not an easy task.
Regulators should indeed strike the balance betweeen, on one hand, encouraging invest-
ment and innovation, giving the investors the long term stability of revenues they seek
when making large commitments to infrastructural renewal and, on the other hand, pro-
moting price-orientated service competition and avoiding the assertion of monopoly priv-
ileges over these new infrastructure.
When revising the regulatory framework for the new telecommunication networks
in 2007, the European Commission (henceforth ”EC” or ”Commission”) has carefully
considered whether pursuing a forbearance approach and remove regulatory commitments
on the NGNs.3
At that time, the EC noted that although broadband penetration rate was increasing
in Europe, fiber-to-the-home (FTTH)4 networks were still very little developed. This was
strongly in contrast with Japan and USA, where the take-up of fiber seemed to be driven
by intense local competition with electricity utilities in Japan, and strong competition
between cable and telephone companies in USA. Infrastructure based competition, rather
than service or access-based competition, may have played a role.
The impact assessment explored three main policy options:
option 1: separate the incumbent’s wholesale and retail operation, by way of an
accounting, and/or functional and/or structural separation of the infrastructure
and service provision;
option 2: no regulation, which implies removing or restrict sector-specific regulation
(forbearance approach);
option 3: maintain the current model of the framework.
The Commission considered that a modified option 3, where mandatory functional
seperation is an exceptional measure available to the national regulator, was the most
appropriate option.5 As to option 2 (regulatory forbearance), the EC noted that the
3European Commission, 2007: Impact assessment accompanying the document to the Commis-
sion proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending European Par-
liament and Council Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC and 202/21/EC. Available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2007:1472:FIN:EN:PDF
4Fiber-to-the-x indicates a broadband network using optical fiber to provide all or part of the local
loop used for the last mile telecommunications. In case of fiber-to-the-home, fiber reaches the boundary
of the living space.
5It should be stressed that the European regulatory framework requires national regulator to impose
ex-ante remedies only on operators that are found to have significant market power. Starting from 2014,
national regulators can identify additional markets susceptible of regulation through the application of
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presence of competing alternative infrastructures was key, and in the absence of such
infrastructure competition, regulation plays a vital role in setting the right conditions for
accessing the incumbent’s infrastructure and thereby creating service-based competition.
The EC considered that option 2 carried a strong risk of disrupting the level playing field
between market players without any clear indication that it would lead to more investment
and innovation.
The Review of the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework carried out
in 2016 goes along the same lines. The 2016 Review, indeed, seeks to ensure a more
legally certain approach to network access regulation, encourage the re-use of existing civil
engineering for infrastructure deployment, the use of commercial agreements including co-
investment and access agreement between telecoms operators.6
The conflict between regulation, competition and investment has been highly debated
in the literature, and there is a wide theoretical literature that investigates the rela-
tionship between access pricing and investment in telecoms market. This chapter aims
at contributing to the existing literature by illustrating a theoretical model where high
access price (to the limit of being excessive from the regulator’s point of view) to the
legacy copper network spur both entrants’ and the incumbent’s investment in a superior
broadband technology (the fiber).
The discussion is motivated by the investment strategies pursued by the alternative
operators in the Slovak fixed telecoms market, following the incumbent’s refusal to supply
access to its legacy copper network. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2
provides the factual background on the abuse of dominance in the Slovak market. Section
2.3 presents a review of the most relevant literature, focusing on the most recent contri-
butions. Section 2.4 describes the setting of the strategic investment game, while Section
2.5 presents the obtained findings. Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 discuss, respectively, the
access price would have been set by the regulator and the conditions under which the in-
cumbent would react to the alternative operators’ investment by investing itself. Section
2.8 concludes.
2.2 The abuse of dominant position in the Slovak
market
Slovak Telekom (ST) is the fixed incumbent operator of the Slovak market, and started
offering broadband services in 2003. In 2004, Slovakia entered the European Union and
the so-called ”three criteria test” contained in Article 2 of the EC Recommendation of 9 October 2014




adopted the European Directives on national regulation. In 2005, the Slovak telecom
regulator, designated ST as holding significant market power in the fixed broadband
market and mandated the operator to provide wholesale access to its copper network and
to publish a Reference Unbundling Offer (RUO) establishing the conditions under which
alternative operators could gain access to its unbundled local loops.7
In 2014, the EC fined ST for abusive conduct in the period from August 2005 (date
of launch of the first reference unbundling offer) to at least the end of 2010. According
to the EC, ST refused to properly supply access to its LLU (e.g. witholding relevant
information on the physical site of their local loop unbundling) and engaged in margin
squeeze practice (by charging excessively wholesale pricing that would have impeded an
equally efficient competitor to enter the market).
Since alternative operators could not get access to the local loop of ST’s copper net-
work, they had to look for alternative solutions to provide fixed broadband services:
Orange Slovensko (hencefort ”Orange” or ”OSK”), active in the Slovak mobile mar-
ket since 1997, entered the fixed market by deploying its own fiber network around
2006 and 2007 in urban areas;
UPC Slovakia, the main cable operator of the country, started offering triple-play
services (TV, broaband and voice) in 2006 over its cable networks;
Slovanet, SWAN and Benestra started acquiring in 2007 smaller and local players,
that were using different access technologies (WIMAX, cable, fiber).
Moreover, the evidence collected shows that, after the launch of fibre service by Orange,
Slovak Telekom has also announced a similar intent: offering fiber services under the T-
Com brand.
The evidence from the Slovak market shows that, by setting excessively high access
price to its copper network, the incumbent has provided entrants with incentives to invest
in fiber network. The model developed in this chapter sheds light on which are the
mechanisms that make this outcome possible.
2.3 Literature review
Existing theoretical studies on the relationship beween access regulation and investment
in the broadband market mainly fall into three categories:
7The local loop unbundling (LLU) is a regulatory regime that requires the incumbent telephone
companies to unbundle the last-mile copper loop to the entrant carriers.
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papers investigating the impact of access pricing on the incumbent’s investment in
the quality of the existing technology;
papers investigating the impact of access pricing on the timing of the entrant’s
investment in the existing technology;
papers investigating the impact of access pricing on both the incumbent’s and the
entrant’s incentives to invest in a superior technology.
The first and second strand of the literature examines the impact of mandatory local
loop unbundling8 on firms’ incentives to invest in the existing technology. The ”ladder
of investment theory”, originally developed by [Cave and Vogelsang, 2003], posits that
allowing the entrant to lease some network elements that are difficult to replicate (such
as the last-mile copper loop) at the initial stage of competition may encourage them to
invest in their own facilities some time later. This argument has been fiercely criticized.
First, many papers proves that mandatory unbundling adversely affects incumbent’s
incentives to invest into the upgrades and maintenance of existing facilities. [Gayle and
Weisman, 2007] show that decreasing - rather than increasing - the unbundling access
price can discourage investment in process innovation. [Foros, 2004] examines the interplay
between a vertically integrated firm and an independent competitor in the retail market
for broadband services. The latter leases access to the network of the vertical integrated
firm. The paper shows that, if the two firms do not differ too much with respect to
their ability to offer value-added services when the input quality is improved, access
price regulation reduces incumbent’s incentives to invest. If the vertical integrated firm’s
ability to offer value added services is much higher than that of the rival, and there is
access price regulation, the vertical integrated firm will overinvest to drive the rival out
of the market. [Kotakorpi, 2006] shows that when the incumbent’s investment generates
spillovers to rivals’ demand, the incumbent will invest less than the social optimum. When
access price is regulated, the problem is exacerbated as the incumbent is not allowed to
make profits on access provision. [Vareda, 2010] shows that an increase in access price
gives the incumbent higher incentives to invest in quality upgrades, but it discourages
cost-reducing investments.9 The effect of an increase in access price on the aggregate
investment will depend on the weight of each type of investment.
Access regulation may also affect the entrant’s investment incentives. [Bourreau and
Dogan, 2006] shows that mandatory unbundling delays facility-based entry. The paper
8See footnote 7.
9Quality upgrades allow to increase bandwidth and the number of potential services, by relying on
the installation of new fiber optic cables. Cost reducing investments allow to reduce the cost per user, by
relying on more sofisticated network equipment. The quality upgrading investment is modelled as a shift
in both the incumbent’s and entrant’s demand function. The cost reducing investment, instead, reduces
only the incumbent’s costs and it is likely to reduce the rival’s number of subscribers.
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also argues that sunset clauses - i.e. clauses specifying ex-ante a period of time after which
the incumbent’s network will be no longer regulated - are not effective: in a unregulated
environment, when the threat of facility-based entry becomes likely, the incumbent will
prefer charging attractive access prices to its network, therefore further delaying entrant’s
investment. The author suggests that the appropriate policy for regulators is to commit
to ban unbundled access when facility-based entry becomes feasible. [Avenali et al., 2010]
show instead that an access price that rises over time is critical to foster alternative
operators’ investment.
This chapter mainly contributes to the third strand of the literature, which exam-
ines the relationship between access regulation and investment incentives in a superior
technology. The most recent contributions to this strand are listed below.
[Bourreau et al., 2012] analyse the investment decision of both an incumbent and
an entrant. They develop a sequential investment game in which the incumbent moves
first. At the beginning of the game, both firms rely on the incumbent’s old generation
network. The entrant pays an access price, which is exogenous and set by the regulator.
The original feature of the model is that firms are assumed to invest in a continuum of
areas, and investment costs vary across areas. The paper shows that high access price
increases entrant’s investment, while the effect on the incumbent’s investment may be
ambiguous. The latter is due to the presence of two opposite effects: the ”retail-level
migration effect” and the ”wholesale-revenues effect”. When the access price to the old
generation network is low, the price of the retail services based on the old generation
network is low, and the incumbent will need to set relatively low prices for the retail
services based on the new generation network, as to attract consumers. This reduces
the profitability of investing in the new generation network. The wholesale-revenue effect
works in the opposite direction. When the access price to the old generation network
is low, the opportunity cost of investing in the new generation network is low since the
foregone wholesale revenues will be low. This increases the profitability of investing in
the new generation network.
[Inderst and Peitz, 2012] develop a strategic investment game in which both the in-
cumbent and the entrant will simultaneously make their investment decisions given the
decision of their respective competitor. There is no duplication of investments: investment
costs relative to demand are assumed too high to make network expansion profitable for
more than one of the two firms. Investment costs are symmetric, the access price to the
incumbent’s network is exogenously set by the regulator. The authors show that, when
access to the new technology is not mandated, a higher access price for the old technol-
ogy leads to stronger investment’s incentives for the entrants and weaker investment’s
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incentives for the incumbent.10
[Brito et al., 2012] analyse the incentives of an incumbent and an entrant to invest
and to give access to a new technology. They develop a two stage game: in stage 1, both
firms decide whether to invest, if only one firm invests, it makes an access price offer to
the rival; in stage 2, if one of the firms did not invest, it chooses which technology to use,
if any. The entrant and the incumbent have the same investment costs, the access price
to the old technology of the incumbent is exogenous. The authors show that if the invest-
ment cost is low, there is a unique equilibrium where both firms invest. If the investment
cost is high, either there is a unique equilibrium when the entrant alone invests, or two
equilibria coexist: in one the incumbent alone invests, and in the other the entrant alone
invests. The case where the entrant alone invests occurs for a larger set of parameter
values. This occurs because the incumbent pays a lower access price when it asks for
access to the new technology since, differently than the entrant, it has an outside option
of using its own old technology at a zero access price.
The original feature of this chapter is that access price is endogenous and set by the
incumbent. The purpose of the model is indeed to explain the mechanism through which
an abuse of dominant position can affect investment incentives. The abuse of dominance is
transposed into the model by allowing the incumbent to arbitrarily set the access price to
its own (old) technology. This chapter also differs from the reviewed literature by taking
the following approach: (i) both the incumbent and the entrant simultaneously make
their investment decision in the new technology, (ii) there is asymmetric information on
investment costs, (iii) investment can be duplicated and finally (iv) access to the new
technology is not granted.
2.4 The setting
There are two firms, an incumbent (firm I) and an entrant (firm E), competing in the
retail telecoms market to provide broadband services. At the beginning of the game,
the incumbent relies on its legacy copper network (the old generation network, OGN) to
provide retail services. The entrant may instead decide to lease access to the incumbent’s
copper network at the unit price a ≥ 0, or to invest in a superior infrastructure (the next
generation network, NGN). The access price a is set by the incumbent.
10This applies both in case of drastic and non-drastic innovation. In the latter case, however, the
authors assume that the incumbent is subject to access regulation only when it does not invest. When it
invests, it will act as a monopolist.
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2.4.1 Demand for broadband services
Similarly to [Bourreau et al., 2012], this model adopts the competitive setting of quantity
competition with quality differentiation from [Katz and Shapiro, 1985]. The indirect
utility function of a consumer of type τ is U = τ + sj − pj, where sj and pj denote
the quality and price of firm j, with j = i, e. Consumers’ type is uniformly distributed
over (0, 1]. Firms set quantities, and all the other marginal costs and wholesale costs are
normalized to zero.11 The quality of the OGN is denoted by so, and the quality of the
NGN by sn. Therefore, firms set sj = s
o or sn, for j = i, e. Since the NGN allows to
provide premium broadband services, sn > so.
In the Katz and Shapiro setting, if both the incumbent and the entrant are active in
equilibrium, their quality adjusted prices are the same, pi−si = pe−se = p̂. The marginal
consumer has valuation τ = p̂, and hence, for the uniform distribution assumption, the
total demand is given by Q = qi + qe = 1− p̂.
2.4.2 Timing and strategies
The strategic investment game has two stages which unfold as follows. In stage 1, the
incumbent decides the level of the access price a. In stage 2, the entrant and the incum-
bent simultaneously make their investment decisions given the decision of their respective
competitor. The incumbent’s investment strategy may be:
relying on its copper network and providing quality so; or
investing in the NGN (the fiber network), paying the investment cost I and providing
quality sn.
The entrant’s strategies may instead be:
leasing access to the incumbent’s copper network, providing quality so, and paying
the access price a; or
investing in the NGN, paying the investment cost I and providing quality sn; or
staying out of the market.
2.4.3 Profits
The incumbent’s profits are equal to Πi = piqi+aqe, whereas the entrant’s profit are equal
to Πe = (pe − a)qe with a = 0 if the entrant employs the NGN. Profits after deduction of
11This is an innocent assumption as long as the demand is assumed to be linear.
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investment cost are given as Πk,lj − I, where k, l = O,N refer to the network technology of
the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. Investment costs are assumed to be constant
across different geographical areas (the fixed of cost of rolling out the fiber network does
not depend on the consumers’ location).
The investing firm will not grant its competitors access to the new technology.
The equilibrium gross profits in each possible configuration are presented below:
1. Service-based competition within the copper network - both firms employ the in-
cumbent’s copper network:
Πo,oi (a) =
(1 + so)2 + 5a(1− a) + 5aso
9
Πo,oe (a) =
(1 + so − 2a)2
9
2. Infrastructure-based competition between the copper and the fiber network:
the incumbent uses its copper network, while the entrant employs its own fiber
network:
Πo,ni =
(1 + 2so − sn)2
9
Πo,ne =
(1 + 2sn − so)2
9
the incumbent employs the fiber network while the entrant relies on access to
the incumbent’s copper network:
Πn,oi (a) =
(1 + 2sn − so)2 + 5a(1− a) + a(sn + 4so)
9
Πn,oe (a) =
(1 + 2so − sn − 2a)2
9
3. Infrastructure-based competition between the fiber networks (both firms employ







4. The entrant stays out of the market and the incumbent is monopolist:
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As in [Bourreau et al., 2012], when the entrant relies on the incumbent’s network, its
profits decrease with the access price. Conversely, the incumbent’s profits increase with
the access price up to a certain level. Indeed, when the access price is excessively high,
increasing it further may reduce the entrant’s demand and, in turn, wholesale revenues and
thereby decreasing the incumbent’s profits. The thresholds on the access price correspond
to the monopoly access prices.12
2.5 The equilibrium
In this section we solve the equilibrium by backward induction. so is normalized to zero,
so that sn measures the technology gap. The innovation is not drastic: the gap between
the old and new technology is not excessively high. This applies as long as 0 < sn < 1+2so
so that Πo,ni > 0.
2.5.1 Stage 2: investment decision
The stage 2 of the game can be depicted in a normal form. The value of a will depend
on the choice of the incumbent in stage 1.
Table 2.1: The investment decision







e − I Πoi (a);0
sn Πn,oi − I;Πn,oe (a) Π
n,n
i − I; Πn,ne − I Πni ;0
12The thresholds are as follows:
∂Πo,oi




∂a ≥ 0 if a ≤
(5+sn+4so)
10
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Πo,oe (a) ≥ 0 and Πn,oe (a) ≥ 0 for any value of a and sn. We assume that entry costs are
zero, and in case Πo,oe (a) = 0 and Π
n,o
e (a) = 0, the entrant will prefer to enter rather than
not to enter the market. The strategy NE is hence a dominated strategy for the entrant.
The incumbent will decide to invest in the new technology when the extra-profits it
gains when investing are such that it covers the investment costs:
suppose the entrant invests: the incumbent will invest only if Πn,ni − Π
o,n
i ≥ I. It
will invest for I 6 4
9
sn; [A]
suppose the entrant does not invest: the incumbent will invest only if Πn,oi −Π
o,o
i (a) ≥




As for the incumbent, the entrant will decide to invest in the new technology if the
extra-profits cover the investment costs:
suppose the incumbent invests: the entrant will invest only if Πn,ne − Πn,oe (a) ≥ I.




suppose the incumbent does not invest: the entrant will invest only if Πo,ne −Πo,oe (a)




2.5.2 Stage 1: setting a
Table 2.2 recaps the equilibrium strategies of the incumbent and the entrant for the
relevant values of I.13
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Assumption 1 There is asymmetric information on the investment costs: the incumbent
does not know the fixed cost the entrant will have to bear to deploy the fiber infrastructure.




is an innocent assumption considering that both the threshold [A] and the profits for
0 < I 6 [A] do not depend on the level of access price. It is plausible to assume that
the entrant’s investment costs are at least equal to the incumbent’s investment costs: the
incumbent can use the copper ducts to lay the fiber cables and this provides him with a
cost advantage. Henceforth I focus on the equilibria that may arise when the investment
costs are above [A].
Depending on the level of access price a set by the incumbent, the investments’ costs
and the quality gap sn, three possible equilibria may arise:
the entrant invests alone;
the incumbent invests alone;
neither the entrant nor the incumbent invests.
As in [Brito et al., 2012], the case where the entrant alone invests occurs for a larger
set of parameter values than the case where the incumbent alone invests. The incremental
profits the entrant will obtain when it invests and the incumbent does not invest, or when
it invests and the incumbent also invests are higher than the incremental profits will get
the incumbent in the opposite situations. Indeed, when not investing, the entrant will
have always to pay an access price to rely on the incumbent’s copper network.14
The objective of this model is to investigate the underlying causes of the outcome
observed for the Slovak market. To this end, in what follows, I will ignore the equilibrium
whereby only the incumbent can invest (which may realize when entrants’ and incumbent’s
investment costs are above [B] and below [C]).
The entrant may hence decide to invest or not. The incumbent will never invest. The
entrant’s decision of investing will depend on its investment costs and the thresholds’
value. The thresholds’ value depends on a and sn. The incumbent does not know the
entrants’ investment costs and will hence set a as to maximize:
E(Πi) = (1− Prob(E invests)) · Πooi (a) + (Prob(E invests)) · Πoni (2.1)
where
14Differently from [Brito et al., 2012], the investing firm will not grant access to its network. This is a
plausible assumption: in the Slovak context, for instance, the alternative operators have invested in fiber
to react to the anticompetitive conduct pursued by the incumbent. In this setting, it is reasonable to
assume that, after investing in fiber, the alternative operator will decide to not provide the incumbent











· (Πoni − Πooi (a)) (2.2)
The incumbent faces a trade-off between increasing a to increase its profits and
decreasing a to reduce the probability that the entrant invests:




the probability that the entrant invests in the new technology is increasing in the
level of access price to the old technology;
the incumbent will be better off if the entrant does not invest: Πoni − Πooi (a) < 0;



















4sn(sn + 1)− 4a(a− 1)
9
)
· 1 + 5a(1− a)
9
(2.3)




























28sn − 45i+ 16sn2 + 10. (2.5)
This is below a = 1
2
, that is the level of access price that maximizes Πooi (a). Moreover,
this level of access price decreases in sn and increases in i: the higher will be the quality
of the new technology (sn), the higher will be the incentive of the incumbent to reduce
15See Appendix 2.9.
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the access price to discourage the entrant’s investment; the higher will be the cost of the
investment (i), the lower will be such incentive.
In equilibrium, the incumbent will set the level of access price as to reduce the thresh-
olds below which the entrant will invest. Would that be enough to discourage the entrant
from investing? The entrant’s investment costs may turn out to be lower than the in-
cumbent was expecting, and the entrant may still decide to invest. Indeed, in case the
entrant’s investment costs result to be lower than 4s
n(sn+1)−4â(â−1)
9
, the entrant will invest.
In the Slovak market, the deployment of the fiber network has been driven by the alterna-
tive operator Orange Slovensko (OSK). OSK is part of the global Orange group, which is
among the largest provider of broadband services in Europe. The know-how and financial
support of the Orange group could have enabled OSK to deploy fiber infrastructure in
the Slovak market.
The findings above are summarized in Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1 In equilibrium, (i) in case there is incomplete information on the en-
trant’s investment costs and (ii) the incumbent has not convenience to invest, the in-
cumbent will face a trade-off between increasing the access price to increase its wholesale
revenues, and decreasing the access price to dissuade the entrant from investing in a new
technology.
Proof 2.1 See Appendix 2.9.
The equilibrium level of access price does not maximize the incumbents’ wholesale
revenues, as to reduce the probability the entrant will invest. However, this may still be
higher than the fair terms would have been set by a regulator.
2.6 Social welfare and access price
The key question is understanding whether the level of access price set by the incumbent
is higher than the level the regulator would set to maximize social welfare. The Slovak
evidence shows that the incumbent has set an excessive access price, thereby abusing its
dominant position.16
Social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus. In this setting, we assumed
there are two firms: the incumbent and the entrant. The regulator may assign a positive
weight, θ, to the incumbent’s profits, to protect its incentives to invest. Social welfare
would then be equal to:
16Please consider that, according to the EC, ST’s abuse of dominance consisted of both (i) a margin
squeeze practice (in the form of excessive wholesale price) and (ii) a refusal to properly supply access to
its LLU.
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W = CS + θΠk,li + Π
k,l
e
where k, l = O,N refer to the network technology of the incumbent and the entrant,
respectively.
Both consumer and producer surplus depend on the equilibrium will arise in the mar-
ket. As before, I will focus on two possible equilibria: the entrant will invest alone, or
neither the incumbent nor the entrant will invest. In case the entrant will invest alone,
the entrant profits will be Πo,ne while the incumbent profits will be Π
o,n
i . Profits will not
depend on the access price, as the entrant will be relying on its own fiber network. The
social welfare will be:
W (a)inv =













a− sn − 2
9
= 0 (2.7)
This is a convex function, and given a ≥ 0, it is maximized for a∗inv = 0.
In case neither the entrant nor the incumbent will invest, both the firms will rely on
the legacy copper network, and the entrant will pay to the incumbent the access price.















18a− 12− 10θ − 20aθ
18
= 0 (2.9)
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For θ → ∞, a∗noinv = 12 . When the weight assigned to the incumbent’s profits is
infinitely high, the level of access price that maximize the social welfare is equal to the
level that maximize the incumbent’s profits.
Figure 2.1: The level of access price when both firms rely on copper








The equilibria that will arise will depend on whether the entrant’s investment costs
are above or below the thresholds identified in Table 2.2. The regulator does not know
the entrant’s investment costs, and will maximize the following:



















































The solution to Equation 2.10 is the level of access price that maximizes social welfare,
a∗.17
Proposition 2.2 For some combination of sn, i, and θ, the level of access price set by
the regulator, a∗, is lower than the level of access price set by the incumbent, â.
17See Appendix 2.9.
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Figure 2.2 shows the range of values of i and sn that makes the level of access price set
by the incumbent higher than the level the regulator would set. The range will depend
on the values of θ, that is the weight the regulator assigns to the incumbent’s profits.
When θ = 1 (Figure 2.2a), the incumbent sets an excessively high access price for low
values of sn. When the quality of fiber is lower, the incumbent is less threatened by the
entrant’s investment, and will set an high access price. At the same time, the regulator has
less incentives to stimulate the entrant’s investment, and will not be tempted to increase
the access price. The higher is θ, the narrower is the range of values that makes â ≥ a∗
(Figure 2.2b).
Figure 2.2
(a) Inequality range, θ = 1 (b) Inequality range, θ = 15
2.7 The incumbent’s reaction
Right after OSK started investing in fiber, the Slovak incumbent announced that ”ex-
tending optical networks to households is not to end in Slovakia with investments of
Orange”.18
Within four years of this announcement, ST has reached and surpassed the number
of OSK’s fiber subscribers (see Figure 2.3).
18See ST’s annual report, 2007: Extending optical networks to households is not to end in Slovakia
with investments of Orange. On the very first day of the commercial launch of that operator’s service
Doma, based on fibre-optics network brought right to the client’s home, a similar intent was announced by
Slovak Telekom, offering services for households under the T-Com brand. The largest fixed line operator
wants to invest by year-end SKK 1 bn in a network covering close to 200 thousand households. Orange,
currently covering some 110 thousand potential clients, wants to achieve a similar presence by then.
In the following year, Slovak Telekom anticipates investing approximately SKK 1 bn more into optics.
Orange has not yet revealed its next year’s plans but the Company’s investment will probably be around
the same level.
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Figure 2.3: Fiber services - subscribers by operator
There might be some uncertainty on the costs of the deployment of a new technology.
The decision of the entrant to invest may have made the incumbent realize that the roll-
out of the fiber infrastructure is less expensive than expected. Furthermore, the entrant’s
investment may have generated some positive spillovers:
the incumbent may directly benefit from the investment efforts made by the entrant
by obtaining savings in its administrative and contractual costs. The entrant, in-
deed, may have already went through the administrative process of obtaining the
necessary authorizations, or investigated the feasibility of the investment in the
territory19;
an earlier investment in fiber may indirectly benefit the incumbent by reducing
the uncertainity on the demand-side and, in turn, the investment risk. The initial
supply of fiber-based services may have positively affected a wide range of sector
including TV-media, healthcare, education, whose ability to enhance their services is
increased by the availability of ultra-fast broadband Internet access. This may have
enhanced the demand for fiber services and also increased consumers’ willingness to
pay.20
Given the setting of the model, the incumbent will invest if the entrant invests when:







19Similar assumptions are in [Bourreau et al., 2012]
20Another source of positive investment spillovers is related to infrastructure sharing. In this model,
however, I assume the entrant is not cooperating with the incumbent after the investment. This is
plausible given that the entrant’s investment is modelled as a reaction to the abuse of dominance position
of the incumbent.
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In the above, I assume that Ii ≥ 4s
n
9
. In the case in which, after the entrant’s invest-




) or benefited from some positive spillovers, it will decide to react to the entrant’s
investment by investing itself.
2.8 Conclusions
The relationship between regulation, competition and investment keeps on being a topic
of hot debate in the field of competition policy. In the telecommunications markets, reg-
ulatory tools have historically been considered key to promote competition at the retail
level. Entry in telecoms markets requires large and irreversible investments in infrastruc-
ture. Based on the ”ladder of investment” theory, regulators have prompted entry by
allowing alternative operators to lease access to the incumbent’s network. Entrants could
have hence invested in their own network gradually, as their customer base increased.
While encouraging entry in the short run, access regulation can hinder both the entrant’s
and incumbent’s incentives to invest.
Numerous studies show that mandating access to the incumbent’s network may delay
entrants’ investment in the existing network, or discourage incumbents from upgrading
their networks. This chapter contributes to the relatively small literature strand that
investigates the relationship between access pricing and firm’s incentives to invest in a su-
perior technology, thereby migrating from an old to a new technology. This chapter aims
at investigating the underlying causes of the outcome observed in the Slovak market. The
European Commission has fined the Slovak incumbent for having abused its dominant
position by refusing to properly supply access to its copper network and charging exces-
sively high wholesale price. In response to the abuse, alternative operators have started
developing their own network thereby leading the deployment of the fiber infrastructure
in Slovakia.
I adapted the model in [Bourreau et al., 2012] to make both access price and investment as
endogenous choices. In the model, the entrant decides whether relying on the incumbent’s
copper network or investing in a (superior) fiber network, while the incumbent decides
(i) whether investing or not and (ii) the level of access price on the copper network. The
access price and the entrant’s decision to invest are interrelated: a higher access price to
the copper network may spur entrant’s investment in fiber. The model also assumes asym-
metric information on the investment costs: the incumbent does not know the entrant’s
costs to deploy the fiber infrastructure.
Results show that, for intermediate values of investments costs, the incumbent will set
an access price higher than the fair price would have been set by the regulator, and the
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entrant invests alone in the fiber network. This chapter also shows that, when the entrant’s
investment generates some positive spillovers or reduces the incumbent’s uncertainity on
its own investment’s costs, the incumbent reacts to the entrant’s investment by investing
itself.
Conclusions are far from obvious. The findings of this chapter may suggest that dereg-
ulating access to the incumbent’s network can spur the modernization of the telecoms’
infrastructure. However, results also point towards a duplication of infrastructure and
investment costs. Moreover, the Slovak evidence shows that alternative operators have
delimited their investment effort to the urban and densely populated areas, where costs
are expected to be lower. In the rural and mostly remote areas, incentives to invest are
lower, and the incumbent would benefit from the monopoly privilege ensured by the high
access price on the copper network. The ultimate impact of the Slovak infringement on
consumers’ welfare is hard to assess and deserves further research.
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 The optimal access price set by the incumbent
In stage 2 of the strategic investment game, the incumbent sets a to maximize E(Πi) and






































28sn − 45i+ 16sn2 + 10
When the access price is a = a2, it increases with s
n - the technology gap - and
decreases with i - the higher support of the uniform distribution of Ie. This implies that
the higher is the quality of the new technology, the higher is the access price and the
higher is the probability that the entrant invests. Furthermore, the wider is the support,
the higher is the investment cost and the lower will be the access price. Such comparative
statistics do not sound reasonable: the incumbent should indeed decrease the access price
(and in turn the probability the entrant will invest) when the quality of the new technology
is high, and instead increase the same when the investment costs are high (and hence the
probability the entrant will invest is less likely). Henceforth, a2 is excluded.
Figure 2.4a and 2.4b shows the incumbents’ expected profits for a = a1 (left hand
side) and a = a3 (right hand side), for some values of s
n and i.
For any positive value of i, expected profits decrease in sn.21 This is reasonable: the
higher is the quality of the superior technology, the higher may be the demand that will
migrate to the entrant in case it will invest.
21Please consider that the assumption that a 6 1− sn and a ≤ 12 is such that s
n ≤ 12 .
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Figure 2.4





























While it is straightforward that E(Πi(a1)) ≤ E(Πi(a3)) for positive and high values
of i and regardless of sn, the relationship is less clear for the lowest positive values of i.
Figure 2.5 shows the incumbent’s expected profits for the lowest positive values of i. For
i at least above 0.2, incumbent’s expected profits are higher when the access price is set
equal to a3 (red line). This seems to be robust ∀ sn ∈ [0, 12 ].
Figure 2.5: Incumbent’s expected profits
(a) Incumbent’s expected profits, s =
0.01
(b) Incumbent’s expected profits, s =
0.5
For i ∈ [0.2,∞] and ∀ sn ∈ [0, 1
2
], the incumbent will set â = a3, as this maximizes its
profits. Figure 2.6 shows how this varies with sn (Figure 2.6a) and i (Figure 2.6b).
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Figure 2.6: The access price set by the incumbent
(a) â, i = 0.4 (b) â, sn = 0.4
2.9.2 The optimal access price set by the regulator





































Equation 2.10 is solved for a = a∗.22
Figure 2.7 and 2.8 show, respectively, how the access price a∗ varies wth sn and i for
θ = 1 and θ > 1.
When θ = 1, the regulator assigns equal weight to the profits of the entrant and the
incumbent, and the consumer surplus. In this case, the level of access price set by the
regulator decreases with i and increases with sn. Holding constant the cost of investment,
when the quality of the fiber is high, the regulator encourages investment in fiber by
making it difficult access to the incumbent’s network (Figure 2.7a). Holding constant
the quality of the fiber, when the costs of deploying fiber are expected to be high, the
regulator encourages entry by allowing access to the incumbent’s network at a lower price
(Figure 2.7b).
When θ > 1, the regulator assigns a positive weight to the profits of the incumbent to
protect its incentives to invest. In this case, the level of access price set by the regulator
increases with i and decreases with sn. This is the same comparative statics that applies
to â. Holding constant the cost of investment, when the quality of the fiber is high,
the regulator discourages investment in a superior technology by making access to the
22This equation has three roots, but two of them are imaginary.
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Figure 2.7: The access price set by the regulator, θ = 1
(a) a∗, i = 0.6 (b) a∗, s = 0.3
incumbent’s network less expensive (Figure 2.8a). The higher is θ, the higher will the be
the level of access price for a given level of sn: however, the values of the access prices
converge for high values of sn. Holding constant the quality of the fiber, when the costs
of deploying fiber are expected to be high, the regulator sets an higher access price to
increase the incumbent’s profits (Figure 2.8b). The higher is θ, the higher is the level of
access price for a given i.
Figure 2.8: The access price set by the regulator, θ > 1
(a) a∗, i = 0.6 (b) a∗, s = 0.3
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Chapter 3
Abuse of dominance in the fixed





In Europe, fixed telecoms markets generally present high entry barriers and sunk costs.
Telecom is a relatively capital-intensive industry and fixed telecoms markets are also char-
acterised by the strong presence of former national monopolists (incumbents), who rolled
out their (metallic) infrastructure over significant time periods protected by exclusive
rights.
Since the liberalization of telecoms markets, competition and regulatory authorities have
often intervened to ensure a fair competition process and guarantee the entry of alternative
operators. The European (EU) regulatory framework (Regulation 2887/2000) considers
that it would not be economically viable for new entrants to duplicate the incumbent’s
metallic local access infrastructure within a reasonable time, and it establishes that na-
tional operators with significant market power (SMP) are obliged to provide access to
their network infrastructure. Regulation mandates unbundled access1 to the metallic
local loops of national operators with SMP at transparent, non-discriminatory and fair
terms.
Over the last decades, the European Commission (EC) has opened 5 proceedings against
dominant operators in the fixed telecom markets for having refused to supply access to
their networks or squeezed their competitors’ margins in the retail markets (by setting ex-
cessively high wholesale price or charging retail prices below costs). These conducts were
considered to have exclusionary effects in the retail market for fixed telecoms services, by
preventing the entry or hindering the growth of alternative operators. Table 3.1 shows
the timeline of the 5 infringement decisions taken by the EC to fine foreclosure conducts
by incumbent operators in fixed telecoms markets.
Table 3.1: Infringement decisions adopted by the EC in fixed telecoms markets
EC decision Year of decision Period of infringement
Wanadooo (French incumbent) 2003 2001-2002
Deutsche Telekom (German incumbent) 2003 1998-2001
Telefonica (Spanish incumbent) 2007 2001-2006
Telekomunikacja Polska (Polish incumbent) 2011 2005-2009
Slovak Telekom (Slovak incumbent) 2014 2005-2010
Slovak Telekom is the most recent case investigated by the EC.2 Slovak Telecom (ST)
is the incumbent operator in Slovakia and owns the only nationwide fixed copper access
1The local loop unbundling (ULL) is a regulatory regime that requires the incumbent telephone
companies to unbundle the last-mile copper loop to the entrant carries. The last-mile loop connects the
network termination point at the subscriber’s premises to the cabinet or equivalent facility in the fixed
public telephone network.
2The decision has been adopted in October 2014 - EC Case AT 39523.
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network. The EC identified both a refusal to supply and a margin squeeze conduct. The
assessment indeed revealed that ST withheld relevant network information necessary for
the unbundling of local loops, unjustifiably reduced the scope of its regulatory obligation
to unbundle and applied excessively high wholesale prices which made it unfeasible for
alternative operators to replicate the retail broadband services offered by ST. The assess-
ment of this case has created a legal precedent according to which the indispensability of
the access product does not need to be shown if the incumbent has a legal obligation to
grant network access.3
Mandating access to the incumbent’s network is commonly regarded as a pro-competitive
measure that enables alternative operators to enter the retail market and ultimately to
invest. The underlying principle is that entrants lease some network elements that are
particularly difficult to replicate at the initial stage of competition, and invest in their
own facilities some time later when they have reached a critical mass of consumers (this is
also known as the ”ladder of investment” approach). There is however a wide theoretical
and empirical literature that questions the validity of this approach: mandatory access
may indeed distort both the incumbents and the entrants’ incentives to either upgrade
their networks or invest in a superior technology. Once entrants enjoy profits from serv-
ing consumers based on the wholesale access product provided by the incumbent, their
incentives to invest in their own infrastructure may be hindered, especially if access prices
are set too low.
Existing studies show that local loop unbundling does not stimulate the adoption of broad-
band technologies ( [Bouckaert et al., 2010], [Distaso et al., 2006]) and does not encourage
entrants to invest in their own infrastructure ( [Wallsten and Hausladen, 2009], [Bacache-
Beauvallet et al., 2014], [Briglauer et al., 2015]). Furthermore, the most recent empirical
literature shows that the number of entrants’ unbundled lines are negatively correlated
with the number of entrants’ fiber lines. Nowadays, the deployment of ultra-fast broad-
band networks, the Next-Generation Access networks, has become a major issue for reg-
ulator and telecom companies. Fiber networks are the ultimate technology to increase
bandwidth and deliver fast broadband connections. This chapter aims at contributing to
the existing literature by investigating the investment strategies pursued by fixed tele-
com operators in the Slovak broadband market, following the refusal of the incumbent
to properly and fairly provide access to its metallic infrastructure. This chapter aims at
empirically demonstrating that, by hindering access to its metallic network infrastructure,
3This has also been confirmed by the General Court (GC) on 13 December 2018: the GC held
that since the relevant regulatory framework acknowledged the indispensability of ST’s local loop for
alternative operators, the Commission was no longer required to independently establish indispensability.
While the General Court largely upheld the Commission’s decision, it reduced the fines imposed on the
basis that the Commission failed to establish that ST’s margin squeeze practices resulted in exclusionary
effects before 1 January 2006.
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ST’s anticompetitive conduct has triggered alternative operators’ incentive to invest in
their own and superior fiber infrastructure.
The original feature of this chapter is that it exploits the abuse of dominance by the
Slovak incumbent to demonstrate that banning, rather than mandating, access to the
incumbent’s copper network may cause entrants to invest. During the period 2005-2010,
Slovak Telekom has withheld from alternative operators network information that were
necessary for the unbundling of local loops and applied excessive wholesale prices to get
access to its local loops. A firm’s decision to invest in a new infrastructure generally
depends on (i) the profits it expects to gain by investing in a new technology and (ii) the
profits it expects to gain by purchasing access to the incumbent’s network. The higher
is the access price set by the incumbent, the higher will be the incremental profits from
investing, and in turn, the higher will be the incentive to invest. This is also shown in
Chapter 2 of this thesis, which demonstrates that, in case of asymmetric information on
the costs of deploying fiber, and for intermediate values of investment costs, the incum-
bent will set an excessively high access price and the entrant will decide to invest in a
superior technology.
The identification strategy of this chapter exploits heterogeneity in fiber coverage in the
European Union through a Difference in Differences (”DiD”) approach. European coun-
tries where the incumbent has not engaged into an anticompetitive conduct are used to
evaluate what would have been the evolution of entrants’ investment in fiber in Slovakia in
the absence of the abuse. In line with most of the existing related literature, this chapter
investigates investment dynamics by relying on penetration metrics. The availability of
fiber connections (i.e. fiber coverage), which would have been an exact measure of the
investment made in fiber technologies, is proxied by the number of subscribers to fiber
services (i.e. fiber penetration). This however should not impede the identification of the
effects on investment: since fiber deployment was very limited in Europe before 2005, a
positive variation in the penetration of fiber services need necessarily to be attributed to
an increase in the number of newly available fiber connections. Results show that, by
hindering access to its network, the Slovak incumbent has triggered alternative operators
to invest in fiber network.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the related empirical literature
on access regulation and broadband adoption and investment. Section 3.3 discusses the
level of fiber coverage in Slovakia, right after the end of ST’s abuse, compared to the rest
of Europe. Section 3.4 provides the factual background and shortly describes the Slovak
market structure. Section 3.5 discusses the data and identification strategy, and Section




The existing empirical literature has centered on the relationship between regulation and
broadband technologies adoption. Regulatory policies shape the mode of competition be-
tween broadband internet access providers. [Bouckaert et al., 2010] distinguishes between
three main forms of competition:
inter-platform competition: which is not dependent on access regulation, but instead
results from rivalry between multiple infrastructures in a country (e.g. DSL and
cable network);
facilities based intra-platform competition, which mainly depends on mandatory
access through local loop unbundling: alternative operators lease unbundled local
loop elements and have to invest in their own equipment;
service based intra-platform competition, which depends on mandatory access through
bitstream access: alternative operators merely resell the incumbent’s retail services.
Most of the existing literature have dealt with the relationship between different modes
of competition, as implied by regulation, and the overall penetration of broadband tech-
nologies. The ultimate aim is investigating whether mandatory access encourages broad-
band penetration, and in that case, which type of access should be imposed. While resale
service (which gives rise to service-based intra-platform competition) allows entrants to
merely resell the incumbent’s service, ULL (which instead gives rise to facilities based
intra-platform competition) requires the entrants to invest in their own equipment and,
at the same time, gives them the opportunity to differentiate their service from that of
the incumbent, for instance by offering higher speed connections.
Based on a panel data set for 20 OECD countries over the period 2003-2008, [Bouckaert
et al., 2010] finds that inter-platform competition positively affects broadband penetra-
tion, while service based competition has a significant and negative impact on penetration.
ULL have no significant impact. Broadband penetration is measured as percentage of
households subscribed to any broadband technology (DSL, cable, fiber).4 Similar findings
are obtained by [Distaso et al., 2006], who develop both a theoretical and econometric
model, demonstrating that while inter-platform competition drives broadband adoption,
intra-platform competition for the DSL services does not play a significant role.
Employing a very detailed data set covering the whole of the United Kingdom, [Valletti
and Verboven, 2015] finds that ULL has a positive effects on total broadband penetration
in the early years, and such effect disappears as the market reaches maturity. However,
4The authors relies on a dataset provided by Analysys Mason, similar to the one that informs the
analysis of this chapter.
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they also estimate that local areas experiencing ULL entry have a considerably higher
average broadband speed than those that have not experienced such entry.
[Crandall et al., 2013] reviewed the major empirical studies conducted between 2003 and
2011 which test for the effects of unbundling on either broadband penetration or, in a
few cases, broadband availability. Overall, the author concluded that these studies do not
support the hypothesis that unbundling increases broadband penetration.5
In addition to these studies, there is also a large body of empirical research on the
effects of ULL on investment. According to the review conducted by [Cambini and Jiang,
2009], most of the evidence shows that local loop unbundling discourages both incumbent
and entrants from investing in infrastructure. This is the branch of the related literature
much closer to the analysis presented in this chapter, and I present below the most
recent contributions. In most of the cases, investment in fiber is measured through fiber
penetration, that is the number of subscribers to fiber services. Differently from the papers
cited above, these studies focus on the effects of ULL on the penetration of a specific, and
superior, broadband technology.
[Wallsten and Hausladen, 2009] look at the correlation between the use of unbundled local
loops and the rollout of fiber broadband connections, based on biannual dataset of 27 EU
countries from 2002-2007. Results shows that the number of broadband lines per capita
provided over unbundled local loops is negatively correlated with broadband connections
over fiber. The most likely explanation for the negative results of local loop unbundling
on investment in fiber is that firms with the ability to invest in their own equipment are
more likely to choose to use local loops instead of building new platforms if the option is
available to them.
[Bacache-Beauvallet et al., 2014] use an annual dataset of 15 European countries from 2002
to 2010 and test the validity of the ”ladder of investment, (LOI)” regulatory approach.
The idea of the LOI is that, by setting low access prices, the regulator encourages service
based-entry in the short term. Then, once entrants have gained a sufficient customer base,
they can climb up the ladder of investment and invest in their own facility. This basically
implies that service-based intra-platform competition could serve as a stepping stone for
facilities-based intra-platform competition which, in turn, can encourage inter-platform
competition. The paper develops an econometric model in which the number of broadband
lines that belong to new entrants and are deployed using a new access technology (e.g.
fiber) is the dependent variable, and the number of bitstream access or unbundled lines
that are used by new entrants in previous periods is the main explanatory variable. They
find that operators that use unbundled local loops do not ascend the ladder of investment
5Few papers argue in favour of the positive effect of unbundling on broadband penetration and
availability, see [Willig, 2019] and [Ford and Spiwak, 2004].
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and build their own infrastructure. Their empirical results are consistent with the ladder
of investment hypothesis only when considering the migration from bitstream access lines
to unbundled lines.
Based on a sample of EU27 countries over the period 2005-2014, [Briglauer et al., 2015]
investigate the relationship between ULL prices and the new broadband technologies
adoption and coverage. This is one of the very few papers that examines the effects of a
change in the prices to access the old technology on the new technology adoption. Results
show that a 1% increase in the regulated price to access the DSL network increases the
penetration and coverage of FTTx technologies by respectively 0.45% and 0.47%.
This chapter aims at contributing to the existent empirical literature by examining the
impact of an abuse of dominance in the DSL segment, which impedes entrants to get access
to the incumbent’s network, on investment in fiber networks. While the existing literature
exploits heterogeneity in ULL prices or in the number of unbundled lines across European
countries and over a time-span to identify the causal relationship between unbundling and
investment in fiber, this chapter offers an ex-post evaluation exercise where the effects of
access regulation on investment are evaluated after an infringement of such regulatory
obligations. Finally, this chapter exploits a rich and disaggregated dataset providing
quarterly data on the number of subscribers to each broadband technology and operator
in almost all EU27 countries, over the period 2003-2010.
3.3 Heterogeneity of fiber coverage in Europe in 2011
In March 2010, the EC launched the Europe 2020 strategy which includes the ”Digital
Agenda for Europe”, aimed at harnessing the full potential of the Information Commu-
nication Technologies (ICT). As part of the Agenda, Member States had to provide their
citizens with basic broadband coverage by 2013 and broadband speeds of at least 30
Megabits per second (Mbps) by 2020. According to the study carried out by Point-topic
for the EC6, by the end of 2011, almost 95.7% of households - over 200 million - in the
European Union had access to at least a basic level of fixed broadband services. These
were based on fixed line technologies capable of providing at least 2 Mpbps downstream,
and mainly including DSL, WiMAX7 and Standard Cable8. The DSL technology is pro-
vided through the conventional telephone lines and relies on the legacy copper network
6Broadband coverage in Europe in 2011 - Mapping progress towards the coverage objectives
of the Digital Agenda. A study prepared for the European Commission DG Communications
Networks, Content & Technology. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/
study-broadband-coverage-2011
7WiMAX is a wireless service based on IEEE standards.
8This is broadband delivered over a fixed TV network using coaxial cable according to the earlier
cable broadband standard such as DOCSIS 1 or 2.
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previously owned by the State. Over 50% of EU households - 105 million - also had Next
Generation Access (hereinafter, ”NGA”) services available to them, capable of deliver-
ing at least 30 Mbps, and that are mainly based on the VDSL9, fiber to the premises
(FTTP)10 and Docsis 3 Cable11 technologies. In particular, FTTP is the ”ultimate tech-
nology” for delivering super fast broadband directly into people’s homes and businesses.
This is based on fiber optic cables, rather than copper cables, connected all the way from
the exchange to the premises. The Point-topic study shows however that FTTP is, on
average, available to just 12% of homes. Most notably, the picture is fragmented when
looking at each Member State.
Figure 3.1 shows the FTTP coverage in European Member States in 2011, that is right
after the end of the ST’s abuse in Slovakia. FTTP coverage is measured as the percentage
of homes within a country which have access to FTTP. Having access means being able
to subscribe to the FTTP without requiring significant additional investment.12
Based on a partitional clustering method13, countries have been grouped in 5 clusters, de-
pending on their FTTP coverage. Slovakia, together with Lithuania and Latvia (cluster
1), have the greatest FTTP coverage, thereby leading the investment in FTTP technolo-
gies. In general, Eastern European Countries have the greatest coverage: most of them
are indeed above the European average of 11.6%. Among the Western European Coun-
tries, the five Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden - have
achieved well above average fiber coverage. Portugal, France and Luxembourg are also
well above the average.
9This a ”very-high-speed” version of DSL capable of delivering 25Mbps or more over conventional
telephone lines.
10There are several configurations of fiber network infrastructure which are mainly arranged into two
groups: FTTP/FTTH/FTTB (Fiber laid all the way to the premises/home/building) and FTTC/N (fiber
laid to the cabinet/node, with copper wires completing the connection).
11This is broadband delivered over a fixed TV network using coaxial cable according to the DOCSIS
3 standard, providing download speeds of 30 Mbps and above.
12Please note that this means that a home that is covered by a FTTP line has not necessarily activated
that line and subscribed to the fiber services.
13Partitional clustering is opposite to hierarchical clustering and requires data to be assigned into k-
clusters by minimizing the distance between two points. Figure 3.1 is based on k-means clustering, which
starts with a user defined number of clusters, k. The objective function is given by the Euclidean distance
between a data point and the cluster center (see [Saxena and al., 2017]). I have iteratively imputed higher
number of clusters and selected the optimal number of clusters based on the highest value of the Calinski
and Harabasz (1974) pseudo-F.
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Figure 3.1: FTTP coverage in Europe - 2011
Most of the very low-coverage countries (cluster 5) rely on alternative NGA technolo-
gies such as Docsis 3 Cable and VDSL. In 2011, the development of fiber infrastructure in
Europe was hence very heterogeneous. There are several factors explaining why Central
Eastern European (CEE) countries have taken the lead:
1. the immediate need is greatest since copper networks are less developed; this is
particularly true for local areas which rely on local cable-TV networks or fixed
wireless access technologies;
2. a large proportion of housing consists of several flats (typically 40) per block, and
this makes economically attractive to run optical fiber to a single block. In many
Eastern countries, indeed, infrastructure has been deployed locally and using non-
standard architecture and deployment techniques;
3. lower costs to deploy the fiber network, which is often done aerially and, in any
case, relies on lower labour costs;
4. late launch of DSL services14;
14For instance, in Romania the incumbent Romtelecom was relatively late and launched DSL services
in 2005. Partly as a consequence, alternative carriers entered the broadband market either using existing
infrastructure (e.g. cable operators) or new infrastructure (e.g. fibre-based Internet Service Providers
or ISPs – the so-called ‘neighbourhood networks’). See http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/broadband/
BB MDG Romania BBCOM.pdf
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5. late entry in the EU and late launch of wholesale services on the incumbent’s net-
work. Most of the CEE countries have entered the EU in 2004, with the exception
of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, and Croatia in 2013. The late entry in the EU
delayed the adoption of the EC Regulation, and in particular the adoption of EC
Regulation 2887/2000 on local loop unbundling, which has been applied to Member
States since 2001, and required operators holding significant market power on the
fixed public telephone network to give access to their unbundled local loops. Even
after the entry in the EU, some incumbent operators refused to supply access to
the local loops of their copper network calling for the intervention of the EC, who
fined them for abuse of dominance and imposed them to provide access. This has
occurred in Slovakia, Polonia and Slovenia.
In the absence of a proper copper network, and in light of the favourable investment
conditions, telecoms operators launched FTTP networks quite early in CEE countries.
With the exception of the Estonia, where the incumbent Elion has driven the investment
in fiber15, small regional operators and alternative operators have been the leader of the
FTTP investment in CEE countries. In Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, the
investment by alternative and regional operators have almost immediately been followed
by the incumbent investment.
In the Nordic countries, instead, and in particular in Sweden and Denmark, the de-
ployment of fiber has been driven by municipal organizations and electricity utilities.16
Sweden is characterised by the early deployment of point to point FTTH, led primarily
by independent municipal organizations such as Stokab. Stokab has been formed in 1994
and financed by the City of Stockholm. By the end of 2011, 90% of all Stockholm’s
households and nearly 100% of all companies had FTTH connections with speeds of up to
1 Gigabit-per-second.17 In Denmark, instead, the deployment of fiber network has been
mainly driven by utilities company. The primary FTTH network is the point-to-point
network developed by DONG Energy (”DONG”). The second and third largest fixed
telecom operators, who have also heavily contributed to the fiber deployment, are Waoo!
- established as a product and marketing house for the fiber access networks of 15 of the
Denmark’s largest energy companies - and Syd Energi - which is the telecoms arms of an
electricity company (previously part of Waoo!).18
15Small regional operators have also invested, supported by the Estonian Wideband Infrastructure
Project (”EstWin”) funded by the Government.
16In Finland, two of the three incumbents, Elisa and Finnet, have heavily invested in FTTB and VDSL
technologies.
17Please see https://www.ftthcouncil.eu/documents/CaseStudies/STOKAB.pdf.




In the remaining well-performing Western Countries, the FTTP investment drivers
have been various. In Portugal, the strong presence of cable has spurred the incumbent’s
investment in FTTH since 2008. In France, the alternative operator, Iliad, leveraged on
its DSL base to invest in fiber.19 Iliad is indeed considered as one of the few cases where
access seekers have been able to reach the final rung of the ”ladder of investment”20 (as
per [Cave and Vogelsang, 2003]).
This chapter empirically investigates whether Slovakia would have attained the same
level of fiber coverage in the absence of the anticompetitive conduct engaged by ST, that
impeded alternative operators to rely on ST’s copper infrastructure. In particular, this
chapter examines whether, and to what extent, ST’s conduct has triggered alternative
operators’ investment in fiber.
3.4 The Slovak fixed telecom market and the abuse
Slovak Telecom (ST) is the largest telecom operator in the Slovak Republic: it owns and
operates the fixed copper network originally built using public resources, which covers
the entire territory of the Slovak Republic. ST provides a wide range of narrowband and
broadband data services, and starting from April 2007, also launched ultra-broadband
services over its fiber network.
Following the entry in the EU in May 2004, in line with European regulatory frame-
work, the Telecommunication Office of the Slovak Republic (”TUSR”) designated ST as
an operator with significant market power (SMP) in the wholesale market for access to
the unbundled local loop (”ULL”) in March 2005. The EC regulation requires operators
holding SMP in the fixed telecoms market to give access to ULL and to publish a Refer-
ence Unbundling Offer (”RUO”). ST published its first RUO in August 2005. The RUO
specified the contractual and technical conditions under which ST was willing to give
wholesale broadband (e.g. bitstream) and physical (e.g. ULL) access to its network.21
The access procedure defined in the first RUO, however, was such that the network in-
formation provided by ST regarding its ULL was insufficient or unclear, given late in the
19In 2006, Iliad joined the Paris Digital City initiative, marking the start of the fibre deployment in
Paris. To reduce investment costs, the company has relied for its early fibre deployments on access to the
Paris sewer system. Since the September 2008 ruling by the French Regulation Authority that imposed
duct access, Iliad makes use of the civil infrastructure of Orange. To further reduce roll-out costs, the
operator made use of aerial solutions and of facilities belonging to the municipalities.
20Other examples are NetCologne, M-net, Wilhelm.Tel and EWE-Tel among others in Germany,
Metroweb in Italia, Statsnet in Sweden
21The TUSR does not prescribe the content of the RUO in detail, but it just requires that the RUO
guarantees non-discrimination, transparency and fair access to network elements and to the related in-
formation.
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process and onerous.22 ST was basically hindering access to its local loops.
In contrast with the situation at European Union level, in Slovakia, ULL was non-
existent until December 2009, when the first 3 local loops were unbundled by GTS Slo-
vakia.23
The sluggish opening up of ST’s physical network infrastructure has triggered many
regulatory and legal disputes. The TUSR repeatedly fined ST for refusing to provide
wholesale access to its network and ST has changed the RUO terms nine times over the
period 2005-2010. In the meantime, the EC Commission initiated ex-officio a case against
ST. Following requests for information and an unannounced inspection at ST’s premises
in January 2009, the EC opened formal proceedings against ST in April 2009. In October
2014, the Commission established that ST (and its parent company Deutsche Telekom)
has committed a single and continuous infringement of Article 102 of the Treaty of the
Functioning of the European Union (”TFEU”), which lasted from 12 August 2005 (that
is the date when the first RUO was published) until 31 December 2010. According to the
Commission, the infringement consisted of the following practices24:
withholding from alternative operators (’AOs’) network information necessary for
the unbundling of local loops;
reducing the scope of its obligations regarding unbundled local loops;
setting unfair terms and conditions in its Reference Unbundling Offer regarding
collocation, qualification, forecasting, repairs and bank guarantees;
applying unfair tariffs which did not allow an equally efficient competitor to rely
on wholesale access to ST’s unbundled local loops to replicate the retail broadband
services offered by ST without incurring a loss.
While the EC identified anticompetitive conduct from ST’s provision of ULL, the EC as-
certained availability of both national and regional wholesale broadband access (”WBA”)
at competitive conditions. Although WBA still allows AOs to provide retail services
based on DSL connections, WBA and ULL should not be however considered substitute
wholesale products. Compared to ULL, WBA does not allow an AO to influence most
of the technical and quality parameters of the network connection, which relies on the
incumbent backbone and active operating equipment. According to the ladder of invest-
ment approach, WBA is the first rung of the ladder.
22ST was omitting crucial information on the location of the physical access site and on the availability
of local loops in specific part of the network. Alternative operators willing to access ST’s network
would have obtained such information only on request, subject on access fee, and after having signed a
confidentiality agreement and provided a bank guarantee.
23European Commission, Case AT. 39523, § 387
24EC decision, Case AT. 39523, Article 1.
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The final amount of the fine imposed on Slovak Telekom and on Deutsche Telekom, for
which they were jointly and severally liable, was EUR 38 million.
Figure 3.2 shows the market share of fixed telecom operators in Slovakia (as a percent-
age of total number of subscribers to broadband services provided over fixed technologies)
over the period 2003-2010. Following the liberalisation of the Slovak telecommunication
sector in 1998 and the launch of retail broadband services in June 2003, a variety of play-
ers entered the Slovak retail broadband market. The cable operator, UPC Broadband
Slovakia, is the second largest operator in Slovakia and provides broadband and ultra-
broadband services over its cable network. The other fixed players operating at national
level are mainly SWAN, Slovanet and GTS Slovakia. Both SWAN and Slovanet provided
retail services over a limited fiber infrastructure. GTS Slovakia mainly serves business
customers and it was the first operator capable of concluding an agreement with ST over-
unbundled access to the local loop before 2011. Over the period 2006-2009, SWAN and
GTS Slovakia acquired many small fixed national players, making the number of Slovak
players decreasing from 14 to 5. In 2006, the fixed national operator Orange Slovensko
(hereinafter, Orange or OSK), belonging to the French Telecom group Orange, entered
the Slovak market and rolled out its own FTTH (fiber to the home) infrastructure, mainly
in densely populated area.25
At that time, Slovakia was also characterised by a large number of regional players mainly
providing fiber services at local level (e.g. Satro, Antik, Imafex).
25European Commission, Case AT. 39523 - Slovak Telekom
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Figure 3.2: Market share of fixed telecom operator - Slovakia
In 2006, ST served almost 60% of fixed broadband subscribers, through mainly DSL
technologies, while UPC and other operators have respectively a market share of 11.2%
and 29.2% and serve their customer mainly based on cable and fiber technologies. Orange
attained an appreciable market share in 2008. Interestingly, ST’s market share decreased
over the period 2006-2010, to the benefit of other operators and Orange.
At the end of its investigation, the EC concluded that ST’s conduct, consisting of
refusal to supply access and margin squeeze, was likely to foreclose AOs from the key xDSL
segment of retail mass-market for broadband service. Investing in their own infrastructure
deployment was the only possibility left to AOs on the retail mass market for broadband
services offered at a fixed location. According to the market analysis carried out by the
TUSR, by the end of 2011, Slovanet provided fiber services in 6 cities, SWAN in 10 cities,
Antik in 7 cities, Orange in 17 cities, and other operators only locally, mostly in parts of
larger cities or newly built housing estates. Slovanet declared that investing into fiber was
the only practicables means of continuing its business.26 Orange sought ULL access to
ST’s network and finally decided, in 2006, to roll out its own fiber network. The operator
indeed declared that ”given the market situation and given that the outcome of the
regulation was difficult to foresee [they] have decided to invest in [their] own infrastructure
based on FTTH”.27 Orange explained that it built this network in some densely populated
areas where a reasonable payback of the investment could be expected.
26EC Decision, Case AT. 39523, § 1090.
27EC Decision, Case AT. 39523, § 424.
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Orange started to build its fiber network in 2006. The coverage of Orange’s fiber
network in terms of households amounted to over 300,000 households at the end of 2009.
ST followed shortly with its fiber network roll out targeting the most densely populated
areas, and reached 315,000 households at the end of 2009. ST’s roll out significantly
overlapped with OSK’s roll out, since both operators have focused on deploying fiber in
larger cities and densely populated areas. ST’s investment might have been triggered
by the competitive pressure exerted by OSK: right after OSK started investing in fiber,
the Slovak incumbent announced that ”extending optical networks to households is not
to end in Slovakia with investments of Orange”.28 On the other hand, ST’s fiber roll-
out appeared inevitable given the technical limitations of the copper network and the
increasing demand of customers for high speed access.
3.5 Data and Identification
The empirical analysis seeks to identify the effects of ST’s anticompetitive conduct on
the decision of AOs to invest in a new and superior technology, the fiber. Additionally, it
also assesses the effects of the abuse of dominance on total investment in fiber in Slovakia.
Over the period 2005-2010, ST has refused to supply access to the local loops of its copper
network to AOs. The objective of the analysis is demonstrating that such anticompetitive
conduct has left the AOs with no other choice than investing in fiber to enter the retail
telecom markets. The investigation of the causal effects of the refusal to supply access
on investment in fiber has to start with the examination of the determinants of firms’
investment decisions.
Assume firm j is an alternative operator in a market. In line with the EU telecommu-
nications regulatory framework, firm j may decide whether entering the retail market by
(i) relying on the incumbent’s legacy network O (as old technology) and paying a whole-
sale access price a, or (ii) investing in a next generation infrastructure N . It is profitable
for firm j to invest if the additional gross profit it earns by investing in a next generation
infrastructure is higher than the investment cost I:
ΠNj − ΠOj (a) ≥ I
28See ST’s annual report, 2007: Extending optical networks to households is not to end in Slovakia
with investments of Orange. On the very first day of the commercial launch of that operator’s service
Doma, based on fibre-optics network brought right to the client’s home, a similar intent was announced by
Slovak Telekom, offering services for households under the T-Com brand. The largest fixed line operator
wants to invest by year-end SKK 1 bn in a network covering close to 200 thousand households. Orange,
currently covering some 110 thousand potential clients, wants to achieve a similar presence by then.
In the following year, Slovak Telekom anticipates investing approximately SKK 1 bn more into optics.
Orange has not yet revealed its next year’s plans but the Company’s investment will probably be around
the same level.
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When the alternative operator relies on the old network to provide its services, its profits
ΠOj (a) decrease with the access price a. This assumption is rather standard and implies
that the entrant faces a make-or-buy decision according to the level of the access charge29:
as long as the access charge to the old network increases, since its profit would decrease,
it might decide to invest in its own next generation infrastructure. In the equation above,
this implies that as long as the access price a increases, the profitability of investment
increases. The ultimate decision will also depends on the cost of investment I.
By setting excessively high access price, thereby hindering access to its network, ST
has triggered AOs’ incentives to investment. For intermediate values of I, the AOs may
indeed find convenient investing in fiber.30.
The identification strategy exploits cross-country variation in fiber investment within
the European Union through a Difference in Differences (”DiD”) methodology.
3.5.1 Econometric model
The DiD methodology has been widely applied in the economic literature on program
evaluation for the estimation of treatment effects (see [Imbens and Wooldrige, 2009],
[Abadie and Cattaneo, 2017]). It is also widely used in the field of ex-post evaluation
of competition policy decision, and in particular, for the estimation of merger effects.
(see [Ashenfelter and Hosken, 2008], [Ashenfelter et al., 2013a], [Aguzzoni et al., 2016a].)
The DiD methodology entails comparing the evolution of the outcome variable in
the unit(s) affected by the treatment (i.e. treated units) with the evolution of the same
variable in the unit(s) that was instead not affected (i.e. control units), before and after
the treatment. The variation over time in the outcome variable in the control units is
used to establish what would have occurred in the treated units in the absence of the
treatment. In line with the above, the effects of the abuse on fiber investment can be
obtained by comparing the variation of fiber investment in Slovakia and in the other
European Countries, before and after the abuse.
More formally, this can be implemented through the following equation:
yijt = α + βabuset + γtreatedj + δabuset × treatedj + µXjt + λt + ρj + εjt (3.1)
where yijt measures the fiber investment in country j at time t by all the alternative
operators i31, Xjt indicates a vector of time-varying observable factors at country level, λt
29See [Bourreau and Dogan, 2006].
30Chapter 2 of this thesis presents a theoretical model that outlines the mechanisms that make this
outcome possible.
31When investigating the effect of the abuse on total investment and the investment made by the
incumbent, yijt measures, respectively, the fiber investment in country j by all telecoms operator and by
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and ρj are respectively time and country fixed effects helping to control for unobservable
factors at time and country level, εjt is the error term.
In a standard DiD fashion, abuset is a dummy variable that takes value one over the
period of the abuse (2005q4-2010q4) and zero otherwise; treatedj is a dummy variable
that takes value one when the country is Slovakia, and zero otherwise. The interaction
term abuset× treatedj takes value one when the fiber investment is measured in Slovakia
and over the abuse period, and zero otherwise. Its coefficient measures the causal effect
of the abuse, and it will be equal to:
δ = (E[Yijt/t = abuse; j = treated− E[Yijt/t = noabuse; j = treated])−
(E[Yijt/t = abuse; j = control]− E[Yijt/t = noabuse; j = control])
The causal effect will be indeed equal to the additional variation in fiber investment
occurred in Slovakia, compared to the control countries, before and after the abuse. By
taking the difference in the variation of the outcome variable between the treated and the
control countries, the DiD methodology allows to control for any unobserved time-varying
factors which may affect the outcome variable and confound the estimation of the effect.
Identification in the DiD methodology relies on the common-trend assumption: in
absence of the treatment, the average outcome for the treated countries and the average
outcome for non treated countries would have experienced the same variation over time.
This makes the selection of the control countries a crucial step to reach a clear identifica-
tion of the causal effects of the abuse on fiber investment. The set of the selected control
countries, indeed, should be able to reproduce the counterfactual trajectory of the fiber
investment in Slovakia.
3.5.2 Control group
The control group consists of alternative operators from a sub-set of European Countries.32
I have limited the candidate countries to European countries as they share a common
framework in terms of access regulation and may be subject to common macro-economics
shocks.
The control group has to be not affected by a similar treatment or structural changes
in the period of analysis. I have hence excluded Poland, Slovenia and Spain, where the
telecom incumbents also infringed Article 102 of the TFEU by abusing their dominant
the national incumbent
32When investigating the effects of the abuse on total investment and on the investment made by the
incumbent, the control group consists of, respectively, all the national telecom operators and the national
incumbents from a subset of European Countries.
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positions in the wholesale market for access to physical network infrastructure.33
Slovakia is an Eastern European country and, as most of the CEE countries, entered the
EU in 2004, thereby adopting the EU framework on access regulation quite lately. This
reinforced the position of the incumbent operator especially in the DSL market. As in
many Eastern Countries, following the liberalization of the telecoms markets, many small
AOs (e.g. Antik, Slovanet) entered the retail market by deploying a limited, but own,
telecom infrastructure. These small AOs relied on different technologies, ranging from
WIMAX, cable to fiber. At the same time, many utilities companies (e.g. Energotel)
exploited their infrastructure to deploy limited fiber networks. In light of the above
similarities, I have further restricted the control group to the European countries located
in the Central-East Europe.34 As a robustness check, I am also considering two alternative
control groups:
all European countries, with the exception of Poland, Slovenia and Spain;
all European countries in which alternative operators have made an early investment
in fiber. I have considered all the countries where (i) there has been an investment
in fiber by AOs before 2005q2 and (ii) the AOs’ investment has occurred before the
incumbent’s. This includes both CEE and WE countries35 and it aims at capturing
countries where demand and costs conditions are favourable to early investment in
fiber.
In spite of a careful selection of the control countries, the common trend assumption
still need to be assessed. I have empirically evaluated the plausibility of this assumption
by using a twofold strategy, similarly to [Ashenfelter et al., 2013a]. First, I have estimated
the difference between the outcome variable in the treated and control countries, for each
quarter in the pre-abuse period. I have then estimated whether such differences are jointly
33With the decision COMP 39.525, the EC established that Telekomunikacja Polska, the Polish in-
cumbent, refused to properly provide access to its network from August 2005 to October 2009. With
the decision COMP 38.784 the EC fined Telefonica, the Spanish incumbent, for having foreclosed equally
efficient competition by squeezing their margins in the market for wholesale broadband access from
September 2001 to December 2006. Finally, Telekom Slovenije, the Slovenian incumbent, has been
instead fined by the Slovenian Competition Protection Agency for having abused its dominant posi-
tion the wholesale markets for broadband bit-stream access and for access to physical network infras-
tructure over the period 2005-2014 (see https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/multisite/ecn-brief/en/content/
telekom-slovenije-abuses-its-dominant-position-refusing-access-network). See also Table 3.1.
34The CEE included in the control group are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania.
35This control group includes Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Sweden, Denmark and
Italy. In Italy, investment has been driven by small private investors in the Northern Italy and the
alternative operator Fastweb starting to deploy its fiber network in 2005. See Section 3.3 for Sweden and
Denmark.
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equal to zero. This has been implemented by estimating the following equation:
yijt = α +
∑
q
βqquarterq + γtreatedj +
∑
q
δqquarterq × treatedj + µXjt + ρj + εjt
(3.2)
Rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficients δq are jointly equal to zero implies
rejecting the common trend assumption. Secondly, I have examined whether the fiber
investment in the treated and control countries trend similarly in the period before the
abuse. This has been done by estimating the following equation:
yijt = α + βtrend+ γtreatedj + δtrend× treatedj + µXjt + ρj + εjt (3.3)
Rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficient δ is equal to zero implies rejecting the
common trend assumption.36
3.5.3 Data
The dataset that informs the analysis of this chapter is a panel of 22 EU countries over
the period 2003q4-2010q4.
In line with most of the existing related literature, the investment made by national
fixed telecom operators in fiber has been proxied by the penetration of fiber services
provided by such operators. For each country, I have obtained quarterly data on the per-
centage of fixed subscribers (over total population) to fiber services offered by each telecom
operators.37 Data systematically cover all the European Countries with the exception of
Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg, and have been provided by Analysys Mason.
Data on fiber coverage, rather than fiber penetration, would have been a much proper
measure of investment. Coverage measures indeed the availability of fiber connections,
without necessarily implying that such connections have been activated by a subscriber.
Penetration reflects, instead, both the availability and the demand of fiber connections.
Unfortunately, coverage data were available only starting from 2011 (and were not disag-
gregated at operator level). Relying on data on penetration should not impede to identify
the causal effects of the abuse on investment. Before 2005, DSL was the main broadband
technology in Europe and the deployment of alternative broadband technologies, including
fiber, was quite limited. The variation in the penetration of fiber services before and after
2005 has to be necessarily related with a variation in the availability of fiber connections,
36This is similar to [Muralidharan and Prakash, 2013].
37I have grouped national and small alternative operators by taking the sum of their subscribers, and
divided them by the national population for each quarter.
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that is a variation in fiber investment. By using data on penetration, however, the causal
effect of the abuse on investment may be underestimated. Fiber connections are generally
used to provide high-quality services (e.g. Triple-play) that tend to be more expensive and
to face less demand (especially at their early stages). The evidence collected by the EC at
the time of the investigation of ST shows indeed that ”although Orange’s fiber network
covered 300,000 households in 2009, Orange had only 38,000 fiber subscribers (accounting
for only 12.6% of the total capacity)”38. Figure 3.3 shows the fiber penetration (rather
than coverage) in Slovakia and the other European countries in the last quarter of 2010
(the latest data available). Differently from Figure 3.1, Slovakia is no longer taking the
lead: the countries with the highest fiber penetration are instead Sweden, Lithuania and
Romania.39
Figure 3.3: FTTP penetration in Europe - 2010q4
Data on penetration could hence underestimate the investment made by national
operators. Table 3.2 shows some descriptive statistics for the main outcome variable of
this analysis in Slovakia and the three proposed control groups.
The penetration of fiber services experienced a huge increase both in Slovakia and
in the remaining European Countries: the percentage of subscribers to fiber services in-
creased by 2.07 percentage points in Slovakia, while it increased by 0.82 percentage points
38EC decision, Case AT 39523, § 1102
39While the percentage of households covered by fiber connection is almost 60% in Slovakia, only 10%
of them are subscribed to such services.
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Table 3.2: Outcome variable: penetration of fiber services offered by AOs
pre-abuse abuse
group mean stdev min max mean stdev min max
Treated (SK) .25 .14 .13 .52 1.76 .87 .63 3.00
Control (CEE) .14 .26 0 1.03 1.45 1.66 0 6.53
Control (AO) .53 .78 0 2.95 2.28 2.00 .04 7.03
Control (ALL) .20 .54 0 2.95 1.02 1.65 0 7.03
in all the candidate control countries (last row of Table 3.2). Fiber penetration during
the abuse period in Slovakia was almost twice the penetration in the remaining European
countries, but also lower than the penetration in the Central Eastern European countries,
and in the countries where alternative operators have made an early investment in fiber.
I have also collected a set of country-specific control variables which may explain change
in the demand or supply of fiber services.
GDP per capita and the penetration of mobile services may affect the demand of fixed
broadband services based on fiber technologies. GDP per capita may be indeed inter-
preted as a proxy of income, while the demand of mobile (voice) services may capture the
population propensity for telecom services. Population dispersion and population density
may instead affect the fiber investment’s costs.40 There are large economies of density
when deploying a new infrastructure: the establishment of a network in densely populated
areas allows to share the ducting for the connection loops of multiple premises and reduces
investment costs. While population density measures the average number of people per
squared km, population dispersion indicates how individuals are spread throughout the
territory. In spite of very high (average) density, population can be concentrated in a
single portion of the territory, e.g. rural or mountainous areas, where costs are expected
to be higher and investment less viable. In this dataset, population dispersion measures
the percentage of population living in rural areas.
Finally, I have also collected time-invariant variables and in particular:
year of entry in the EU: WE Countries have entered the EU between 1985-1995,
while CEE countries joined the EU between 2004-2013. Late entry indicates late
adoption of the EU framework of access regulation on DSL network, thereby in-
creasing the countries’ need of finding a viable alternative by investing in their own
infrastructure;
40As in [Bacache-Beauvallet et al., 2014], due to the lack of appropriate date, I cannot directly control
for the cost of fiber. However this should not give rise to an omitted variable problem. The cost of
fiber deployment depends on the cost of fiber equipment and the costs of fiber infrastructure. The cost
of fiber equipment is roughly the same in all EU countries, and therefore is captured through the time
fixed effects. The cost of fiber infrastructure is instead controlled for through population density and
dispersion.
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amount of State aid received to deploy NGA technologies in the period 2003-2010.
National investment could have been indeed facilitated by public subsidies.41
Table 3.3 recaps the set of control variables, their definition, source and provide some
basic statistics.
Table 3.3: Control variables

























30,261.3 69,330.7 2,698.6 17,133.9
41In CEE countries, only Lithuania has received public subsidies for NGA infrastructure deployment
in the analysed period. I have hence only included this control variables when performing the analysis
with the two alternative control groups, where the number of countries receiving NGA aid is higher,
thereby allowing for statistical inference of the aid effect on penetration.
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Table 3.3: Control variables
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3.6 Results
The validity of the DiD estimates depends on not rejecting the null hypothesis of the
parallel trend assumption between the fiber investment in Slovakia and in the control
countries before ST’s abuse. Section 3.6.1 empirically assesses the plausibility of this
assumption. Sections 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 show the estimated effects of ST’s abuse on the fiber
investment made by alternative operators and total investment. Estimates are based
on the control group composed of CEE countries. Robustness check with the alternative
42This is based on EC databases, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/
telecommunications/broadband decisions.pdf
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control groups are presented in Appendix 3.8. Finally, Section 3.6.4 operates a comparison
country-by-country, and estimates the effects of the abuse on the investment made by
alternative operators in Slovakia by comparing it to the investment made by alternative
operators in each single European country.
3.6.1 Common trend
Figure 3.4 shows the estimated differences (and their standard deviation) in the penetra-
tion of fiber services offered by AOs in Slovakia and in the CEE countries, taking into
account a set of supply and demand factors (see Equation 3.2), for each quarter before
the beginning of the abuse. Coefficients close to zero or not significant imply that we
cannot reject the parallel trend assumption.
Figure 3.4: Differences in penetration of fiber services offered by AOs between Slovakia
and CEE countries
The coefficients are jointly equal to zero43, and most of them are close to zero. The
estimated coefficients for the first three quarters of 2005, although not significant, are
positive.
Table 3.4 tests whether the penetration of fiber services offered by AOs in Slovakia and
in the CEE countries trends similarly before the abuse, taking into account a set of de-
mand and supply factors (see Equation 3.3). When the coefficient of the interaction term
43The F-test indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The p-value is indeed equal to
0.97.
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trendxtreated is zero or not significant, we cannot reject the parallel trend assumption.
Model (1) takes into account the entire period 2003q4-2005q3, while Model (2) excludes
the second and third quarter of 2005. This is in light of results shown in Figure 3.4 , and
based on the fact that ST has been designed national operator with SMP in March 2005,
hence the abuse could have exerted its effects starting from that date.
Table 3.4: Common trend assumption - penetration of AOs’ fiber services







pop. dispersion 0.00802∗∗∗ 0.00846∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)




mobile penetration 0.00640∗∗∗ 0.00625∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
year entry EU:2004 0.242∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.070)






Standard errors in parentheses
Fixed effect at half-year level
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Based on Analysys Mason, Eurostat, ITU, OECD, World Bank data
The coefficient of the interaction term trendxtreated in Model (1) is positive and
significant thereby rejecting the common trend assumption. This is likely to be driven
by the first quarters of 2005: the same coefficient in Model (2) is indeed not significant
thereby not rejecting the assumption that the outcome variable trends similarly in the
treated and control countries before the abuse.
Similar tests have been performed on the remaining outcome variables: penetration of
fiber services offered by the incumbent and total penetration of fiber services (that is
the sum of the incumbent’s and AOs’ subscribers for fiber services). The common trend
assumption is always satisfied (see Appendix 3.8).
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3.6.2 Effects of the abuse on AOs’ investment
Table 3.5 presents the estimate of the impact of ST’s conduct on the fiber investment
made by AOs, based on Equation 3.1. Model (1) shows the baseline specification, where
the variation in the investment made by AOs in Slovakia (proxied by the percentage
of subscribers) is compared to the variation in the investment made by AOs in CEE
countries. In Model (2), to take into account the results of the common trend test, I have
excluded observations from the second and third quarters of 2005 and from the country
(Estonia) where the common trend assumption is rejected.44 Finally, in Model (3), I have
interacted the DiD variable (i.e. treatedxabuse) with a year dummy variable, to estimate
the effects of the abuse over time.
Results indicate that the percentage of AO’s subscribers to fiber services in Slovakia
has relatively increased following ST’s abuse, compared to the CEE countries. Table
3.5 indicates that the abuse caused an increase in the percentage of subscribers to fiber
services offered by AOs by 1.16 (Model 1) to 1.48 percentage points (Model 2).45 Model
(3) indicates that the effects have increased over time, up to 2009. The largest effect
is registered in 2009, when Orange has attained appreciable market share in the Slovak
retail market.
This exercise is meant to investigate whether the Slovak incumbent’s abuse has stimulated
AOs investment in fiber. In the absence of reliable data on fiber investment or coverage,
I have performed an analysis on fiber penetration, which suggests that the abuse has
increased AO’s customer base. Since the deployment of fiber networks before the abuse
was negligible and limited to local areas, the increase in the number of subscribers has to
be related with the greater availability of fiber connections, and hence indicates greater
investment in fiber.
44Based on Equation 3.3, I have indeed estimate whether the outcome variable in each single control
country trend similarly to the same variable in Slovakia. In Estonia, the test rejects the parallel trend
assumption.
45Results are robust even when clustering standard errors at country level, or by including fixed effects
at country level.
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Table 3.5: Effects on fiber penetration offered by AOs
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Common trend Time effects














pop. dispersion 0.0559∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
pop. density -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per capita 0.0000396 0.0000379 0.0000411
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
mobile penetration 0.0593∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0607∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
year entry EU:2004 1.459∗∗∗ -0.644 1.465∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.362) (0.216)
year entry EU:2007 2.164∗∗∗ 2.180∗∗∗
(0.364) (0.364)
year entry EU:2013 -2.220∗∗∗
(0.370)
Constant -5.489∗∗∗ -3.616∗∗∗ -5.610∗∗∗
(0.556) (0.516) (0.556)
Observations 232 216 232
R2 .7432303 .7549345 .7501261
Standard errors in parentheses
Fixed effect at half-year level
Based on Analysys Mason, Eurostat, ITU, OECD, World Bank data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Most of control variables show expected sign. GDP per capita and mobile penetration,
which have been included as proxy of demand, positively affects the outcome variable,
although the GDP coefficient is not significant. The later is the year of entry the higher is
the penetration of fiber services, although the sign of the dummy for ”Year entry EU:2013”
is negatively signed. Late entry in the EU means indeed late adoption of the EU access
regulation, and this may reinforce the position of the incumbent in the DSL market and
increase the need of AOs to invest in alternative technologies. There is only one country
in the sample that entered the EU in 2013, Croatia, and this may make the coefficient of
”Year entry EU:2013” less reliable.
The sign of the coefficient of population density and dispersion is rather counter-intuitive.
Population density negatively (rather than positively) affects fiber penetration. Popula-
tion density is a proxy of investment costs: highly densely populated areas should make
the investment more viable. Similarly, the percentage of people living in the rural ar-
eas (i.e. population dispersion) positively (rather than negatively) affects the outcome
variable: when a larger fraction of the population lives in rural areas, where investment
costs are expected to be higher, the penetration of fiber services should be lower. The
estimate of this coefficient may be confounded by other factors: in many CEE countries,
investment in fiber has been driven by municipal operators deploying the network at the
neighbourhood level. This may have caused less densely populated countries or rural
countries to witness a stronger wave of investments than expected.46
Appendix 3.8 shows that the abuse may also have spurred AO’s investment in other
alternative technologies, namely the fixed wireless access technologies (FWA). FWA tech-
nologies cannot be considered perfect substitutes of fiber, since they do not allow to
provide high-quality broadband services, such as video-on-demand. However, FWA tech-
nologies can be used to complement the geographic coverage of the AOs broadband offer:
FWA can address attractive market niches (e.g. rural/remote areas) where the timeframe
and the economics of fiber deployment make the business case challenging.47
The analysis above does not allow to quantitatively investigate what occurred after
the end of the abuse. The above shows that during the abuse, in the absence of a valid
alternative, operators decided to invest in a superior technology. After the end of the
abuse, operators had the possibility to resort to cheaper technologies (i.e. ULL over the
incumbent’s copper network) and this may have deterred further investment. The annual
reports released by Orange seem to confirm such assumption:
46The control variable which measures the amount of aid received is not included in this specification
since only one country among those considered, Lithuania, has received public subsidies for the deploy-
ment of fiber infrastructure. I have also run a robustness check by excluding Lithuania from the set of




from 2006 to 2010, OSK’s FTTH network reached more than 308,000 households in
17 Slovak cities;
in 2015, OSK’s FTTH network covered over 342,000 households across 18 cities in
Slovakia;
in 2017, OSK’s FTTH network covered over 370,000 households across 34 cities in
Slovakia.
The additional investment made after the abuse, measured in terms of new cities and
households covered, is quite limited if compared to the investment effort made during the
abuse. This may be however related to the decreasing returns of investment: once covered
the urban areas, the costs of deploying the infrastructure in intermediate and rural areas
are expected to be higher, and in turn, the returns of the investment to be lower.
It can be interesting understanding whether the findings of this analysis are specific
to the Slovak market, or can be extended to any markets where a similar infringement
occurred. During the same period of the Slovak abuse, the incumbent in the Polish market
for fixed telecom services was refusing to properly supply access to its copper network.48
As in the Slovak case, the EC opened an investigation and established that the conduct was
likely to foreclose competitors in the retail market, thereby fining the Polish incumbent for
an infringement of the Art. 102 of the TFEU over the period August 2005 - October 2009.
The available qualitative evidence suggests that the abuse has been mainly followed by
investment in cable technologies. Multimedia Polska, one of the AOs in the Polish market,
started investing in its own cable networks in 2008-2009, four years after the beginning of
the abuse. In 2009, cable operators accounted for 1.58 million of Polish subscribers, which
is about 24% of the market for fixed broadband services. Cable subscribers were, however,
mostly limited to larger cities.49 On the other hand, fiber and wireless technologies
represented, together, only 4.3% of all broadband access lines in Poland in 2009.50 The
limited development of the fiber technologies in the Polish market, in the period right
after the start of the abuse, may however be related to the characteristics of the territory
- whose morphology may impede the efficient deployment of the infrastructure - or to the
financial resources available to the AOs. The investment effort made into cable, however,
still corroborates the idea underlying this analysis: banning access to the incumbent’s
network may stimulate AOs’ investment.
48Similar infringements also occurred in other European countries. However, either the period when
the infringement occurred was too early to expect investment in next generation access technologies (e.g.
in Spain the abuse started in 2001) or there is no sufficient data to understand what occurred (e.g.
in Slovenia the infringement was investigated by the National Competition Authority and the public
evidence is limited).
49EC decision, Case COMP 39.525, §42
50EC decision, Case COMP 39.525, §46
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3.6.3 Effects of the abuse on total investment
The analysis of the impact of the abuse on the percentage of subscribers of AO’s fiber
services shows that, by hindering access to its metallic network, ST has spurred AOs to
invest in their own fiber infrastructure. Does this imply that, due to the anticompetitive
conduct of ST, Slovakia has achieved greater investment in fiber? To answer this question,
Table 3.6 provides the estimate of the effect of the abuse on the percentage of people
subscribed to fiber services (regardless of the operator offering the service). Model (1)
excludes the observations related to the second and third quarter of 200551, while Model
(2) investigates the effects over time.
Results indicate that the effects of the abuse on total fiber penetration are positive and
significant (at 5% significance level): because of the abuse, Slovakia has attained higher
level of fiber penetration. As before, Model (2) indicates that most of the effects come
from 2009, when OSK gained an appreciable market share.
51As before, the common trend assumption is satisfied when excluding the first quarter of 2005. I
have also tested whether the common trend assumption cannot be rejected when comparing the outcome
variable in Slovakia to each control countries. The test indicates that the assumption is always satisfied.
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Table 3.6: Effects on total fiber penetration
(1) (2)















pop. dispersion 0.0518∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006)
pop. density -0.0212∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
GDP per capita 0.0000531 0.0000614
(0.000) (0.000)
mobile penetration 0.0627∗∗∗ 0.0593∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
year entry EU:2004 1.637∗∗∗ 1.520∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.261)






Standard errors in parentheses
Fixed effect at half-year level
Based on Analysys Mason, Eurostat, ITU, OECD, World Bank data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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The estimated effect on total penetration seems however to be driven by AOs. When
focusing on the percentage of subscribers to the fiber services offered by the incumbent
ST, the effects are no longer significant. Table 3.7 provides the estimate of the effect of
the abuse on the percentage of people subscribed to fiber services offered by ST. Model
(1) excludes the observations related to the second and third quarter of 2005 and to the
country (Estonia) where the common trend assumption is rejected52 while Model (2) in-
vestigates the effects over time.
The variation in the incumbent’s fiber subscribers, before and after the abuse, seems to
be not significantly different than its counterfactual. However, the identification strategy
adopted in this chapter requires that the outcome variables are independent of the treat-
ment, after conditioning on the set of observed covariates. When examining the decision
of the incumbent to invest in fiber, it is harder to claim that this is independent of the
decision to engage into an anticompetitive conduct in the DSL segment. This may limit
the causal interpretation of the results obtained on the percentage of subscribers to the
fiber services offered by the incumbent.
52The common trend assumption is instead satisified for all countries when the total fiber penetration
is considered.
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Table 3.7: Effects on fiber penetration offered by ST
(1) (2)















pop. dispersion 0.00712∗ 0.00637∗
(0.003) (0.003)
pop. density -0.00565∗∗∗ -0.00536∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
GDP per capita -0.00000833 -0.00000611
(0.000) (0.000)
mobile penetration 0.00876∗∗∗ 0.00791∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
year entry EU:2004 0.314 0.306∗∗
(0.176) (0.104)
year entry EU:2007 0.0367
(0.175)






Standard errors in parentheses
Fixed effect at half-year level
Based on Analysys Mason, Eurostat, ITU, OECD, World Bank data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.6.4 By-country analysis
To further explore the drivers of the obtained results, I have investigated which of the
control countries mostly contributes to the estimated effect, by performing a country-
by-country analysis. I have implemented Equation 3.1 on each single EU country, and I
have hence compared the variation in the outcome variables in Slovakia to the variation
occurred in the same variables in each single EU country, before and after ST’s abuse.53
Since results seem to be driven by the effects of the abuse on the investment made by
AOs, I have focused on the analysis on the penetration of fiber services offered by AOs.
Figure 3.5 shows the coefficients obtained (when statistically significant) for each coun-
try. The estimated coefficients are always positive, except for Denmark. The positive
coefficients range from 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points, thereby indicating that ST’s conduct
have caused an increase in the percentage of people subscribed to AO’s fiber services
by 0.2-0.5 percentage points. The estimated effects are lower than those obtained when
considering all the CEE countries as control group (see Table 3.5) and seem to be driven
by CEE countries. Among the WE countries, the comparison with Italy and Netherlands
provides positive and statistically significant effects, while the comparison with Denmark
seems to indicate that the abuse has caused a reduction (rather than an increase) in the
penetration of fiber services offered by AOs. As extensively discussed in Section 3.5, a
clear identification of the causal effects through the DiD methodology requires that the
treated and control group trend similarly in the period before the abuse. Although the
empirical test cannot reject the assumption of common trend for all the countries, except
for Estonia, Sweden and Finland, the number of observations available when comparing a
pair of countries is too limited to make a valid statistical inference. Moreover, as discussed
in Section 3.3, the deployment of fiber infrastructure in Denmark has been quite peculiar,
since it has been driven by utilities company (e.g. DONG, Waoo!, Syd Energy) who have
used their own existent infrastructure to lay down fiber optic cables. This has undoubt-
edly generated consistent cost savings, and facilitated the growth of fiber coverage and
adoption.
53As before, I am however excluding Poland, Slovenia and Spain, since they have been affected by
similar treatment in the same period.
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Figure 3.5: Effects of abuse on investment: by-country analysis
3.7 Conclusions
A common criticism against mandatory access to the incumbent’s legacy copper network
is that there is a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiencies. While mandatory
access may stimulate competition in the short-run at the retail level, it may reduce the
incentives to invest in infrastructure, both by the incumbent, who is forced to share its
network, and potential entrants, who can free-ride on the incumbent’s network.
Nowadays, the deployment of fiber technologies has become a major issue for sector-
specific regulators and investing firms: telecom operators need to speed up their networks
to meet the growing demand for bandwidth arising from new multimedia services such
as streamed video on demand, high definition television, cloud computing. There is a
concern among practitioners and policy makers that regulation-induced competition in
retail telecoms markets may discourage investment in new technologies. This chapter in-
vestigates the impact of mandatory access to the incumbent’s DSL network on investment
in fiber technologies. Differently from the existing literature on the relationship between
access regulation and investment, this chapter performs an ex-post evaluation exercise
and exploits the abuse of dominance of the Slovak incumbent to investigate whether ban-
ning access to the incumbent’s network spurs entrant’s investment. The EC has indeed
ascertained that Slovak Telekom, the dominant fixed telecom operators in the Slovak mar-
3.7. CONCLUSIONS 157
ket, refused to properly provide access to its unbundled local loops and set excessively
high wholesale access price over the period 2005-2010. The empirical analysis presented
in this chapter demonstrates that the abuse of dominance, by hindering access to the
incumbent’s copper network, has triggered AOs’ investment in fiber technologies. Based
on Difference in Differences method, I identify the effects of the abuse by comparing the
variation in the penetration of fiber services offered by AOs in Slovakia and in Central
Eastern European countries, before and after the abuse. Results show that, due to ST’s
anticompetitive conduct, Slovak AOs have witnessed an increase in their customer base
by 1.16-1.5 percentage points. Since the deployment of fiber was limited to small neigh-
bourhood before the abuse, the increase in the customer base is likely to be determined
by an increase in the number of available connections, that is an increase in fiber coverage
and investment. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows that, due to ST’s
infringement of its regulatory obligations, Slovakia has attained an higher level of fiber
penetration. Such effect is however driven by AOs. Although the incumbent immediately
reacted to AOs’ investment by investing itself, there is no evidence that it would have
invested less in the counterfactual.
While access regulation is often described as a policy tool designed to encourage en-
trants to enter the retail market and gradually invest in their own infrastructure, the
evidence collected in this chapter shows that banning access to incumbent network can
foster entrant’s investment in their own and superior technology. It is hard to say, how-
ever, whether such result would support a forbearance regulatory approach. In Slovakia,
AOs investment has been limited to urban areas, where investment costs were lower. The
incumbent’s copper network still represented the essential network to serve intermediate
and rural areas, where the abuse of dominance may have strengthened the position of
the incumbent and ultimately harmed consumers through higher prices or lower quality
of DSL services. Moreover, the obtained findings may be confined to markets similar to
Slovakia, such as the Central Eastern European markets, where the conditions are much
favourable to early investment in new technologies by alternative operators. A conclusion
that may be drawn is that regulated access price should be geographically differentiated,
with the help of appropriate cost-based rules. Differentiated access charges, rather uni-




3.8.1 Common trend assumption
Table 3.8 empirically assesses the plausibility of common trend assumption for the out-
come variable (i) penetration of fiber services offered by all national operators (Total) and
(ii) penetration of fiber services offered by national incumbents (Incumbent). The control
group of countries is given by the CEE countries, excluding Poland, Slovenia and Spain
(where a similar treatment has occurred). As in Table 3.4, Model(1) test the common
trend assumption on the entire pre-treatment period (2003q4-2005q3), while Model(2)
excludes the second and third quarter of 2005.
Table 3.8: Common trend test
Total Incumbent
Model(1) Model(2) Model(1) Model(2)
treated -9.524∗ -0.0714 2.715 0.00523
(4.897) (0.177) (3.568) (0.113)
trend -0.0691∗∗∗ -0.0714∗∗∗ -0.0200∗ -0.0117
(0.012) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012)
treatedxtrend 0.0538∗ 0.0179 -0.0156 -0.0204
(0.027) (0.045) (0.020) (0.029)
pop. dispersion 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.00439∗∗ 0.00392∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
pop. density -0.0132∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.00657∗∗∗ -0.00490∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP per capita 0.000159∗∗∗ 0.000150∗∗∗ 0.0000970∗∗∗ 0.0000690∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
mobile penetration 0.00746∗∗∗ 0.00743∗ 0.00120 0.00119
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
year entry EU:2004 0.432∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.157∗
(0.077) (0.101) (0.056) (0.065)
year entry EU:2007 1.219∗∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.205) (0.117) (0.131)
Constant 10.76∗∗∗ -1.210∗∗∗ 2.873 -0.476∗∗∗
(2.095) (0.174) (1.526) (0.111)
Observations 72 54 72 54
R2 .8636576 .8480926 .6966492 .6363079
Standard errors in parentheses
Fixed effect at half-year level
Based on Analysys Mason, Eurostat, ITU, OECD, World Bank data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The common trend assumption is always satisfied when the outcome variable is the
incumbent’s fiber services penetration, while it requires to exclude the first quarters of
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2005 to be satisfied when the outcome variable is total fiber services penetration. This is
shown clearly in Figure 3.6b and Figure 3.6a, which presents the difference between the
outcome variable in Slovakia and the CEE countries, for each quarter of the period before
the abuse, estimated as per Equation 3.2.
Figure 3.6
(a) Common trend test - Total fiber
penetration
(b) Common trend test - Incumbent
fiber penetration
3.8.2 Robustness check
This Appendix presents robustness check based on two different control groups: (i) all
European countries not affected by similar treatments, (ii) all European countries where
alternative operators have made an early investment in fiber (i.e. before 2005) and have
anticipated the incumbent. I have focused on the main analysis, which investigates the
impact of the abuse on the investment made by alternative operators.
Table 3.9 empirically assesses the parallel trend assumption: for both control groups, the
trend of the outcome variable in Slovakia does not seem to diverge from the trend of the
same variable in the control countries, in the period before the abuse. The coefficient of
the interaction term treatedxtrend is indeed not significant for both Model (1) - related
to the control group of all EU countries - and Model (2) - related to the control group of
all EU countries were AOs invested first in fiber and before 2005.
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Table 3.9: Common trend test
(1) (2)







pop. dispersion -0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
pop. density -0.00348∗∗∗ 0.00105
(0.000) (0.002)
GDP per capita 0.0000833∗∗∗ 0.0000363
(0.000) (0.000)




year entry EU: 1973 -0.889∗∗∗ -0.372
(0.170) (0.400)
year entry EU: 1981 0.877∗∗∗
(0.211)
year entry EU: 1986 1.374∗∗∗
(0.249)
year entry EU: 1995 -0.0250 1.818∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.470)
year entry EU: 2004 1.824∗∗∗ 0.835∗
(0.297) (0.371)
year entry EU: 2007 2.352∗∗∗ 0.325
(0.376) (0.531)






Standard errors in parentheses
Fixed effect at half-year level
Based on Analysys Mason, Eurostat, ITU, OECD, World Bank data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.10 confirms the main results: due to ST’s abuse of dominance, Slovakia has
experienced a greater and positive variation in the penetration of fiber services offered by
AOs. Since the fiber deployment was quite limited before the abuse, the estimated effects
indicate that ST’s conduct has triggered AOs’investment in fiber. Results are robust both
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when considering all European countries (Model (1)) and European countries where AOs
invested first (Model (2)) as control group54.
54In Model(2) results are significant only when we exclude those countries for which the common trend
assumption is not satisfied (i.e. Estonia and Sweden).
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Table 3.10: Effects on fibre penetration offered by AOs - robustness
(1) (2)





pop. dispersion 0.000749 -1.893∗∗
(0.005) (0.574)
pop. density -0.00224∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.027)
GDP per capita 0.0000729∗∗∗ 0.000330∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)




year entry EU: 1973 -0.344 3.411
(0.189) (2.105)
year entry EU: 1981 0.417
(0.257)
year entry EU: 1986 0.467
(0.311)
year entry EU: 1995 -0.978∗∗∗
(0.219)
year entry EU: 2004 2.163∗∗∗ -5.895
(0.322) (4.053)
year entry EU: 2007 3.448∗∗∗ 65.11∗∗∗
(0.443) (16.480)






Standard errors in parentheses
Fixed effect at half-year level
Based on Analysys Mason, Eurostat, ITU, OECD, World Bank data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.8.3 Effects on other technologies
This appendix aims at investigating whether the refusal to supply access to the na-
tionwide copper network has spurred investment in alternative network infrastructures,
in addition to fiber infrastructure.
The available data allows to observe the penetration, across countries and over time,
of the following technologies: (i) DSL, (ii) fiber, (iii) cable and (iv) fixed-wireless access
networks (FWA).
Cable technologies are mainly owned by cable television operators, who provide inter-
net services by relying on the high bandwidth of their network. Conventional coaxial cable
networks used for the transmission of TV signals may be upgraded to allow the provision
of broadband and ultra-broadband services. In Slovakia, UPC Broadband Slovakia, who
provides fixed broadband services over its cable network, is the second largest operator in
the retail market for broadband services. It may be argued that cable operators, relying
on their own network, may be less affected by the consequences of the abuse of dominance
of the incumbent operator. Still, the remaining alternative operators, who were used to
rely on the incumbent’s copper network, could have had the incentive to establish a new
cable network.
The available data suggests, however, that the number of cable lines offered over the
period of analysis by operators differently than the pre-existing cable operators are quite
limited, especially if compared to the remaining alternative technologies (fiber and FWA).
I would hence focus on FWA.
Fixed wireless technologies allow to offer broadband services to final customers via
radio frequencies, without having to lay cable to connect to customer’s premises. The
evidence collected by the European Commission at the time of the ST’s investigation,55
shows that fixed wireless technologies are a valid substitute of fixed wire line access tech-
nologies (which includes DSL, cable and fiber). Indeed, even though wireless technologies
cannot be used to provide high-end broadband services (e.g. IPTV or Video-on-Demand),
they can provide a good substitute for basic fixed-line broadband offers, due to their low
prices.
Fixed wireless technologies have played a significant role in Slovakia since the early
days of broadband, and according to the evidence collected by the Commission56, providers
of FWA broadband were mostly small and alternative operators active at regional level,
in areas with no access to DSL technology.
The following analysis assesses whether, the abuse and, in turn, the absence of whole-
sale access to the incumbent’s copper network, had provided alternative operators with
55EC Decision, Case AT. 39523, § 92-94
56EC Decision, Case AT. 39523, § 94
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incentives to invest in FWA technologies. FWA and fiber technologies are substitutes
only to a limited extent: FWA does not belong to the family of the NGA technologies
and only allows to offer basic broadband services. Alternative operators may still have
opted to invest in FWA, besides fiber, to expand into geographic areas where deploying
fibre infrastructure was too expensive.
In line with the main analysis on the effects of the abuse on fiber investment, I adopt
a DiD approach and compare the variation in FWA penetration in Slovakia, with the
variation in FWA penetration in three different control group of countries and namely the
CEE countries, all the European countries, and countries where AOs have first invested
in fiber technologies.57
Unfortunately, the available data only allows to observe the penetration of FWA ser-
vices in the total market, and there are no FWA penetration data at operator level (as
in the fiber case). Nonetheless, the qualitative evidence presented in the Commission
decision shows that most of the FWA operator in Slovakia are small and regional opera-
tors. We hence assume that FWA penetration in Slovakia is mainly driven by alternative
operators.
Table 3.11 shows the variation in the average FWA penetration, before and during the
abuse, in Slovakia and in the three proposed control groups. FWA penetration grows over
time in all countries. The highest average FWA penetration before the abuse (i.e. before
2005q4) is observed in the CEE control countries. Slovakia, however, witnesses a relevant
growth over time, and almost reaches FWA penetration in the CEE control countries in
the abuse period.
Table 3.11: Outcome variable:total penetration of FWA services
pre-abuse abuse
group mean stdev min max mean stdev min max
Treated (SK) .06 .01 .03 .09 1.59 1.00 .09 3.37
Control (CEE) .25 .47 0 1.84 1.29 1.86 0 7.65
Control (AO) .09 .10 0 .44 .66 .81 0 3.08
Control (ALL) .12 .31 0 1.84 .66 1.32 0 7.65
Table 3.12 shows, instead, the results of the common trend test (based on Equation
3.3), for each of the proposed control groups.
57Even in this case, I have excluded the European countries where a similar anticompetitive infringe-
ment has occurred.
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Table 3.12: Common trend test
(1) (2) (3)
CEE countries All countries AOs countries
treated -0.911 -0.940 0.486
(9.306) (6.891) (0.859)
trend -0.0178 -0.0208 0.00516
(0.023) (0.011) (0.003)
treatedxtrend 0.00230 0.00386 -0.00169
(0.052) (0.039) (0.005)
pop. dispersion 0.000221 0.00172 -0.00570∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
pop. density 0.00661∗∗ 0.000116 -0.00322∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP per capita 0.0000189 0.0000285∗∗∗ -0.00000446
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
mobile penetration 0.00928∗ 0.00824∗∗∗ 0.00328∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
year entry EU:1973 0 -0.265∗ 0.0404
(.) (0.112) (0.074)
year entry EU:1981 0 0.467∗∗ 0
(.) (0.139) (.)
year entry EU:1986 0 0.451∗∗ 0
(.) (0.165) (.)
year entry EU:1995 0 -0.112 -0.391∗∗∗
(.) (0.100) (0.087)
year entry EU:2004 0.237 1.126∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.196) (0.068)
year entry EU:2007 0.202 1.210∗∗∗ 0.00567
(0.304) (0.249) (0.098)




Constant 1.820 1.853 -0.423
(3.980) (1.750) (0.456)
Observations 72 176 72
R2 .5891582 .4394474 .9252959
Standard errors in parentheses
Fixed effect at half-year level
Based on Analysys Mason, Eurostat, ITU, OECD, World Bank data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The parallel trend assumption in the pre-abuse period is always satisfied, regardless
of the subset of European countries taken into consideration. Indeed, the coefficient of
the variable of interest, i.e. the coefficient of the variable treatedxtrend is not statistically
significant, for each of the three model presented.
Table 3.13 shows the estimated effects of ST abuse on the investment in FWA tech-
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nologies, made by all operators in the market. Once again, results are assessed for each
of three proposed control group.
When compared to the evolution of FWA penetration in the CEE countries (Model
(1)), the evolution of the overall FWA penetration in Slovakia does not seem to be affected
by the abuse. However, Model (2) and Model (3), which compare the evolution of the
Slovak FWA penetration to alternative subsets of European countries, shows significant
and positive effects. The refusal to supply access to the DSL network seems to have posi-
tively affected the growth of FWA penetration when compared to all European countries
(Model (2)) or to the countries where AOs made early investment in fiber (Model (3)).
When assessing the common trend assumption for each single country, it comes up
that the few countries where the parallel trend assumption cannot be rejected are mostly
those included in the control group made of ”AOs countries”. This may indicate that
the results obtained through this control group (Model (3)) are the most reliable. The
estimates in Model (3) indicate that, because of the anticompetitive conduct of ST, FWA
penetration has increased by 0.88 percentage points. The estimated effect is lower than the
effect estimated on fiber penetration (equal to 1.385 percentage points when considering
the ”AOs countries” control group).
In conclusion, the above analysis suggests that the refusal to supply access to the
incumbent’s copper network may have spurred investment in FWA technologies, in addi-
tion to fiber technologies. The substitutability between the two technologies is limited -
fiber technologies are superior - and alternative operators may have decided to invest in
FWA to extend their geographic coverage in areas where is more expensive deploying fibre
infrastructure. In any case, the estimated impact seems to be smaller than the impact
observed on fiber investment.
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Table 3.13: Effects on FWA total penetration
(1) (2) (3)
CEE countries ALL countries AOs countries
treated -0.949∗∗ -1.016∗∗ 0.138
(0.291) (0.318) (0.199)
DID 0.228 1.107∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.358) (0.198)
pop. dispersion -0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.00241
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
pop. density -0.00718∗∗∗ 0.000398 0.000952
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
GDP per capita 0.000660∗∗∗ 0.0000735∗∗∗ -0.0000524∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
mobile penetration 0.00361 0.00587∗ -0.00913∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
year entry EU:1973 0 -0.297 2.221∗∗∗
(.) (0.171) (0.506)
year entry EU:1981 0 1.295∗∗∗ 0
(.) (0.232) (.)
year entry EU:1986 0 1.791∗∗∗ 0
(.) (0.263) (.)
year entry EU:1995 0 -0.368∗ 0.622
(.) (0.178) (0.474)
year entry EU:2004 0.603∗∗∗ 3.509∗∗∗ 0.0836
(0.178) (0.282) (0.474)
year entry EU:2007 3.937∗∗∗ 2.822∗∗∗ -0.751
(0.273) (0.369) (0.626)




Constant -4.060∗∗∗ -3.865∗∗∗ 0.615
(0.427) (0.441) (0.664)
Observations 261 638 261
R2 .8082885 .503169 .7294673
Standard errors in parentheses
Fixed effect at half-year level
Based on Analysys Mason, Eurostat, ITU, OECD, World Bank data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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